NUMERICAL LIMITS ON IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

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CONTENTS

OPENING STATEMENT

Page

Simpson, Hon. Alan K., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming, chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Nelson, Alan C., Deputy Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service 2
Asencio, Hon. Diego C., Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Department of State 8
Houstoun, Marion, immigration staff specialist, Department of Labor; accompanied by Dr. James A. Orr, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor 13
Herriot, Roger A., Chief, Population Division, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce 24
Garcia, Hon. Robert, a Representative in Congress from the 21st Congressional District of the State of New York 49
Bilderback, Loy, Zero Population Growth 72
Espenshade, Thomas J., the Urban Institute 87
Keely, Charles, Center for Policy Studies, the Population Council 94
Castillo, Leonel, Immigrant Aid Society, Inc., Houston, Tex 109
Hardin, Garrett, chairman, the Environment Fund, Washington, D.C 114
Zolberg, Dr. Aristide R., Department of Political Science, University of Chicago 124
Comstock, Phil, Citizens' Committee for Immigration Reform 142
Green, Ambassador Marshall, Population Crisis Committee 152

ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND MATERIALS SUBMITTED

Asencio, Hon. Diego C.:
  Testimony 8
  Prepared statement 10
Bilderback, Loy:
  Testimony 72
  Prepared statement 74
  Letter to Senator Simpson, February 1, 1982 84
Castillo, Leonel J.:
  Testimony 109
  Prepared statement 112
Comstock, Phil:
  Testimony 142
  Prepared statement 145
Espenshade, Thomas J.:
  Testimony 87
  Prepared statement 89
Garcia, Hon. Robert:
  Testimony 49
  Responses to written questions 53
Green, Ambassador Marshall:
  Testimony 152
  Prepared statement 154

Page
Hardin, Dr. Garrett:
  Testimony 114
  Prepared statement 116
Herriot, Roger A.:
  Testimony 24
  Prepared statement 27
  Responses to written questions 64
Houstoun, Marion:
  Testimony 13
  Responses to written questions 58
Keely, Charles B.:
  Testimony 94
  Prepared statement 96
Lovell, Hon. Malcolm, Jr.: Prepared statement 16
Nelson, Alan C.:
  Testimony 2
  Prepared statement 4
Zolberg, Dr. Aristide R.:
  Testimony 124
  Prepared statement 127

APPENDIX

Additional Articles and Statements

DeConcini, Hon. Dennis, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona 167
Eisen, Phyllis, director of public policy, Zero Population Growth, Inc 168
Hohl, Donald G., associate director, Migration and Refugee Services, U.S. Catholic Conference 171
Kasun, Jacqueline R., professor of economics, Humboldt State University, Arcata, Calif 177
Park, Erich, executive secretary, Estonian Aid, Inc., New York, N.Y 179
Report by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "English Language Usage by the Hispanic Population in the United States" 182
Simon, Julian L., "The Effects of Immigrants on the Public Coffers and Standard of Living" 225

NUMERICAL LIMITS ON IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to notice at 10:25 o'clock a.m., in room 5110, Dirken Senate Office Building, Hon. Alan K. Simpson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN K. SIMPSON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Senator **SIMPSON**. We come to order in the committee. I want to apologize sincerely. I have been on the road now for 1½ hours. That is worse than driving between Cheyenne and Casper ghastly. Anyway, it is quite an experience. I do not want to do that every day.

Today's hearing is on the numerical limitations on immigration. We will focus on the issue of whether to have numerical limits on immigration in the United States. The purpose of the hearing is to examine the various criteria for determining any numerical limits.

So our purpose today is not to select any kind of specific number, but rather to try to obtain the varied views and analyses of the factors which should be considered if we establish a ceiling on immigration, and the mechanisms which should be used in adjusting any ceiling as the conditions change within our country. And of course, many factors are involved. These include social and cultural factors; demographic and regional considerations; the labor force, and economic criteria.

So this hearing is one of the last in a long series. I see some of you sighing and rolling your eyeballs to the heavens. I feel the same thing myself at times, but I think when we have completed our work—and very shortly that will be the case—that we will at least have listened to a broad spectrum of both sides on every single issue. And that is what I have wanted to do.

So this hearing is one of the last in a series before the subcommittee completes its final draft of a comprehensive immigration and refugee policy reform bill. And indeed, we have spent dozens of hours in the hearing room and have heard the testimony of over 200 witnesses. A substantial portion of that, of course, had to do with measures to control illegal immigration. I guess I certainly feel that any limit we might determine to establish for legal immigration will be absolutely meaningless if we were to do that without insuring that limit could be enforced effectively, humanely, and without discrimination.

So I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I am very pleased to have Alan Nelson with us again, Deputy Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Ambassador Diego Asencio, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs of the Department of State, and Marion Houstoun, Immigration Staff Specialist with Mr. Orr, I believe also present, the Bureau of International Labor Affairs at the Department of Labor, and Roger Herriot, Chief of the Population Division of the Bureau of the Census of the Department of Commerce.

Those are the members of the first panel.

So I appreciate your participation. You have been advised of the time limitations. Again, my apologies for the delay.

If you want to proceed in the order on the agenda, that would be appropriate.

Alan.

STATEMENT OF ALAN C. NELSON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Chairman, welcome back. I am sorry that you had a start like this coming in, but we do appreciate the number of times that we have had to come up here to testify, because it indicates certainly the work you and your committee and your staff have been doing to move the immigration bill, and I think we all see that need, and we do appreciate those efforts, and we look forward to the successful conclusion of those efforts.

As you indicate, Mr. Chairman, the panel and I are here to talk about the overall numbers of immigrants and refugees and the preference system. Our testimony has been submitted, and we will submit that for the record, and I will just briefly mention several of the aspects of that.

I think the background is known. I will not repeat that part of the testimony.

As we know, in addition to immigrants entering under the preference system, aproximately 140,000 other immigrants enter outside its numerical limitations, most of those being immediate relatives of United States citizens, and under the Refugee Act of 1980, the definition of refugee was adopted consistent with United Nations Convention and Protocol, and that definition has no geographic or ideological limitations.

The President determines the number of refugee admissions and their allocation among countries after the appropriate consultations with the Congress. So under this act, the prior seventh preference relating to persons fearing persecution in Communist or some Middle Eastern countries was eliminated.

Now, in fiscal year 1980, 231,700 refugee admissions were authorized, and 214,000 approximately were actually approved, while in fiscal 1981, 217,000 authorized, and only 158,500 were approved. Regarding 1982, the administration recommended 173,000 refugees. After consultations with Congress, the number was set at 140,000.

As a policy matter before the committee, the administration does oppose any type of overall cap on refugee and immigrant numbers for several reasons. Basically, we believe based on past experience it is impractical, it is not in the interests of the American people, and that it does create some potential limits in foreign policy matters, particularly dealing with crises. So we would oppose an overall cap.

And in a sense, under the statutory preference system for numerically limited immigration and the refugee consultation process, there is a form of a cap in any event. And of course, in emergencies this can be raised, so that we feel there is a solid enough system in place.

We also do not believe that it is practical to put an overall cap where additional refugees would come at the expense of other numerically restricted immigration numbers. We recognize, you now have some interest in that regard, but do not feel that that would be appropriate or practical.

Likewise, the administration does not favor placing a curb on the prompt immigration and reunification of immediate family members of U.S. citizens. We do believe that that area will stabilize in terms of numbers, and we would like to have that be maintained.

So in summary on that point, we think the existing laws regarding overall numbers are basically sensible, workable, and basically should not be changed. The one modification that has been part of the administration's bill, which, we would strongly urge before this committee and the Congress, is the limitation on numbers for our immediate neighbors of Mexico and Canada. There are very long waiting lists for visa numbers for individuals born in Mexico, and there are some particular hardships there. The President, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and others have indicated that some special relationships with our immediate neighbors are in order. Therefore, the administration bill does propose the separate annual numerical limitations of 40,000 each for Canada and Mexico, and that they would compete for visas only among themselves, and that of visa applicants in one country would allow the unused visa numbers to be available for visa applicants of the other country in the following year. And we think that is an important need and also a realistic alternative to illegal immigration.

We also do not believe that this 40,000 extra, 20,000 per country would add significantly to the number of immigrants and refugees expected to enter the United States during fiscal year 1982.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared testimony. We will certainly be happy to answer any questions.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Nelson.

[The prepared statement of Alan C. Nelson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN C. NELSON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you again to testify on behalf of the Administration's proposals for immigration reform. I am here to discuss overall numbers of immigrants and refugees and the preference system.

As you know, the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act enacted on October 3, 1965 instituted the current system for admitting immigrants. Immigration from the Western Hemisphere, on which no restrictions had previously been placed, was limited to 120,000 per year.

With respect to immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere, an annual limit of 20,000 visas per country was established. In addition, each colony or dependency of an independent country of the Eastern Hemisphere was limited to 200 visas per yer. The 1965 amendments also provided for seven preferences and a non-preference classification to select qualified immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere. A percentage of the 170,000 visas available to immigrants from that hemisphere each year was allotted to each preference. Immediate relatives of United States citizens and certain special immigrants, however, were exempt from any numerical limitations.

The 1976 amendments to the Act, effective January 1, 1977, extended the preference system and the annual per country ceiling of 20,000 per year to the Western Hemisphere. They also increased the ceiling on colonies and dependencies to 600 per year.

In addition to immigrants entering under the preference system, approximately 140,000 other immigrants enter outside its numerical limitation. These are the immediate relatives of United States citizens plus a small number of special immigrants. The latter include ministers of religion, employees and retired employees of the United States Government abroad, returning residents, and certain individuals who have lost U.S. citizenship.

The Refugee Act of 1980, enacted March 17, 1980, adopted the definition of "refugee" agreed to by the United States as a party to the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. That definition has no geographic or ideological limitations. The Refugee Act also provided that each year the President determines the number of refugee admissions and their allocation among countries, after appropriate consultations with members of Congress. As a result of this Act, the prior seventh preference, which related to conditional entrants from the Middle East or Communist or Communist-dominated countries, was eliminated.

In Fiscal Year 1980, a maximum of 231,700 refugee admissions were authorized, and 213,950 refugees were actually approved for admission to the United States. In Fiscal Year 1981, 217,000 refugee admissions were authorized, while only 158,531 refugees were actually approved for admission. In the annual consultations with Congress conducted in September, the Administration indicated its intention to set a maximum level of 173,000 refugee admissions for Fiscal Year 1982. In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 22, 1981, the Attorney General stated that "the Administration has given serious consideration to the domestic impact of the recommended level of refugee admissions." He referred to the domestic difficulties which have arisen in the resettlement process and the budgetary implications at the Federal, State, and local levels. Following the consultations between the Administration and Congress, 140,000 refugee admissions was established as the level for Fiscal Year 1982.

The Administration opposes any type of overall cap on immigrant and refugee admissions as impractical, not in the interest of the American people, and restricting Presidential authority to respond to certain foreign policy crises.

1) In the first place, we have a Congressionally established ceiling on numerically limited immigrants. Secondly, we have a cap

on refugee numbers that results from the annual consultation between representatives of the President and the Judiciary Committees of Congress. In emergencies, this cap can be raised after a renewal of the consultation process in which the President's representatives explain the reasons for the intended increase, and Congress can query and challenge the basis for the intended action.

2) If there were an overall cap such as has been proposed by Senator Huddleston, any additional numbers for refugees would have to come at the expense of the numerically restricted immigration, either in that year or the next. After World War II, we admitted refugees under those conditions and saw the negative effects of borrowing ahead on the immigration quotas of future years for certain countries. We do not believe that the American people nor Congress would want to return to that. Should such an overall numerical cap be enacted, the pressure on the President and Congress, not to interrupt the anticipated flow of immigrants by excptional refugee circumstances, would be an unwarranted constraint on our foreign policy actions.

3) We would not favor placing a curb on the prompt immigration and reunification of immediate family members of U.S. citizens. This area of numerically exempt immigration is evidencing some growth, but this is caused primarily by the earlier entry of immigrants and refugees who have become citizens. The increase in immigrants since the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act and the higher level of refugee admissions since 1975 are the basis for anticipating some continuing growth in this area. To the extent that refugee admissions decrease, however, the growth of numerically exempt immigration should diminish, and admissions in this area should stabilize.

The Administration believes that the actions of Congress regarding immigrants, and the President and Congress regarding refugees, serve to reflect the national interest as to the levels of immigrant and refugee admissions. A procedure is available to lower the refugee admissions without the imposition of a cap, which seems certain to be arbitrary and disruptive in its results on family reunification and the foreign policy aspects of refugee admissions. Furthermore, the ceiling on numerically restricted immigration can be changed through legislation.

The Administration finds that the existing laws relating to the overall number of immigrants who can be admitted each year and the system under which immigrants and refugees are admitted are sensible and workable and basically should not be changed. One modification is recommended which would affect the number of immigrants.

The Administration has recognized that the present annual country ceiling on immigration from our two closest neighbors is unrealistic and should be increased. The extension of the 20,000 per country annual ceiling to the Western Hemisphere caused particular hardship to Mexico. The combination of the imposition of the per country ceiling and the preference ceilings on immigration from the Western Hemisphere has caused very long waiting lists for visa numbers for individuals born in Mexico. The second preference waiting list for Mexico is extremely long, but there are also long fourth, fifth, and sixth preference waiting lists.

The proposed legislation would create separate annual numerical limitations of 40,000 each for Canada and Mexico and would increase all numerically limited visas from 270,000 to 310,000 per year. Qualified immigrants from each of the two countries would compete for visas only among themselves. If, in any fiscal year, immigration from either country were to fall below 40,000, in the next fiscal year the limitation for the other country could be increased by an amount equal to the shortfall. If immigration from both countries were to fall below 40,000 in any fiscal year, both countries would be entitled to an increase in the following fiscal year. I do not, however, expect this to happen.

The proposed legislation recognizes our special relationship and common borders with our closest neighbors. It also would provide a realistic alternative to illegal immigration.

I will leave to the State Department a discussion of the expected outcome of the proposed changes, except to state that they would allow the entry of both Mexican and Canadian nationals who, under the present preference system arrangement and country ceilings, either cannot enter or must face long waiting periods for visa numbers. Finally, the maximum net addition -- 40,000 -- would not add significantly to the 550,000 immigrants and refugees expected to enter the United States during FY 1982.

This completes my prepared testimony. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator SIMPSON. We will go forward with Ambassador Asencio.

STATEMENT OF HON. DIEGO C. ASENCIO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador ASENCIO. Mr. Chairman, if you will also permit me to submit my remarks for the record and give you a very quick summary.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection.

Ambassador ASENCIO. As Mr. Nelson indicated, we have proposed a single change in the existing system of numerical limitations, and we do not propose any changes in the preference system. We believe that this proposal, which should be considered in conjunction with the rest of the President's program, will supplement the tools with which this Nation can begin to address the multiple problems posed by illegal immigration.

As Mr. Nelson mentioned, we propose to establish separate limitations of 40,000 each on immigration from our two continental neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and there would be provision for the unused portion of either of the two 40,000 limitations to be used by natives of the other country. The increased limitations for Canada, and particularly for Mexico, would reflect our close relationships with both while providing an additional opportunity to reduce or deter illegal immigration by opening a supplementary channel for legal entry into the United States.

Other than this one change, we are opposed to further changes in the overall systems of limitations. Total legal immigration has three components: immediate relatives and special immigrants, preference and nonpreference immigrants, and refugees. Two of these are already subject to numerical limitations. Preference and nonpreference immigrants are subject to a fixed annual limitations, now 270,000. Refugees are subject to the limitation established annually by the President after consultation with the Congress, and the immediate relatives and special immigrants are not subject to a numerical limitation.

With respect to refugees, the Department believes that the existing provisions of law are appropriate and should be retained. The system provides for adequate control over the number of refugees who are actually admitted each year without imposing a rigid ceiling which could inhibit the President's ability to respond to changing foreign and domestic circumstances.

In sum, we believe that the establishment of an absolute ceiling would produce an excessive rigidity in our immigration system. Such a rigidity might be necessary if the figure for the absolute limit were arrived at through scientific analysis. This has not been done, to my knowledge, and I am not certain that it can be done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Asencio follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DIEGO C. ASENCIO

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear today to discuss -- within the context of the President's proposals for comprehensive reform of entry of foreigners into the United States -- the numerical limitations on immigration.

As you know, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy made recommendations concerning this subject. The President's Inter-Agency Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy carefully considered the Select Commission's recommendations and concluded that it should not espouse them. Instead, as part of the President's program, the Administration has proposed a single change in the existing system of numerical limitations and does not propose any changes in the immigrant selection (preference) system. We believe that this proposal, which should be considered in conjunction with the rest of the President's program, will supplement the tools with which this nation can begin to address the multiple problems posed by illegal immigration.

The Administration proposes to establish separate limitations of 40,000 each on immigration from our two continental neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Under this proposal natives of each country would compete only among themselves for immigration. Each country's 40,000 limitation would be separate not only from that of the other country but also from the rest of the world. The existing preference system would apply to each of these limitations so that the same immigrant selection system would apply to each country and each of the limitations would be apportioned among the preference classes in the same manner as at present. I should emphasize that this proposed change would not result in any reduction in immigration from other areas of the world, since the numerical limitation for all other countries would be established at 230,000.

An added feature of our proposal is that there would be provision for the unused portion (if any) of either of the two 40,000 limitations to be used by natives of the other country. Thus, in the first year of operation, the limit for each country would be 40,000. If, for example, during that first year, immigration from Mexico used the full 40,000 limitation and immigration from Canada used just 25,000 numbers, in the second year the limitation for Canada would remain at 40,000 but the limitation for Mexico would be increased by Canada's unused 15,000 numbers to 55,000. This calculation would be made every year and increases, if any, could be made to either limitation, depending upon actual usage. Theoretically, there could be increases in both limitations in a given year if there had been a shortfall under both limitations during the preceding year. This latter situation, although legally possible, would appear to be unlikely.

The President's proposal takes into account the very special and unique ties - social, economic and cultural - which exist between the United States and its two contiguous neighbors. The proposal represents an additional element in this Administration's concerted and integrated plan to regain control over our borders. The increased limitations for Canada and, particularly, for Mexico would reflect our close relationships with both while providing an additional opportunity to reduce or deter illegal immigration by opening a supplementary channel for legal immigration to the United States.

Other than this one change, the Administration is opposed to further changes in the overall system of limitations. Total legal immigration has three components -- (1) immediate relatives and special immigrants; (2) preference and nonpreference immigrants; and (3) refugees. Two of these are already subject to numerical limitations. Preference and nonpreference immigrants are subject to a fixed annual limitation -- now 270,000 (which would rise to

310,000 under the Administration's proposal for establishing separate limitations for Canada and Mexico). Refugees are subject to the limitation established annually by the President after consultation with the Congress. Only immediate relatives and special immigrants are not subject to a numerical limitation.

We believe that this system is sound and should not be disturbed. First, we can see no need or basis for imposing an annual limitation on immediate relatives and special immigrants. The special immigrant classes -- returning residents, ministers of religion, former U.S. Government employees, certain expatriated women and certain former employees in the Panama Canal are statistically insignificant and there is no likelihood of there being any meaningful increase in the totals. The only significance of their being numerically exempt is that the relatively few applicants who qualify in these classes can immigrate without undue delay.

As to the "immediate relatives" -- the spouses and children of citizens and parents of adult citizens -- there appears to be a consensus that these classes should be granted the highest degree of benefit under the immigration laws. This has traditionally included exemption from numerical limitations for spouses and children and, since 1965, for parents. Action now to impose a numerical limitation on these classes of immigrants would certainly be seen as a step away from the principle of immediate family reunification. Also, the very imposition of a numerical limitation raises the possibility of a backlog of applicants, unless the limitation is set at a figure so large that it becomes meaningless.

With respect to refugees, the Department believes that the existing provisions of law are appropriate and should be retained. While there is not a fixed, permanent numerical limitation on refugee admissions, there is an annual limitation set by the President in consultation with the Congress. The annual consultations provide a means for establishing the authorized level of refugee admissions each year based on a careful analysis of domestic and foreign policy requirements. The system provides adequate control over the number of refugees who are actually admitted each year without imposing a rigid ceiling which could inhibit the President's ability to respond to changing foreign and domestic circumstances.

In summary, we believe that the establishment of an absolute ceiling would produce an excessive rigidity in our immigration system. Such a rigidity might be necessary if the figure for the absolute limit were arrived at through a scientific analysis. This has not been done, to my knowledge, and I am not certain that it can be done.

I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

Senator SIMPSON. Next, Ms. Houstoun, please.

STATEMENT OF MS. MARION HOUSTOUN, IMMIGRATION STAFF SPECIALIST, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DR. JAMES A. ORR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Ms. HOUSTOUN. Thank you very much.

I am accompanied by Dr. James Orr. As you know, neither Under Secretary Lovell nor Deputy Under Secretary Seraby are able to attend this hearing today. Both are at the OAS Labor Ministers' Conference in Santo Domingo. I would like, however, to submit Mr. Lovell's statement for the record, and to summarize it.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection.

Ms. HOUSTOUN. The Department of Labor supports the current tripartite system for controlling the number of aliens admitted as permanent residents. We believe it is both a sound and a practical one because it insures de jure limits to most immigration, while continuing our historic exemption of immediate relations of U.S. citizens and providing a statutorily defined but justifiable mechanism for determining refugee numbers.

The Department believes there are no labor-market reasons for replacing these mechanisms with the numerical precision of either an overall de jure cap or a system that would vary admissions according to labor-market conditions. If those mechanisms and the current preference system are retained, annual immigration levels during the 1980's are unlikely to drop much below the level of 470,000 or to exceed 650,000.

As in the preceding decade, most variations in overall annual numbers would be generated by changes in refugee flows, which would be annually set by the President after consultation with the Congress. Since roughly half of all new arrivals enter the U.S. labor market, this could mean a range of 235,000 to 325,000 new workers each year. The impact of this possible range in labor force growth is, however, of little consequence to a labor force projected to grow by 2 million annually until 1985, and by 1.5 million between 1985 and 1990. Without emergency flows of refugees, immigration would account for roughly 10 percent of the annual increase in the labor force. With the 200,000 refugee flow, it would account for roughly 15 percent of annual labor force growth.

The administrative and human costs that an overall de jure cap would generate argue strongly against precise numerical control of immigration. Under such a system, emergency flows of refugees would have to be admitted at the expense of immigrant relatives or immigrant workers. Varying immigration levels according to U.S. labor-market conditions would likewise cause administrative burdens and personal hardships, because the admission of immigrants would likewise become subject to unforeseeable delay.

In addition, the economic indicator generally proposed as the mechanism for setting limits, the unemployment rate, is ill-suited to that purpose. Low aggregate unemployment rates frequently mask high unemployment rates for various groups of workers, for example, teenagers and auto workers, while high aggregate unemployment rates may mask occupation-specific or area-specific labor shortages.

Further, unemployment rates are not only too crude an instrument, they are also too unreliable. Past rates are not good predicters of future rates, and projected rates are often inaccurate.

The Department therefore strongly favors retaining the current system of setting numerical limits of immigration. We also find no compelling labor-market reasons for changing the predominantly humanitarian goals of current policy. Given the limited size and current characteristics of recent immigration, we believe that the allocation of more immigrant workers visas at the expense of fewer visas for relatives would be an unwarranted interference with family reunification.

While the skill level of third and sixth preference workers is significantly higher than the skill level of immigrant relatives—and of U.S. workers—substantial numbers of relatives enter the U.S. labor market, and many are highly skilled. For example, in fiscal 1979, some 4,400 were teachers, 3,900 were engineers, 3,300 were in professional positions, and 3,000 were nurses.

Increasing the number of worker visas by decreasing the number of visas for relatives would only marginally upgrade the skill level of immigrants. A comparison of the occupations of third and sixth preference workers with the occupations submitted by relatives suggests that the cost of getting one highly skilled worker would be five visas for relatives. Thus, for example, doubling the number of visas allocated to workers by foregoing 50,000 visas for relatives is likely to yield only an additional 10,000 highly skilled workers.

We would be happy to answer any technical questions you have, sir.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Malcolm Lovell, Jr. follows:]

STATEMENT OF MALCOLM LOVELL, JR.
UNDER SECRETARY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE POLICY
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

January 25, 1982

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I welcome the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Administration's immigration policy proposals and to discuss our views on overall numbers and criteria for selecting immigrants.

Current immigration policy provides for the numerically unrestricted admission of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and for the annual admission of 270,000 immigrants under a six-class preference system and per-country ceilings of 20,000. Eighty percent of all immigrants subject to the worldwide and per-country ceilings are admitted on the basis of one of four types of kinship relations to U.S. residents; twenty percent (third and sixth preference) are admitted on the basis of government-screened employer demand for their labor. In addition, since the 1980 Refugee Act, refugee admissions are annually determined by the President, after consultation with the Congress. After a year's residence, refugees admitted into the United States may be granted immigrant status, irrespective of any numerical limitations.

During the 1970s, total immigrant admissions averaged 433,600 per year, ranging from a low of 370,478 in fiscal year 1971 to a high of 601,422 in fiscal year 1978. These variations are in part the result of an upward trend in the admission levels of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, from 79,213 in fiscal year 1970 to 138,178 in fiscal year 1979. The considerable range in annual immigrant admissions levels during the last decade was, however, principally the result of the adjustment to immigrant status of significant numbers of earlier arriving Cuban and Indochinese refugees, admitted under special legislation.

The Administration's review of current policy and the extensive work of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which submitted its final report to the President and the Congress on March 1, 1981, has led us to reaffirm both the soundness and the practicality of current mechanisms for setting numerical limits on immigrant and refugee flows to this country.

The current tripartite system for controlling the number of aliens admitted for permanent residence is sound and practical because it (1) ensures annual _de jure_ limits to most immigration, yet also (2) continues our historic exemption of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens from numerical limits, and (3) provides us with a statutorily defined but flexible mechanism for determining annual refugee admissions according to the particular circumstances that exist both at home and abroad.

We believe there are no labor-market reasons for replacing these mechanisms with either an annual _de jure_ cap on all immigrant and refugee admissions or a more flexible system, which would vary annual admission levels according to labor-market conditions. In our view, the numerical precision sought by both of these otherwise quite different proposed alternatives is both unnecessary and administratively impractical.

If current law is continued, annual immigrant admission levels in the 1980s are unlikely to drop much below a total of 470,000 (150,000 immediate relatives; 270,000 immigrant relatives and workers; a normal flow of 50,000 refugees). The experience of the 1970s also suggests that annual admission levels would be unlikely to exceed 650,000 (180,000 immediate relatives; 270,000 immigrant relatives and workers; emergency flows of 200,000 refugees). Again, as in the preceding decade, most of the variation in admission levels would be generated by variations in refugee admission levels which would be annually determined by the President after consultation with the Congress. Though exempt from numerical limits, immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are a self-limiting population, whose recent upward trend is principally a function of earlier increases in immigrant and refugee flows and U.S. military and civilian presence overseas.

Since roughly half of all new arrivals enter the U.S. labor market, the continuation of current policy during the 1980s would mean that a range of some 235,000 to 325,000 new arrivals would enter the labor market annually (excluding the eventual entry of immigrant children, who account for some 25 percent of all admissions). The labor-market impact of this possible variation in admission levels is, however, clearly of little consequence in a labor force of 105 million in 1980, particularly one that is projected to grow by 2 million annually until 1985 and thereafter by 1.5 million annually through 1990. (These Bureau of Labor Statistics projections assume intermediate growth in the labor force and 400,000 net immigration.) In brief, then, during the 1980s, legal immigration, without emergency flows of refugees, can be expected to account for roughly 10 percent of the annual growth in the U.S. labor force. With additional large-scale (200,000) annual flows of refugees, legal immigration would account for some 15 percent of the annual growth in the labor force.

The administrative and human costs that an overall de jure cap would generate argue strongly against the soundness of precise numerical control over immigration. Under this system, emergency flows of refugees would have to be admitted at the expense of immigrant relatives or workers. The admission of these aliens would therefore become subject to the unpredictable vicissitudes of political instability abroad and U.S. foreign policy needs. Further, in addition to the obvious administrative difficulties and human costs that this alternative would entail, are the costs to U.S. employers and prospective third and sixth preference immigrant workers, if their admission to fill U.S. jobs in short supply were to become dependent on the admission levels of emergency flows of refugees.

Varying annual immigrant admission levels according to varying labor-market conditions would cause similar administrative burdens and personal hardship: the admission of both immigrant relatives and workers would similarly become subject to potential delays. In addition, it is especially important to understand that the economic indicator that has generally been proposed as the mechanism for determining immigrant admission levels -- the unemployment rate -- is ill-suited to this purpose. Low aggregate unemployment rates frequently mask high unemployment rates for various subpopulations (e.g., teenagers, autoworkers), while high aggregate unemployment rates may mask occupation-specific or area-specific labor shortages. Further, unemployment rates are not only too crude an instrument by which to set immigrant admission levels, they are also too unreliable: past rates are not good predictors of future rates, and unemployment projections are often inaccurate.

The Department therefore strongly favors retaining the current system of setting numerical limits on the admission of immigrants and refugees. Further, as we stated in our November 23 testimony on the preference system, we find no compelling labor-market reasons for changing the predominantly humanitarian goals of current immigration and refugee policy. Given the limited size and current characteristics of recent immigrant flows, we believe that the allocation of more immigrant worker visas at the expense of fewer visas for relatives (or an additional screening of relatives for labor-market impact, as in a point system) would be an unwarrented interference with family reunification. These proposals would also require additional government screening for labor-market impact which would increase the administrative costs of immigration.

Changing the composition of the preference system in favor of more worker visas and fewer visas for relatives of U.S. citizens would only minimally affect the impact of immigration on the U.S. economy. Unlike immigrants at the turn of the century, immigrants today account for only a small fraction of U.S. labor force growth, and they quite closely ressemble the U.S. population and labor force, in terms of age, sex, marital status, labor force participation rates, and occupation. For example, although most recent immigrants are admitted as relatives, their at-entry occupational distribution is remarkably similar to that of the U.S. labor force (see Table 1). Predictably enough, however, the skill level of third and sixth preference immigrant workers is substantially higher than the skill level of both the U.S. labor force and all other immigrants (see Table 2). Nevertheless, in considering the merits of allocating fewer visas to relatives and more to workers, it is important to recognize that (1) substantial numbers of immigrants who are not third and sixth preference workers are highly skilled (e.g., in fiscal year 1979, 4,437 were teachers; 3,962, engineers; 3,312, physicians; 3,092, nurses); and (2) allocating 50,000 visas to third and sixth preference (i.e., doubling the current numbers of visas allocated to these preferences) at the expense of 50,000 visas for relatives is likely to only marginally upgrade the skill level of immigrants. In comparing the occupational composition of third and sixth preference immigrants with that of other immigrants, the data suggest that the cost of gaining one additional highly skilled third or sixth preference worker is five immigrant relatives.

In sum, the Department of Labor supports the Administration's decision to seek only two changes in current immigration and refugee policy: (1) separate limitations of 40,000 each on numerically restricted immigration from Mexico and Canada; and (2) streamlining current labor-certification procedures for third and sixth preference immigrant workers.

TABLE 1

At Entry Occupational Distribution of 1975-1979 Arriving Immigrants* and 1979 Occupational Distribution of U.S. Civilian Labor Force (percent)

Occupation Group	1975 - 1979 Arriving Immigrants1/		1979 U.S. Experienced Civilian Labor Force2/	
White-Collar Workers	44.8		49.9	
Professional, Technical and Managerial		31.6		25.6
Clerical and Sales Workers		13.2		24.4
Blue-Collar Workers	36.6		33.7	
Crafts Workers		11.7		13.2
Other Blue-Collar Workers		24.9		20.5
Service Workers	13.7		13.5	
Farmers and Farm Workers	4.8		2.8	
TOTAL	99.9		99.9	

1/ Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and National Interest, Staff Report, April 30, 1981.

2/ U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1981. Excludes persons in labor force who have not been employed.

* Excludes arriving immigrants not in labor force or not reporting occupations.

TABLE 2

Occupational Distribution of 1979 Arriving Immigrants Admitted Under 3rd and 6th Preference,* All Other 1979 Arriving Immigrants,* and the U.S. Civilian Labor Force (percent)

Occupation Group	1979 Immigrants 3rd and 6th Preference[1]		All Other 1979 Immigrants[2]		1979 U.S. Experienced Civilian Labor Force[3]	
White-Collar Workers	70.0		43.0		49.9	
Professional, Technical, and Managerial		66.0		28.0		25.6
Clerical and Sales Workers		4.0		15.0		24.4
Blue-Collar Workers	12.8		37.5		33.7	
Crafts Workers		8.5		11.2		13.2
Other Blue-Collar Workers		4.3		26.3		20.5
Service Workers	16.1		13.2		13.5	
Farmers and Farm Workers	.7		6.0		2.8	
TOTAL	99.6		99.7		99.9	
Number	16,635		168,310		102,110,000	

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[1] Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1979 Annual Report (Draft).
[2] Ibid.
[3] U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1981. Excludes persons in labor force who have not been employed.

* Excludes 275,403 arriving immigrants not in labor force or not reporting occupations.

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Herriot, please.

STATEMENT OF ROGER A. HERRIOT, CHIEF, POPULATION DIVISION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. HERRIOT. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee. I have prepared a more complete statement that I would like to submit for the record and I would like to summarize a brief version of that orally for you.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection.

Mr. HERRIOT. As you know, the Census Bureau, as a general purpose statistical agency, is not involved in the administration of any public program or the formulation or implementation of public policy. Accordingly, my prepared statement does not deal with policy issues pertaining to the numerical limits on immigration being considered by the Subcommittee but focuses on the kinds of data on immigration and the foreign-born population developed by the Census Bureau which may be useful to the committee in its deliberations on this matter.

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Herriot, would you pull the microphone a little bit toward you there?

Mr. HERRIOT. I am sorry.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you.

Mr. HERRIOT. The Bureau is engaged in the collection of data on the foreign-born population in its censuses and surveys, in the estimation of net immigration into the United States in connection with its population estimates program, and in the analysis of net immigration as a component of population change in past and future years. In addition to describing the role of the Census Bureau as a producer of data on U.S. immigration and immigrants, through its censuses surveys, and estimation programs, the statement presents some model calculations on the impact of net immigration on future population growth.

The 1980 census will provide a wide range of data on the characteristics of past immigrants. Persons who reported that they were born in foreign countries were also asked if they were naturalized citizens and when they came to the United States to stay. Unfortunately, the processing of the sample data will not be completed before late this year at the earliest. Tabulations from the 1980 census will show the foreign-born populations for the roughly 30 countries supplying the largest number of foreign-born persons. Recent immigration will be described more fully in tables showing race and ethnic origin, demographic characteristics, household and family characteristics, language usage, and a variety of social, economic and labor force characteristics. In addition, subject reports on the foreign-born population and related subjects are planned. Various computer tape files will be available which this will provide substantially greater detail. A limited amount of other data is available from a recent supplement to the Bureau's Current Population Survey and from other Bureau surveys.

Immigration has historically been such an important component in population growth that the United States is often referred to as a "Nation of immigrations." Immigration averaged more than three quarters of a million persons per year for the first two decades of this century. As a result of restrictive legislation passed in 1924, the Great Depression, and World War II, immigration fell substantially to less than 100,000 per year in the 1930's and 1940's. Since 1950 immigration has increased to a point where the average number of persons admitted to the United States annually as legal immigrants and refugees has averaged more than 400,000 for the past decade.

Any assessment of the contribution of immigration to population growth must take account of emigration of aliens, that is, the movement out of the United States by former immigrants. Data on emigration collected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service through 1957, and estimates by the Bureau of Census since that year show substantial movement out of the United States by former immigrants—with emigration running roughly 30 percent of immigration. Thus, not everyone who comes to this country stays for a long time.

Net immigration, that is, the excess of immigration over emigration, expressed as a portion of the population, has declined considerably during the 20th century. Immigration for 1910 to 1919 amounted to about 4.1 percent of the population, but only about 0.2 percent of the population in the 1930's.

Beginning with the 1950's, the level of net immigration for each decade has remained at a fairly constant level of about 1.3 to 1.4 percent of the population.

Another way of assessing the contribution of immigration to population growth is to compare gross immigration with births, the component which is the major factor in population growth. Between 1960 and 1979, the ratio of births to legal entrants decreased from about 13 to 1 to less than 7 to 1. However, even though the number of births account for greater numbers of people, it is according to variations in growth of immigration.

Any discussion of immigration needs to have something said about illegal immigration. The Census Bureau has conducted research aimed at developing estimates of illegal immigration. However, at the present time there are no reliable estimates for the number of illegal residents who have entered the United States in any recent period. While number of illegal residents in the United States cannot at this time be closely quantified, policy options on numerical limits of immigration should be evaluated in terms that recognize this uncertainty.

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Herriot, could you please accelerate? The time has expired.

Could you just summarize in 30 seconds or so? I would appreciate it.

Mr. HERRIOT. All right.

Senator SIMPSON. Of course, your entire remarks are in the record.

Mr. HERRIOT. I should like to finish with this last paragraph on the projected impact of immigration on population growth. The growth of the U.S. population over the next 20 years, assuming annual immigration of 500,000, would amount to about 45 million, or 19 percent of the 1980 population. The surviving post 1980 immigrants and their survivors amount to about 12.1 persons, or 4.5 percent of the total population projected for the year 2000.

At this level of assumed immigration, the immigrants and their descendants will contribute about 27 percent of future population growth by the year 2000.

I would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee might have.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Roger A. Herriot follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER A. HERRIOT

DATA ON IMMIGRATION AND THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION COMPILED AT THE CENSUS BUREAU

Introduction

The Census Bureau, as a general purpose statistical agency, is not involved in the administration of any public program or the formulation or implementation of public policy. Accordingly, this statement does not deal with the policy issues pertaining to the numerical limits on immigration being considered by the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, but focuses on the kinds of data on immigration and the foreign-born population developed by the Census Bureau which may be useful to the Subcommittee in its deliberations on this matter. The Census Bureau is engaged in the collection of data on the foreign-born population in its censuses and surveys, in the estimation of net immigration to the United States in connection with its population estimates program, and in the analysis of net immigration as a component of population growth in past and future years.

A wide range of information is secured regarding the characteristics of the foreign-born population in our censuses, including year of immigration, country of origin, citizenship, and various socioeconomic characteristics. In addition to using immigration data collected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Census Bureau must fill some data gaps by estimating various immigration components, such as alien emigration, in order to derive population estimates and measure census coverage. This statement will describe the role of the Census Bureau as producer of data on U.S. immigration and immigrants through its censuses, surveys, and estimation programs, and will present some model calculations on the impact of net immigration on future population growth.

Census Bureau Data Sources on Immigration

A wealth of information on immigration is collected or estimated through the various statistical programs of the Census Bureau. The decennial censuses, ongoing sample surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), special surveys like the Survey of Income and Education, as well as compilations from external administrative systems all serve as sources of data on the flow of immigrants and emigrants and/or the characteristics of the stock of foreign-born persons.

The Census Bureau defines immigrants in a different way from the other major provider of data on immigrants, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). To the INS, an immigrant is someone who has been admitted for permanent residence in the United States. Persons in the U.S. who entered with a non-immigrant visa (such as students and temporary visitors) are not considered immigrants by the INS. Nor are refugees counted as immigrants until they adjust their status to that of permanent resident; this generally occurs at least two years after entrance to the country. Census Bureau data relate to persons whose usual place of residence is the United States; these data include all persons entering the United States from abroad except foreign visitors and foreign embassy employees who live on embassy grounds. Foreign students and refugees are generally included in our censuses and surveys as usual residents.

Comparisons between INS data and Bureau data are made more difficult because a census or survey refers to a specific date and registers a status at that time rather than the flow of migrants into the country. Death or emigration between the date of entry into the country and the date of the census or survey may preclude counting a person as an immigrant. A census count of immigrants actually represents the balance of persons who immigrated during some prior period less those among them who emigrated or died during the period rather than all persons who entered the country during the period.

Decennial Census. Each person in the sample portion of the 1980 census was asked, "In what State or foreign country was this person born?" Those persons who reported that they were born in a foreign country were also asked, "Is this person a naturalized citizen?" and "When did this person come to the United States to stay?" Similar questions were asked in 1970 of a sample of persons. Each census from 1890 to 1950 included questions on citizenship (in 1960, citizenship was asked in New York State only). Year of immigration or the alternate form, number of years in the United States, was asked in the censuses of 1890 through 1930.

A question on residence 5 years earlier is also included in the 1980 census sample. The question is asked for all persons 5 years old and over. Since this question is directed at all persons in the sample (regardless of nativity), it also serves as an indication of the volume of movement of native citizens into the U.S. from overseas during a recent period. Residence 5 years ago was also asked in the 1970 census.

A portion of the movement between the United States and Puerto Rico and the other Outlying Areas (U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) will be documented from the censuses taken in Puerto Rico and Outlying Areas. Responses to questions on residence 5 years earlier asked in the censuses of those areas as well as to questions about length of residence and activity in the United States during the 10 years before the census will be useful in the study of return migration to Puerto Rico and the other Outlying Areas. These data can also be used in combination with the question on residence 5 years ago on the U.S. questionnaire to examine the exchange of persons between Puerto Rico, the other Outlying Areas, and the United States.

Tabulations planned from the 1980 census will show the foreign-born population classified by country of birth for the roughly 30 countries supplying the largest numbers of foreign-born persons. Other characteristics by which the foreign-born population will be classified are year of immigration (5-year intervals from 1960 to 1980, the 10-year interval, 1950 to 1959, and the period prior to 1950) and citizenship. Recent immigration will be described more fully in a table showing race, Spanish origin, age, sex, household and family characteristics, marital status, fertility, educational attainment, language usage, ability to speak English, employment and occupational characteristics, and income of persons who immigrated between 1970 and 1980 by country of birth. In addition, subject reports on the foreign-born population and related subjects are planned and various computer tape files will be available which will provide substantially greater detail. The 1980 census also includes a question on ancestry which identifies the ethnic origins of all persons regardless of when their ancestors entered the United States.

Decennial census data are subject to various types of errors including coverage errors, reporting errors, and, in the case of data from the sample, sampling errors. Underenumeration may occur when entire households are missed or when the respondent in an enumerated residence, for whatever reason, fails to include a household member ("within-household" undercoverage). Within-household undercoverage may be more troublesome among the foreign-born population, particularly if the immigration status of a household member is questionable. Various checking procedures and sophisticated public relations programs were used in 1980 in an attempt to minimize both types of undercoverage.

Among reporting errors, the one of most serious concern is misreporting of nativity. The reliability of responses to questions in the 1970 census on place of birth, citizenship, and year of immigration was tested in the 1970 Content Reinterview Study (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974a). No evidence of bias was found in the reporting of nativity or of year of immigration. However, it was found that on the citizenship question, respondents tended to overstate the category "naturalized" and to understate the category "alien". The extent of bias was determined to be small. For the 1980 census a similar reinterview study will be conducted covering the question on place of birth, citizenship, and year of immigration.

Current Population Survey. A supplement to the November 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS) was designed to provide basic data on ethnicity and language, updating detailed data obtained in the 1969 CPS supplement (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1971), and to bridge the gaps between different measures of ethnicity and language in the 1970 and 1980 censuses. The 1980 questions on ancestry and current language replace the 1970 questions on country of birth of parents and mother tongue. In addition, questions on citizenship, year of immigration, and literacy were included in the 1979 CPS supplement.

The November 1979 CPS will be useful in describing the characteristics of immigrants and will provide the only basis for determining the extent of assimilation of second-generation immigrants. Since country of birth of parents has been dropped from the 1980 census in favor of self-designated ancestry, the 1979 CPS will provide the only data on persons of foreign parentage for a recent date.

Other characteristics available from the 1979 CPS are: household relationship age, sex, marital status, veteran status (males only), race, educational attainment, ethnic origin, labor force status, occupation, industry, hours worked, family income, current language, ability to speak English, literacy in any language, literacy in English, and mother tongue. A public-use tape, containing individual records for the 54,000 households in the sample, was released last year.

The measurement of ethnicity is still a very inexact science and previous work has shown that substantial response variability occurs (for example, see U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974b). It will be possible to use the 1979 survey to examine the relationship between objective measures of ethnicity such as country of birth and country of birth of parents and the subjective measure of self-designated ancestry. The small number of foreign-born persons in the United States (11.7 million in 1979) limits the utility of the CPS data because of relatively large sampling variability.

Immigration in Historical Context

Immigration has historically been such an important component of population growth that the United States is known as a "nation of immigrants". Table 1 (attached) summarizes legal immigration and its contribution to population growth since 1900. Immigration averaged more than three-quarters of a million persons per year for the first two decades of this century. The next decade saw the passage of restrictive legislation (1924) with the result that average annual immigration was halved for the entire decade and reduced even more sharply in the late 1920's in comparison with earlier decades. From 1930 to 1949 the effects of the Great Depression and World War II led to very low immigration compared to previous and subsequent levels--less than 100,000 per year. Since 1950, immigration has increased to the point where the average number of persons admitted to the United States annually as legal immigrants and refugees has averaged more than 400,000 for the past decade.

Any assessment of the contribution of immigration to population growth must take account of emigration of aliens, movement out of the United States by former immigrants. The INS collected data on emigration through 1957. These data, shown in table 1, indicate substantial movement out of the United States by former immigrants--with emigration running roughly 30 percent of immigration. The high levels of recorded emigration are especially notable in light of the fact that INS stopped collecting these data because it was felt that levels of reported emigration were understated. For the period since 1957, the Census Bureau has had to estimate levels of emigration for use in preparing population estimates. Although the estimates of emigration are subject to possibly considerable error, the estimates show that emigration continued at relatively high levels into the 1960's and 1970's, as in the period prior to 1957.

Net immigration, the excess of immigration over emigration, expressed as a proportion of the population has declined considerably during the twentieth century. For the decade 1910-1919, net immigration accounted for 4.1 percent of the population at the end of the decade. By the 1930's, immigration barely exceeded emigration so that net immigration declined to only 0.2 percent of the population. Beginning with the 1950's, the level of net immigration increased and has kept pace with overall population growth. Net immigration as a percent of the total population has remained at a fairly constant level of 1.3-1.4 percent of the population since 1950.

Another way of assessing the contribution of immigration to population growth is to compare gross immigration with births--the component which is the major factor in population growth. Table 2 provides annual data on the components of population change for 1960 to 1979. Between 1960-61 and 1973-74 the annual number of births declined over 28 percent from 4.3 million in 1960-61 to 3.1 million in 1973-74. Since the low point, annual births have increased slightly to 3.4 million. Between 1960 and 1979 the number of immigrants and refugees admitted legally increased from slightly more than 300,000 to almost 500,000. Thus, the ratio of births to legal entrants decreased from about 13 to 1 to less than 7 to 1. In other words, the relative importance of legal immigration as a component of population growth has increased during the past 20 years. Furthermore, the last two or three years have seen substantial increases in the number of aliens (particularly refugees) entering the United States legally. Preliminary figures for 1980-1981 indicate that more than 600,000 alien immigrants and refugees entered the United States legally in that year; as a result, the ratio of births to legal entrants fell to roughly 5 to 1. Even though the relative importance of legal immigration has increased, it can be seen clearly in table 2 that variations in the number of births account for much greater numbers of people than variations in the level of legal immigration (including refugees); for example, the 1.2 million difference in births between 1960-61 and 1973-74 is more than legal immigration for any 2 years combined.

Although alien immigration and refugee movement are expected to be the major contributors to population growth other than births, there are other types of international movement which must be considered in any investigation of the impact of immigration on population size. Citizens as well as aliens moving across national borders represent potential additions to or subtractions from the population. A small number of native persons as well as a substantial proportion of foreign-born persons decide to emigrate. Movement to and from Puerto Rico and other outlying areas also contributes to population change.

These various types of movement across our national borders are measured less exactly than alien immigration; estimates indicate that their net effect is considerably less than 50,000 per year on the average.

Illegal Immigration

Illegal immigration represents a more problematic and possibly numerically more important type of movement across U.S. borders than is considered in tables 1 and 2. The Census Bureau tries to include every resident of the United States in its censuses and surveys, regardless of the legality of the person's residence here. It is concerned, however, with counting only those people whose usual residence is in the United States. The Census Bureau's primary need for separate statistics on illegal immigration is for the completion of studies evaluating the coverage of the 1980 census and improvement of the accuracy of postcensal population estimates. The immigration figures used in the Census Bureau's programs of current population estimates and projections have not included a specific allowance for net illegal immigration, since illegal immigrants are not included in the data compiled by INS and it has not been possible to secure satisfactory estimates for this group. The need for estimates of net illegal immigration in connection with the Census Bureau programs of coverage evaluation and population estimates has led the Bureau to concern itself with the continuing research aimed at developing such estimates. At the present time, however, there are no reliable estimates of the number of illegal residents who have entered the United States in any recent period. The number of illegal residents in the United States cannot be closely quantified and policy options on the numerical limits of immigration must be evaluated in terms that recognize this uncertainty.

An unofficial review of existing empirical studies in 1980 by several Census Bureau demographers prepared for the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) led them to offer the following cautious speculations as to the number of illegal aliens. The total number of illegal residents in the United States in 1978 was almost certainly below 6.0 million and may have been substantially less, possibly only 3.5 to 5.0 million (Siegel, Passel, and Robinson, 1980). The Mexican component of the illegally resident population, the report said, was less than 3.0 million and may have been substantially less. The gross movement into the United States of Mexican illegals, typically border violators, is considerable, as is reflected in the large number of people apprehended by INS, but this "immigration" is largely offset by a considerable movement in the opposite direction. Much of the movement is apparently of a temporary nature so that it is not clear whether the migrants should be considered usual residents of the U.S. according to Census Bureau definitions. Illegal immigrants from countries other than Mexico probably constitute a large fraction of the illegal population. It is likely that a large proportion of the non-Mexican illegal residents, who typically overstay their visa periods or enter on the basis of fraudulent documents, remain here for long periods of time. Although little hard data are available on the size or rate of increase of the illegal alien population, nothing has come to light since the review prepared for SCIRP which would contradict the "speculations" contained there.

Some information on the volume of illegal immigration may be obtained from 1980 census data on aliens. These data were collected in the sample portion of the 1980 census which, unfortunately, has not yet been completely processed and will not be available until late in 1982, at the earliest. The sample data from the census should prove particularly valuable because many illegal aliens, if not a majority, were undoubtedly enumerated in the 1980 census. We make this inference for a number of reasons. The first is that major steps were taken to reduce potential underenumeration and many illegal aliens could not escape the enumeration net. Second, experimental estimates permit the inference that the Current Population Survey of November 1979 included about one and a quarter million illegal aliens. This fact suggests that the 1980 census, as a similar survey procedure with additional coverage improvement procedures, could also have included many illegal aliens. Third, the 1980 census counted nearly six million more persons than were expected in 1980 on the basis of the 1970 census and 850,000 more persons than the estimated total legally resident population in 1980. Thus, although the size of the illegal alien population may never be known precisely, it may eventually be possible to place some reasonable, albeit wide, bounds on an estimate which is based on concrete information.

Effect of Immigration on Future Population Growth

To examine the effect of immigration on the future growth and size of the U.S. population, several series of projections of the population of the United States were prepared, each employing a different assumption regarding annual net immigration after 1980. All series assume some slight increases in fertility from the present levels of 1.9 children per woman up to 2.1 children per woman, and substantial increases in life expectancy to 71.8 years for males and 81.0 years for females by 2000. In these projections, it was also assumed that immigrants arriving after 1980 and their descendants would exhibit the same fertility and mortality patterns as persons residing in the United States in 1980. The assumption regarding future immigration makes no distinction as to the legal status of the immigrants.

The difference between the projections assuming continued immigration and the projections assuming no future immigration represents the contribution of immigration after 1980 to future population growth. This difference consists of post-1980 immigrants surviving to the projection date together with all of their surviving descendants. The series assuming 500,000 net annual immigration could be considered as roughly consistent with recent experience and is examined for illustrative purposes. The effect of different future levels of immigration can be ascertained from the data in table 3. In particular, the section labeled "Post-1980 Growth Attributable to Immigration after 1980" is a direct function of the assumed level of future immigration. That is, when annual net immigration is assumed to be 250,000, the future growth attributable to immigration is half as great as when annual immigration is assumed to be 500,000. It should be noted that future population growth could differ substantially from the projections if fertility and mortality do not follow the course projected; the figures shown are projections of the consequences of the assumptions, not predictions of the future course of events. Furthermore, small proportionate variations in the number of births would have a greater effect than relatively large variations in immigration.

As table 3 illustrates, the growth in the U.S. population over the next 20 years, assuming annual immigration of 500,000, would amount to 45.0 million, or 19.8 percent of the 1980 population. Without any immigration after 1980, the U.S. population would continue to increase because of continuing large excess of births over deaths resulting from the concentration of females in the childbearing ages; by 2000, an additional 32.8 million persons or 14.4 percent would be added to the population. The difference between these two series of projections, which represents the surviving post-1980 immigrants and their surviving descendants, amounts to 12.2 million persons, or 4.5 percent of the total population. At this level of immigration, the immigrants and their descendants contribute 27 percent of the future population growth by the year 2000. At an assumed level of 750,000 net annual immigration, the additional growth attributable to immigration by 2000 would be about 18.4 million, or 6.6 percent of the total population. If annual immigration were limited to 250,000, the additional growth would be only 6.1 million or 2.3 percent of the total population. At this low level of immigration, the future immigrants and their descendants contribute only 16 percent of the growth after 1980.

By 2030, after 50 years of continued annual immigration of 500,000 persons, the contribution of immigration would be 37 million persons or about 11 percent of the projected total population. The future immigrants and their descendants would account for 39 percent of the growth over the next 50 years at this level of immigration. If annual immigration was limited to 250,000, the additional growth would be 18 million, or 6 percent of the total population. At this level of immigration, the future immigrants and their descendants would contribute less than one-quarter of the growth after 1980.

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U.S. Bureau of the Census

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1974a Census of Population and Housing: 1970, Evaluation and Research Program PHC(E)-9, Accuracy of Data for Selected Population Characteristics as Measured by Reinterviews, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office.

1974b Consistency of Reporting of Ethnic Origin in the Current Population Survey, Technical Paper No. 31, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office.

Table 1. Population and Selected Components of Change for the United States: Ten-Year Periods 1900-1909 to 1970-1979

(Populations in thousands)

Period (Years ending June 30)	Population at end of period1/ (1)	Net change during period (2)	Births2/ (3)	Immigration3/ (4)	Emigration4/ (5)	Net Immigration		
						Amount (6)=(4)-(5)	As a percent of population (7)=(6)÷(1)	As a percent of net change (8)=(6)÷(2)
1970-1979	225,055	22,378	33,362	4,203	1,148	3,055	1.4	13.7
1960-1969	202,677	24,847	39,559	3,417	322	2,595	1.3	10.4
1950-1959	177,830	28,063	40,473	2,499	261	2,238	1.3	8.0
1940-1949	149,767	18,739	31,666	857	150	707	0.5	3.8
1930-1939	131,028	9,261	24,432	699	489	210	0.2	2.3
1920-1929	121,767	16,704	28,661	4,296	1,283	3,013	2.5	18.0
1910-1919	105,063	14,573	28,811	6,347	2,061	4,283	4.1	29.4
1900-1909	90,490	(x)	(x)	8,202	(x)	(x)	(x)	(x)

(x) Not available.

1/ As of July 1 of the end of the period. Total population includes Armed Forces overseas. Figures for 1949 and earlier exclude Alaska and Hawaii. Armed Forces overseas excluded for 1929. Source: Current Population Reports, P-25, No. 802 and unpublished data.

2/ Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, p. 49, and unpublished data.

3/ Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, p. 105, plus refugees for fiscal years 1961-1979.

4/ Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, p. 64, and unpublished data.

Table 2. Population and Annual Components of Change for the United States: 1960-1979

(Populations in thousands)

Year (July 1 to June 30)	Population at beginning of year[1]	Net change	Components of population change during year					
			Births (+)	Alien Immigrants[2] (+)	Alien Emigrants (-)	Refugees (+)	Deaths[3] (-)	Other[4] (+)
1979-1980	225,055	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1978-1979	222,585	2,471	3,388	434	137	52	1,905	639
1977-1978	220,239	2,345	3,304	472	134	14	1,932	621
1976-1977	218,035	2,204	3,274	374	126	16	1,882	548
1975-1976	215,973	2,062	3,127	371	118	32	1,909	559
1974-1975	213,854	2,119	3,181	361	113	108	1,925	507
1973-1974	211,909	1,945	3,111	378	108	12	1,951	503
1972-1973	209,896	2,013	3,195	379	105	9	1,973	508
1971-1972	207,661	2,235	3,393	366	104	21	1,947	506
1970-1971	205,052	2,608	3,713	351	103	46	1,927	528
1969-1970	202,677	2,375	3,676	361	100	46	1,930	322
1968-1969	200,706	1,971	3,583	347	98	42	1,946	43
1967-1968	198,712	1,994	3,520	355	95	45	1,911	80
1966-1967	196,560	2,152	3,608	331	93	46	1,852	112
1965-1966	194,303	2,257	3,716	323	91	34	1,851	126
1964-1965	191,889	2,414	3,940	297	88	5	1,821	81
1963-1964	189,242	2,647	4,119	292	86	19	1,782	85
1962-1963	186,538	2,704	4,185	306	84	16	1,804	85
1961-1962	183,691	2,846	4,259	284	82	75	1,744	54
1960-1961	180,671	3,020	4,350	271	79	64	1,683	97
Total, 1960-1979	(X)	44,382	68,642	6,653	1,944	702	35,675	6,004

(x) Not applicable.
-- Not available.

1/ Total population including Armed Forces overseas.
2/ Immigrants admitted for permanent residence minus Cuban and Indochinese refugees who adjusted status.
3/ Includes deaths occurring to Armed Forces overseas.
4/ Includes error of closure, emigration and immigration of civilian citizens of the United States (including net movement to and from Puerto Rico), and inductions less discharges to the Armed Forces overseas. The large figures between 1970 and 1980 are the result of the large error of closure between the 1970 and 1980 censuses. They represent, in part, differences in coverage between the two censuses.

Table 3. Effect of Different Assumed Levels of Immigration on Projected Population Size and Growth for the United States: 1980 to 2030

(Ultimate total fertility rate is assumed to be replacement level, 2.1 children per woman. Populations in thousands)

Assumed amount of net annual immigration	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2010	2020	2030
				Total Population				
1,000,000	227,658	242,482	257,738	271,980	284,882	310,836	337,102	358,602
750,000	227,658	241,164	254,940	267,574	278,765	300,984	323,113	340,249
500,000	227,658	239,846	252,143	263,168	272,648	291,131	309,125	321,896
250,000	227,658	238,528	249,346	258,761	266,531	281,278	295,137	303,543
0	227,658	237,210	246,548	254,355	260,414	271,426	281,149	285,190
				Projected Population Growth after 1980				
1,000,000	(x)	14,824	30,080	44,322	57,224	83,178	109,444	130,944
750,000	(x)	13,506	27,282	39,916	51,107	73,326	95,455	112,591
500,000	(x)	12,188	24,485	35,510	44,990	63,473	81,467	94,238
250,000	(x)	10,870	21,688	31,103	38,873	53,620	67,479	75,885
0	(x)	9,552	18,890	26,697	32,756	43,768	53,491	57,532
				Post-1980 Growth as a Percent of 1980 Population				
1,000,000	(x)	6.5	13.2	19.5	25.1	36.5	48.1	57.5
750,000	(x)	5.9	12.0	17.5	22.4	32.2	41.9	49.5
500,000	(x)	5.4	10.8	15.6	19.8	27.9	35.8	41.4
250,000	(x)	4.8	9.5	13.7	17.1	23.6	29.6	33.3
0	(x)	4.2	8.3	11.7	14.4	19.2	23.5	25.3
				Post-1980 Growth Attributable to Immigration after 1980				
1,000,000	(x)	5,272	11,190	17,625	24,468	39,410	55,952	73,412
750,000	(x)	3,954	8,392	13,219	18,351	29,558	41,964	55,059
500,000	(x)	2,636	5,595	8,812	12,234	19,705	27,976	36,706
250,000	(x)	1,318	2,798	4,406	6,117	9,852	13,988	18,353
0	(x)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
				Post-1980 Growth Attributable to Immigration as a Percent of Total Population				
1,000,000	(x)	2.2	4.3	6.5	8.6	12.7	16.6	20.5
750,000	(x)	1.6	3.3	4.9	6.6	9.8	13.0	16.2
500,000	(x)	1.1	2.2	3.3	4.5	6.8	9.1	11.4
250,000	(x)	0.6	1.1	1.7	2.3	3.5	4.7	6.0
0	(x)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
				Post-1980 Growth Attributable to Immigration as a Percent of Post-1980 Growth				
1,000,000	(x)	35.6	37.2	39.8	42.8	47.4	51.1	56.1
750,000	(x)	29.3	30.8	33.1	35.9	40.3	44.0	48.9
500,000	(x)	21.6	22.9	24.8	27.2	31.0	34.3	39.0
250,000	(x)	12.1	12.9	14.2	15.7	18.4	20.7	24.2
0	(x)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(x) Not applicable. -- Zero.

Source: Calculations based on analytic population projections using the 1980 census.

Senator Simpson. We will go now to some questions.

Just to try to start down through the panel members, Mr. Nelson, in your testimony you mentioned the administration opposes an overall cap. Perhaps these numbers would have to come at the expense of regular immigration channels. You then state this procedure was used after World War II, and there were negative effects as a result.

Could you please explain to the subcommittee what those effects were?

Mr. Nelson. Mr. Chairman, the understanding is that under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, after World War II there were some provisions for exceeding the number of immigrant visas available under the natinal origins quota system, specifically a provision for mortgaging against future numbers. After that, there became such a backlog in quotas being oversubscribed that the Congress felt at that point they had to make changes. So legislation was passed to clear up the backlog.

So, it seems that if we have that kind of problem, we could be faced with this—of going through the same process again. We learned from that experience it is necessary to do so.

Senator Simpson. The administration is opposing the imposition of numerical restrictions on family reunification for U.S. citizens.

You state that this numerically exempt group, which now numbers nearly 140,000 has grown because of increased refugee admissions. I would have believed that most refugees would have been accompanied by members of their immediate family at the time of admission rather than waiting a period of 5 years for citizenship.

What percentage of that figure 140,000 is comprised of relatives of citizens who themselves were once refugees?

Mr. Nelson. Mr. Chairman, apparently we do not have any good statistics that can show that figure, so we are not in a position to be able to give them now or provide them.

Clearly there are a lot of refugees that come in without relatives for a variety of reasons. There is no question in a general sense that both regular immigrants and refugees do draw in others. That is a truism. But we just do not have a figure on that point.

Senator Simpson. Would that be difficult to obtain?

Mr. Nelson. As I understand, Mr. Chairman, it probably would. We certainly will work and do what we can, but apparently there have not been any statistics regularly maintained on that type of issue. We will certainly pursue that and see if we cannot come up with at least some educated estimates in that area.

Senator Simpson. During the September consultation process on refugees, we were advised that there were 95,000 asylum applications pending from persons now residing, and working in the United States.

Could you inform this subcommittee as to how many additional asylum applications have been filed since that time?

Mr. Nelson. That figure 95,000 is approximately correct. Apparently at the first of the year we had about 103,000, so there has been a net flow, I think, at least during that period, of approximately 8,000 asylum requests.

Senator Simpson. How long is the current time lapse for plowing through all the various levels of appeal in an asylum claim?

Mr. Nelson. I might just go back to the last question for a moment.

Of the 95,000, about 30,000 of those are the Cuban boatlift people. They would be encompassed under the proposed legalization procedure and thus would not require case-by-case asylum processing. With respect to your next question—well, the INS completes approximately 4,500 asylum cases per year, and of course, with the number of cases, there is a substantial backlog if you go at that rate.

Also, no question as far as denials. There were approximately 3,350. We do not have regular statistics on the repatriation, partly because there has been a new phenomenon certainly on the number of asylum cases. That is some information again we will try to obtain for the committee.

I might just point out two things in addition, Mr. Chairman. There has certainly been a very huge increase in recent years in the number of asylum cases, and this is a matter of concern. We would have to expect that will likely continue in large numbers, some of this because of world events, some are used frivolously as delays in the process for exclusion or deportation matters, and I would certainly at this point emphasize the importance of the legislation regarding streamlining the asylum process, absolutely essential in the future.

Senator Simpson. I think our hearings disclosed much more of the latter than the former of what you have just stated. Since the number of asylum requests is significant, and since many of these persons will remain in the United States indefinitely, and since the definition, of course, for asylee and refugee is basically the same, would it not be more candid public policy to include the asylee numbers in the total refugee numbers to determine that in consultation with the Congress?

Mr. Nelson. That could well be, Mr. Chairman. I think the reason for the separate reporting is that the Refugee Act of 1980 basically set forth separate categories, and I do not think there was such recognition then as to the extent of the asylum numbers, or problem with it, if you can call it that.

So certainly it is a matter of consideration to do as you suggest.

Senator Simpson. I think we will certainly be pursuing that.

Just several more questions.

How many persons does the administration expect to qualify for any legalization program that it has proposed? Those who are already here would not count against any immigration quotas, is that correct? Is that the administration position?

Mr. Nelson. I believe that is correct.

Senator Simpson. What kind of effect would you expect the legalization program to have on the numerically unrestricted category after those in the legalization program have been naturalized? Would that be heavy?

Mr. Nelson. Well, this is, of course, a very important area, Mr. Chairman, and a very difficult one to predict in terms of numbers. Again, I think it is the kind of thing we probably would need to do some more work on. We do have a task force or work group in the Immigration Service working on a number of these issues, and I think that responses to these questions need to be consistently passed on to the Congress especially some general estimates of numbers. You are talking about some broad ranges. Probably somewhere from a million to over 3 million might well come forward under the legalization program.

Immediately we see probably 200,000 qualifying for permanent resident. As to the number qualifying for temporary resident, it is difficult to top it, again, very broad estimates of 1 million to 3 million.

It is impossible, certainly, to accurately predict the effect on future immigration by reason of legalization. No question, people coming in draw others in, so there would be some increases there. The pressure on illegal immigration is again a difficult one to say, and there could be some pressures in that direction.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, it has been shown that long backlogs for family reunification create, I think, significant illegal immigration.

Do you believe that that might well be so?

Mr. NELSON. I think that probably is so.

Senator SIMPSON. Have you found that significant numbers of relatives of Mexican Americans who file petitions on their own behalf are already working and living in the United States?

Mr. NELSON. I am not sure on that. I really could not comment.

Senator SIMPSON. We were in Mexico City, Ambassador Asencio and myself, and various staff members, and found the figure 80 to 85 percent of those who come to the consul there, the embassy there for legal entry purposes have come out of the United States to do so.

What do you think of that statistic? Fascinating, isn't it?

Mr. NELSON. It is fascinating.

Senator SIMPSON. It is certainly fascinating, 80 to 85 percent, and it was very obvious that that was the case in visiting with some of them. They came back to get their legal papers, but they have been here quite a time.

On the backlog issue, just two more questions.

How long is the current backlog for spouses and minor children to join Mexican permanent residents in the United States? I would like to inquire how long do you anticipate that backlog would become as a result of the legalization program? Would you then expect that backlog to provide increased pressures for illegal immigration which most backlogs indeed do?

Mr. NELSON. The current backlog, Mr. Chairman, is about 9 years. No question, we would expect some additional backlog as a result of the legalization program. How much depends largely on the number of families that are already here. Obviously, if there were a large number of families presently here you would not have the backlog. There would be some probably increase in the backlog. And no question also, the backlog, as you just stated, places some pressure on illegal immigration.

As I understand it, that is sort of a historical pattern throughout our American immigration history with other groups also. So it is a historical phenomenon.

Senator SIMPSON. The administration seems to believe that the number of immediate relatives will stabilize. If that is true, approximately when do you believe that might take place, and do you have any thoughts on what level that might be?

Mr. NELSON. No, Mr. Chairman, I really would not. It is something we would like to be able to provide later on. I would not have any off the top estimate at this point.

Senator SIMPSON. One final question.

One of the witnesses whose testimony I reviewed today states that no longer can our immigration remain the hand servant of foreign policy. He goes on to say that indeed, foreign policy must start serving the needs of our immigration program. The Attorney General must start telling the Secretary of State how many admissions he is going to be allowed to facilitate as foreign policy instead of the Secretary of State dictating foreign policy to the Attorney General. That is an interesting assertion, especially since the witness is quick to point out he is not singling out incumbent cabinet members, nor do I. But is that mentioned in your testimony, the importance of allowing the executive flexibility in the admission for foreign policy reasons, and I just wondered to what extent should foreign policy dictate the overall numbers of immigrants and the refugee level?

Mr. NELSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the current incumbents, I would not want to get in trouble with my brothers at the State Department. We have had some very productive sessions, but no question, immigration is an aspect of foreign policy and a related matter. It probably always has been, probably always will be. The extent of what it influences, whether it be a hand servant or the leader I guess would depend on a lot of factors. We have to recognize the realities that immigration and refugee matters, and maybe even more so now with the increased refugee and asylum type of issues we are facing, will be foreign policy type issues. It seems the needed flexibility is essential so that the State and Justice Departments, as well as other agencies of the Government have the opportunity to work and not be rigidly bound by any firm numerical bounds. Certainly also the relations with Mexico, Ambassador Asencio and you are very aware of, are constant foreign policy matters that tie in with immigration matters. So I do not think we can generalize, or we certainly cannot be specific in saying that immigration ought to drive foreign policy or vice versa. There must be a constant interrelationship, hopefully through efforts such as yours, in getting a firm and effective policy through legislative efforts.

What we are trying to do administratively—to, again, not just react to crises but to be able to project and anticipate—I think is very essential, but the flexibility certainly must be maintained.

Senator SIMPSON. I think it must if we are to have credibility in the consultation process and these other areas. Indeed, that has to be carefully monitored.

Ambassador ASENCIO. Mr. Chairman, may I just add a footnote?

Senator SIMPSON. Please.

Ambassador ASENCIO. Since you are getting Mr. Nelson involved in foreign policy, I think I might just as well get involved in domestic policy.

I just want to make sure that we make a very clear distinction between immigration and refugees. The Secretary of State does not tell the Attorney General what the immigration levels should be. Those are set by statute, and I think there is a tremendous confusion between immigration per se and refugee entrants, parolees, and any number of other categories in this particular business. Often, controversies or problems with regard to different kinds of refugees, asylees or what have you impact negatively, unfavorably in the public consciousness on straight, legal immigration matters. And I think that should be clear.

Senator SIMPSON. I think the distinction is very true. In the subcommittee's work we have found, certainly, the average citizen makes really no differentiation between immigrants, preference immigrants, nonpreference, exempt categories, family reunification, asylees, refugees, special entrants, extended voluntary and all the other terms that we now use in this area to certainly increase the numbers.

Let me ask then of Ambassador Asencio, the Select Commission—and you follow that closely, and I have enjoyed my work with you—recommended an annual ceiling of 350,000 numerically limited immigrant visas with an additional 100,000 visas available for the first 5 years to provide a higher ceiling to allow the backlog to be cleared.

Could you share with us why you feel the administration rejected that proposal?

Ambassador ASENCIO. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

It is my recollection that particularly the 100,000 visas, the additional 100,000 for the first 5 years, was an attempt to establish certain equities, since the Select Commission was talking about the legalization, the one-shot legalization of large numbers of undocumented aliens, and it was felt that those who in effect had obeyed the law and were patiently, in fact, awaiting their turn in line, would be unfairly discriminated against, so that therefore some means of handling that aspect of the problem was necessary.

Now, initially, as I recall, there was a point in the deliberations of the Select Commission—I remember very well. I got rather excited. The idea was that we should eliminate the backlog, in fact, immediately, and I recall having to tell the Select Commission that this would require a quadrupling of my consular resources. That did not seem particularly feasible, which is why the Select Commission eventually decided on 100,000 visas a year for the first 5 years.

With the administration's proposal that the legalization of undocumented aliens be a phased matter where you have a 10 year potentially retrospective period of legalization through a temporary status, and eventually a legal permanent resident status, I believe the equities are not the same as contemplated by the Select Commission, and therefore the additional 100,000 visas a year is no longer necessary.

Senator SIMPSON. We hear that figure. The current waiting period for second preference for Mexico is 9 years, and yet naturalization is only 5 years. I would have believed that more Mexican immigrants would naturalize in order to bring family members in more swiftly, and yet the naturalization rate is only 12 percent.

What is your opinion on why more Mexican Americans petitioning as a second preference family have not naturalized in order to avoid those years of family separation? I would be most interested in knowing.

Ambassador ASENCIO. Well, Mr. Chairman, there my answer would have to be as a Hispanic rather than as a denizen of the Department of State, and I would think there are various factors that one would have to consider. One is that the Hispanic community itself does not sufficiently recognize the political potential of the Hispanic base and has not made a point of organizing programs for naturalization. And the other aspect that I think has to be considered also is that with the contiguity of borders, of course, it is possible for family members to accompany undocumented aliens in the same illegal fashion.

But I would think that another factor that I have often heard is that the naturalization process itself is cumbersome, with substantial delays, backlogs for naturalization. I gather there were provisions in the efficiency bill to address and correct this factor, and I think this could very well have an impressive impact on the rate of naturalization among Hispanics.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me just interrupt a moment to introduce Congressman Robert Garcia, who is here with us, who will testify in a few minutes.

It is nice to have you here, sir. It is a pleasure to have you with us, and we will be looking forward to your remarks. I know how long you have been working in this area. Indeed, you are the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Census and Population.

If I had not been so late in traffic, we would be right there now. Hold on tight. We will get to you in a moment or two.

I ask a further question, if I may, of the Ambassador. I understand that after the 1965 change in the immigration law, the number of Canadian immigrants in the United States decreased dramatically.

Could you please explain why that might have occurred, and do you expect an increase in Canadian demand as a result of additional numbers which would be available to Canada under the administration's proposal?

Ambassador ASENCIO. Of course, we are referring, Mr. Chairman, to the period of the establishment of numerical limitations for the countries, and this, of course, had a very distinct impact on Canadian immigration.

There are a couple of other factors I think to consider here, particularly in relation, as you mentioned, to the doubling of the country ceiling for Mexico and Canada, and their relationship to each other. And here I would have to speculate and say that quite a bit of the demand on the Canadian side for visas, for immigrant visas, was probably shunted into the L Category, that is, intracompany transfers. In addition to that, I understand there is a substantial population of Canadian citizens who spend their winters in my favorite State, Florida, that are on nonimmigrant visas. But it seems to me that the system the administration is now proposing would impact additionally on Canadian numbers because you would get into the nonpreference category that has not received numbers for several years now, and as, say, the nonimmigrant visa holders who see an opportunity to get permanent visas move into that area, there is a build up factor that eventually could provide for respectable numbers on the Canadian side.

Senator **Simpson**. Currently there are no nonpreference visas being issued for any country. With the increase that the administration proposes for Mexico and Canada, will nonpreference visas then become available to those countries?

Ambassador **Asencio**. Yes, sir, we expect that to be the case.

Senator **Simpson**. And if in fact Canada were to use only about 15,000 of its numbers, as some anticipate, how would Mexico actually be able to use the excess numbers to ease the pressures on the second and fifth preferences in view of those current restrictions on percentages that are in the INA, that about 26 percent of the total can be used for second, no more than 24 percent for fifth preference?

So if the backlog is almost totally in those preferences, how might those additional numbers be best used by the Mexicans?

Ambassador **Asencio**. Actually, there is a provision in the law that we call the "fall-down" provision where there is a right to use whatever portion of the percentages allocated to higher preferences and is not used by the other preferences, so that preferences that are now backlogged would benefit from those preferences where there is light use. So I think the system would work.

This is an exceedingly technical point, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to submit a description in writing. But we do not anticipate a problem along those lines.

Senator **Simpson**. That would be very helpful if you would furnish that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Initially, two things must be understood about the preference system. First, each preference is allocated a percentage of the total limitation. As a result, the absolute total which each percentage represents increases as the overall limitation increases. Using the Mexico example, under the proposed basic limitation of 40,000, the totals for each percentage work out as follows:

First	8,000
Second	10,400
Third	4,000
Fourth	4,000
Fifth	9,600
Sixth	4,000

Under the hypothetical you have given (Canada uses 15,000 in a year and, thus, in the next year the Mexico limit is increased to 65,000), the totals for each percentage work out as follows:

First	13,000
Second	16,900
Third	6,500
Fourth	6,500
Fifth	15,600
Sixth	6,500

The second important point is that the second, fourth and fifth preferences (and nonpreference as well) benefit from "fall down" (the right to use whatever portion of the percentages allocated to higher preferences may not be used by the higher preferences). This second point is extremely important. For example, although 20 percent of the limitation is allocated to the first preference, demand in first preference is very small, rarely exceeding 4 to 5 percent of the limitation, if that. Thus, the remainder "falls down" for use by second preference and the result is that the percentage effectively available for use by second preference is about 40 percent rather than the basic 26 percent before the "fall down" is added. Forty percent of the basic 50,000 limitation is 16,000 and forty percent of the 65,000 limit used in your hypothetical is 26,000.

This point carries on down through the preferences. For example, third preference immigration from Mexico is virtually nonexistent. Thus, virtually all of the 10 percent allocated for third preference Mexican applicants would "fall down" to the fourth preference class and, if demand in fourth preference did not use all of the available numbers, eventually to the fifth preference class.

Finally, as I have mentioned previously, Mexican sixth preference demand has been quite small since 1977. It thus, appears possible (if not likely) that demand in this class will fall below the available limit, since it will increase to at least 4,000 under our proposal and to 6,500 under your hypothetical. Thus, the unused portion of the sixth preference limitation would "fall down" to the nonpreference class, as I also have indicated previously.

Now, this possibility is an interesting one since there are many Mexican nonpreference immigrants registered on the immigrant visa waiting list. All of these Mexican nonpreference registrants are Mexican Silva class beneficiaries for whom visa numbers were not available under the Court-ordered Silva recapture program. The availability of nonpreference numbers for natives of Mexico would benefit some of these applicants.

For very technical reasons, some of these Mexican Silva applicants who are registered as nonpreference applicants are also at the same time qualified as second preference applicants. This results from the operation of the savings clause in the 1976 Western Hemisphere bill (section 9 of Public Law 94-571). The savings clause provided that aliens registered under the old Western Hemisphere immigration system as of January 1, 1977, the effective date of Public Law 94-571 were deemed to be nonpreference immigrants under the new system. It went on to provide that any of these aliens who became the beneficiaries of preference petitions after January 1, 1977, were entitled to use their old Western Hemisphere registration dates as the petition filing dates and, thus, as their preference priority (registration) dates. The effect of these provisions was to accord to such aliens both nonpreference status and whatever preference status they might acquire under the newly-applied preference system. In the immigrant visa number allocation system, they became (and remain) entitled to compete both for any available nonpreference numbers and also for numbers in the preference classification to which they became entitled. Operationally, they are considered for possible visa number allocation twice (once under the nonpreference classification and once under the applicable preference classification) and are allocated a visa number under whichever category their chronological turn is reached first. For this reason, the availability of nonpreference numbers for natives of Mexico would hasten elimination of the second preference Mexican backlog as well as cut into the Mexican nonpreference backlog.

For these reasons, it is certain that, however high the Mexican limitation might rise in a given year under the Administration's proposal, the demand exists to use it and the structure of the existing preference system permits its use.

Senator SIMPSON. All of you on this administration panel have stated repeatedly that flexibility in determining these refugee admission levels is needed to avoid the restricting of Presidential authority to respond to foreign policy crises. How effective a foreign policy tool do you find immigration to be in the State Department?

Ambassador ASENCIO. Well, I think of it, Mr. Chairman, in reverse terms. It is an area of activity that impacts on foreign policy quite easily and often in negative ways unless great care is taken. So I do not see it necessarily as a positive instrument in this regard, but as something that could very easily rear up and bite one if care is not taken. And of course, the situation that comes clearly to mind is one, I think, Mr. Chairman, you were able to observe in Mexico quite closely, and that was what the media did with the Silva program, the distortions that were made, the very extensive press play that was given, the erroneous conclusions that were drawn. For instance, the recall of the Mexican Ambassador was ballyhooed, mass deportations were discussed. The entire Mexican media was roiled, I think, as a result of some unfortunate stories that were carried in some cases in the U.S. press, and none of this turned out to be the case. We were required to explain at great length to those Mexican officials not directly involved in the process. Those who were familiar with the program were not excited by the stories because they knew the true facts, but to those who were only involved in a tangential way we had to explain at great length just what was involved.

And I think that is a perfect example of a potential blowing up of something with very dire effects on the foreign policy area that has to be very carefully handled.

Senator SIMPSON. That was most interesting to me, too, to be there soon after that publicity became rampant, and especially since the court order was filed on December 24, and everyone did not think too badly of it until about January 7. It is interesting how they got their juices going on that one.

Ambassador ASENCIO. And may I say without trying to curry favor, that your presence there in explaining some of these aspects gave it an additional dimension. Presumably they would have expected me to say the things I said, but your ability to explain it from a particular and legislative point of view was very, very helpful.

Senator SIMPSON. I saved you again diplomatically.

Ambassador ASENCIO. That is right, absolutely correct.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, it was interesting to hear Ambassador Hugo Margain and his remarkable grasp of the issues. He has some extraordinary knowledge of the issue and handled it most tactfully. I think particularly of our visit with the new Secretary of Labor and of his rich understanding. His future role in immigration is going to be very helpful, for he had a thorough grasp of the problems.

Well, one more question, and then I will come to Congressman Garcia, if I might. He indicates he has about 5 minutes, and then I can come back for about 15 more.

Would that be convenient with this panel?

Ambassador ASENCIO. Fine.

Senator SIMPSON. Then let me ask one more question.

How would you respond, to those who assert that the arguments for executive flexibility on immigration admission simply mean flexibility to add additional immigrant visas when it desires to do so, since the executive already has the authority to curtail immigration?

Ambassador ASENCIO. I would reiterate what I said earlier, Mr. Chairman. Let's make sure that we are aware that we are really talking about refugee admissions and not immigrant entrants. We are not talking about nonrefugee immigration. We are talking about emergency situations where some sort of flexibility of response is necessary, and we should distinguish severely between the refugee situation and legal immigrant status.

Senator SIMPSON. But in our work we still are talking at least in this discussion about overall numbers.

Ambassador ASENCIO. That is correct.

Senator SIMPSON. So certainly refugee numbers count in that situation just the same as immigrants. So foreign policy is important when considering the overall numbers.

Ambassador ASENCIO. Certainly.

And I can say just a couple of thoughts on that.

For instance, it would have been difficult for me to conceive of not taking steps we took, say, at the time of the Hungarian crisis, as an example.

The other thought I would like to leave with the committee is in those situations where refugee numbers would cut into immigrant numbers, what we are really talking about is removing certain rights, privileges and entitlements on the part of U.S. citizens to bring their relatives, other family members, various family members into the United States, and I would imagine even the domestic policy repercussions of that would be rather severe. It would be something that would concern me a great deal, particularly the pressures that my department would be seeing in terms of looking for exceptions.

Senator SIMPSON. If we may now just go quickly to the Honorable Robert Garcia, Member of the House, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Census and Population, for a statement in this area.

And I would appreciate having your remarks, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT GARCIA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 21ST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. GARCIA. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am delighted to be here with the Ambassador, because as one Hispanic following another Hispanic, I can assure you that he really is one of our unsung heroes, and I have never really had a chance to say that publicly. But I think he has done a hell of a job for our country.

Ambassador ASENCIO. Mr. Chairman, may I also remark that I like Congressman Robert Garcia also.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I like you both, and I agree with that assessment.

Mr. GARCIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to consolidate and try to put it together in 5 minutes. We are going to enter, with your permission and the committee's permission, the full text of our testimony.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection.

Mr. GARCIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy. All of us in Congress who are concerned about the most pressing problem of immigration reform are grateful for the work being done by your subcommittee. I hope my testimony will add to this work.

Milan Kundera, who is a Czech author, said that "the stupidity of people comes from having an answer for everything. The wisdom comes from having a question for everything." And frankly, that is how I see the work of Congress on the issue of immigration and refugee policy. Unfortunatey, as legislators we cannot only ask questions, we must also provide at least temporary solutions to problems affecting our Nation, including such sensitive and politically volatile issues as developing an equitable, yet workable, immigration and refugee policy.

I have been asked to speak about the numerical limits on immigration to the United States. I believe this to be the heart of our complex immigration problem. The number of people that we allow to emigrate to the United States is indeed a very significant number. The cutoff point for immigration to the United States will potentially change the course of millions of people's lives. The way we structure our immigration policy will affect not only people abroad, but people living here in the United States. How we arrive at this number is a formidable task. It is an enormous amount of responsibility, and it cannot be taken lightly.

That is why, although, I have been asked to speak about numerical limitations, I feel that some of the criteria by which we judge those limitations must at least be mentioned. First of all, immigration policy is not simply a domestic issue. The affect of U.S. immigration policy has global implications. Control over the entry by noncitizens to a country is generally considered one of the primary considerations for defining national sovereignty. Just how we develop our limitations and how we establish those controls, however, will most certainly affect our relationship with other nations, and, in particular the developing world.

A recent article in Foreign Affairs says that the developing nations of the world will need between 600 and 700 million new jobs between 1980 and the year 2000 to keep unemployment from rising. This is more than all of the combined jobs in the industrialized world in 1980. This pressure on the developing world will have a definite effect on immigration to the United States, documented or not.

It is important, then, that we take this kind of pressure into consideration as we set the limits on immigration to the United States. Our economic aid to the developing world must take into account the inclination of the world's poor to come to the United States by any means possible. It is not fair that we look upon these immigrants as criminals or the dregs of society. President Lopez-Portillo of Mexico put it quite well when he said that he refused to look upon it as a crime for a man to search for work. Stability of the world's under developed nations will be to a certain extent affected by our immigration policy. Further, our relations with these nations is dependent on our achieving a just policy. This includes setting reasonable limits.

We must also take into consideration the demographic, ecological, and economic impact that immigration has on our country when setting these limits. The demographic impact of immigration must be studied so that our Government can more effectively plan the future of this country. The influence of immigration on our Nation's environment is considerable. The rate at which our population grows will have a direct bearing on our natural resource base. The Subcommittee on Census and Population, which I chair, held a hearing on the Global 2000 Report and its analysis of demographic trends and their effect on the environment. Needless to say, the results of the hearing indicated that population shifts have a direct relationship to ecological stability.

The effect of immigration on the economy may seem a little more obvious. There is always the unfounded fear that immigrants detract from our society by taking jobs and making liberal use of social services. Yet, the Select Commission on Immigration in its 1981 report said that, "* * * the contribution of immigrants to U.S. society (is) overwhelmingly positive * * * immigration has been of enormous benefit to our country." Of course, this does not mean that we can afford to have unlimited immigration to this country. It only means that we must also take into consideration the contributions of immigrants when we consider that our limits should be.

Another factor that must be considered before we decide on proper limits is the problem of undocumented immigrants. The Census Subcommittee in its April 1981 hearings on immigration had a representative from the Census Bureau testify about the number of undocumented persons in the United States. Testimony revealed that there are less than the estimated 6 million undocumented persons in the United States. Empirical studies indicate that the number is somewhere in between 3.5 and 5 million people. The Bureau, however, indicated that there are currently no completely reliable estimates of undocumented immigrants living in this country.

Despite the problems involved in obtaining an accurate number for undocumented immigrants, the Census Bureau is beginning to develop research for resolving this problem. The Bureau said that any data received through a legalization program would be invaluable for accurately calculating the number of undocumented persons in this country. I believe the Census Bureau's expertise in analyzing and reporting data must be utilized if we are to set proper limits on the number of immigrants to be admitted to this country.

The Select Commission in its report also recommended against setting up a permanent commission to review immigration and refugee problems. I'm not certain of the wisdom of this recommendation. While I understand the Select Commission's hesitation with expanding the Federal bureaucracy, I believe this issue is important enough to warrant a permanent commission to examine the problem. The politics involved in developing an immigration policy is considerable. Pressure from various well-meaning groups is considerable. A depoliticized interagency council could provide the answer. It is certainly worth considering. In any case, whether or not such a commission is set up, I think it's important that the Census Bureau play a role in defining the scope of this problem, as well as providing valuable information for defining limits.

When I was asked to testify I was given a set of issues to discuss for guiding me in my assessment of what the numerical limits of immigration to the United States should be. I have tried to outline certain criteria which I feel to be important in the setting of these limits. I would now like to briefly touch on those issues outlined by this subcommittee.

I believe we must have a flexible law for defining our limits. I also believe that any proposed law shoul be subject to periodic review. As the political and economic climate of our country and the rest of the world changes, it is important that our policies adapt. Immigration policy must also adapt.

Whether or not immigration policy should be indexed to economic, social, and demographic variables is questionable. Certainly these factors must be considered in drawing up any policy. But the word indexed is too clinical for my liking. We are talking about human beings when we speak about immigrants. We must do our best to avoid treating them like faceless statistics; their lives should not be determined by an impersonal index. Certainly we must consider the state of our Nation as immigration policy is reviewed, but we must never forgt the positive contributions of immigrants as we proceed with any review.

As I mentioned earlier, I believe an interagency council might provide the best framework from which to review immigration policy. This council could be made up of foreign policy experts, labor experts, legal experts, and statistical experts. Their function would be to constantly re-examine the issue. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of Congress to decide what the law should be, but unbiased information could certainly help us in making that decision.

I also feel that our immigration policy should be kept separate from our refugee policy. The 1980 Refugee Act gives an adequate basis for judging refugee problems. Any limits we place on immigration should not include refugees. Nor do I feel that family reunification can be considered when we are setting up numerical limitations. The family provides the backbone of our society and the societies of most immigrants. To separate immigrants from their families is not only inhuman, it is asking for trouble. The family unit is a stabilizing factor. Adjustment to a new society is difficult enough, to do that in isolation without the support of one's family, is unfair. When defining the limits, then, we must also consider how those nations sending immigrants understand the concept of family.

When the numerical limits of our immigration policy are finally decided upon, we must think of our own Nation first. We must consider what impact immigrants have on our economy, our environment, and our society. We cannot turn a blind eye to this problem. As Members of Congress, the final decision on immigration policy is up to us. But, when we pass judgment, we must realize that the United States cannot make its decision in isolation. All the nations of the world are dependent upon each other. What is news in Washington is also news in Mexico City, Warsaw, San Salvador, and Port au Prince. We must, therefore, consider the other nations of the world as we finalize our policy.

As I said, I believe the welfare of our own Nation comes first. This also means taking into account the potential we lose when we turn away prospective immigrants. Einstein was an immigrant. As a matter of fact, 30 percent of all U.S. Nobel laureates are immigrants. The contributions made to this Nation by immigrants is immeasurable. This country was built by the sweat of refugees and immigrants. In judging the realistic limitations of U.S. immigration, we must always remember that the United States is a nation of immigrants.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you very much.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I will, if I may, furnish some written questions that you might see fit to respond to. And I know you have a deadline.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO REPRESENTATIVE BOB GARCIA WITH RESPONSES

Question.—It is difficult to determine the appropriate levels of immigration within the context of population issues, when we do not seem to have any clearly defined overall population policy or goals in the U.S. As Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Census and Population, I would be most interested in your analysis of where we are going in terms of issues such as population growth and stabilization. Is there anything likely to come out of the Congress or the Executive on this?

Answer.—As you noted, population stabilization is difficult to assess. There are presently two bills in Congress, one in the Senate, and one in the House addressing the issues of population policy. Neither bill sets a specific level of growth nor establishes a specific policy. However, the legislation calls for the establishment of a national population policy and office to examine these issues.

There are already a number of government agencies that have an interest in population issues, and have forecasting capabilities. Agencies as varied as the Census Bureau, the Department of Agriculture, and the Army Corps of Engineers produce and use population statistics. What concerns me is the lack of statistical coordination between these agencies. Population problems are wide ranging. These problems affect national security issues, immigration and refugee policy, and economic growth. There is, therefore, a need to at least examine the possibility of establishing national population priorities and a national population office.

The House Census and Population Subcommittee, which I chair, is planning a hearing in early March on the population bill pending before it. We hope to get a clearer picture of the need for establishing a population policy and office at the time.

Question.—I have said that the purpose of this hearing is not to "pick a magic number," but because you have much expertise on population issues and because you held a rather comprehensive series of hearings last year on immigration and population, I would welcome your thoughts on what total limits would be reasonable to establish on immigration, given current U.S. fertility rates.

Answer.—Rigid numerical limitations are self-defeating because any numbers we use must be flexible and reflect the state of affairs at that moment. I also feel that it is best to rely on unbiased statisticians in guiding us in establishing limits. I feel most comfortable evaluating proposals for these limits by using the criteria outlined in my testimony.

As I said in that testimony, I feel that there are less obvious considerations that must be taken into account when setting limits. Some of these considerations include the contribution made by immigrants to our country, the need to examine the effect of population shifts in our environment, and the shift of the median age of Americans.

Question.—You have mentioned in your testimony that we must consider the unemployment pressures in developing nations. I just returned from a serie of fascinating meetings with officials in the Mexican government, and can assure you that they indeed face problems in this area over the next 20 years and beyond. Yet, how can we policymakers reconcile this very important consideration when many of our own workers are unemployed?

Answer.—I would like to quote the findings of the Select Commission for Immigration on the impact of immigrants on our economy. The report states that, ". . . immigration has been and continues to be a force for economic growth in the United States and as a consequence, has a beneficial effect on wages and employment possibilities for most U.S. citizens over time." The report goes on to say that immigrants only make up a small portion of the labor force, and that immigrants have a tendency to benefit the economy.

The report further states that immigrants contribute to the economy as consumers; they are highly motivated; they tend to "plan, save, invest and contribute disproportionately to entrepreneurial activity." I agree with the Select Commission's assessments.

I also feel it is foolish for the United States to think it can exist in isolation. An examination of our defense and foreign aid appropriations would indicate that we can't or don't. The interaction of the world's economies is constantly increasing. What goes on in Mexico and El Salvador affects the United States. The Brandt Commission in talking about establishing a North-South dialogue commented that, ". . . in almost every field of the world's present troubles, a substantial number of the solutions depend on recognizing mutual interests between North and South." I agree with this conclusion.

In my testimony I stated that America must protect its own interests first. I do not believe we should establish an immigration policy that would be harmful to our unemployed or underprivileged. No one is more concerned about helping this nation's minorities and underprivileged that I am. But that does not mean that we should blindly restrict immigration without examining the entire picture of immigration contributions and problems.

Question.—You have mentioned that numerical limits should not include family reunification or refugees. ("Any limits we place on immigration should not include refugees, nor do I feel that family reunification can be considered when we are setting up numerical limitations.") Do you mean that all family reunification should be numerically unrestricted, or just immediate family? I would appreciate your views on this since 80 percent of current numerically limited immigration are family reunification cases.

Answer. I was referring to the immediate family. The system as outlined by the Select Commission is generally an acceptable guide for family reunification. I would, however, also like to see resident aliens and their immediate families given the highest priority regarding the reunification of their immediate families.

Obviously, certain restrictions must be set up to control and regularize immigration, but family reunification must be one of the primary objectives of our immigration policy.

Question.—You have also mentioned that we should consider how sending countries define family in constructing our limits. I am particularly concerned about doing this with regard to adult brothers and sisters, since this is the group where we develop all the backlogs, since it grows exponentially. What are your views on abolishing 5th preference in an effort to set more reasonable limits?

Answer.—I do not feel the fifth preference should be abolished. The inclusion of adult brothers and sisters as a preference is, admittedly, not of primary concern to all ethnic groups. But to only support those preferences that immediately impact a particular ethnic group, is unfair and counter productive.

The backlog in the fifth preference is not appealing, but it is not acceptable. Perhaps a more flexible policy, such as a shifting of priorities, could be arranged, in consultation with those countries that have a backlog in the fifth preference. Further study would indicate the feasibility of this proposal.

In any case, a backlog is better than no hope at all. It may create some problems in processing, but that is no reason to eliminate the category. I am not suggesting that the overall visa/availability be increased in the category. I am, however, suggesting that the category remain in order to make immigration to the United States as equitable to all cultures as possible. This should not be done at the expense of our own national priorities, but I don't believe that maintaining the fifth preference would damage our priorities or our immigration policy.

I am very interested in your remarks about unemployment pressures in developing nations, particularly your remarks about the definition of nuclear family, and how we are to define that. We must decide how much credence we should give to the definition given by the countries who are sending immigrants. We recognize that while family reunification is the touchstone of our immigration policies, even in our numerically restricted category, 80 percent of those in there are here through family reunification.

So we have some serious problems to address, and you will be helpful in that for us.

Thank you very much, Congressman Garcia.

Mr. **Garcia**. Thank you very much.

Senator **Simpson**. We might go back to some questions now of Ms. Houstoun, whose cover has been exposed, as we see her first name is Marion, as opposed to Muffy. So let me ask a few questions here.

In your testimony you point out that a level of 400,000 net immigration would account for 10 percent of the annual growth in the U.S. labor force, but that will rise 15 percent as refugee admissions approach 200,000 per year.

How would you respond to those who assert that immigrants and refugees tend to concentrate most heavily in particular regions of the United States, so that while there may not be a labor market effect in the United States across the board, immigration may certainly disrupt the labor markets in at least those regions of the country?

Mr. ORR. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to that.

Senator SIMPSON. Please.

Mr. ORR. Yes, it is true that immigrants and refugees can comprise significantly more than 10 to 15 percent of the growth in the labor force in local areas where they are relatively concentrated. This has been the experience of the United States in some cases, and with freedom of movement guaranteed, cannot be avoided.

The extent to which there will be a disruption or significant adverse effects in the local areas, however, depends entirely on the type of jobs that immigrants can qualify for, the availability of those jobs in the local area, and the number of local resident workers who also want those jobs. In other words, the effects on the local area, which will be both positive and negative, will depend on the specific skill levels of the immigrants and the industrial structure of the local area.

Senator SIMPSON. Others in that discussion argue that the United States is going to undergo a labor shortage during the 1990's because of decreasing birth rates, and therefore urge that immigration levels should be raised for needed workers.

What is the Department's position on that comment?

Mr. ORR. In responding to that question, I would like to submit a table entitled the U.S. Civilian Labor Force, by age, 1950 to 1995, if I may, for the record.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes; without objection it is so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE, BY AGE, 1950–95

[In thousands]

Age group	Actual [1]					Projected [3]		
	1950	1960	1970	1975	1980 [2]	1985	1990	1995
Young workers (16–24)	11,523	11,544	17,829	22,226	24,623	24,446	22,607	21,846
As percent of labor force	18.5	16.6	21.6	24.0	23.5	21.1	18.5	17.1
Prime-age workers (25–54)	40,017	45,505	50,388	56,182	56,320	75,679	85,616	91,779
As percent of labor force	64.4	65.4	60.9	60.7	62.4	65.8	70.0	72.0
Older workers (55 +)	16,671	12,580	14,497	14,165	14,776	14,860	14,152	13,917
As percent of labor force	17.2	18.1	17.5	15.3	14.1	12.9	11.6	10.9
Total percent	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.8	100.1	100.1
Total number of workers	62,208	69,628	82,715	92,613	104,719	114,985	122,375	127,542

[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Handbook of Labor Statistics" (December 1980), table 3.
[2] U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment and Earnings" (January 1981), table 4.
[3] Howard Fullerton, Jr., "The 1995 Labor Force: A First Look, "Monthly Labor Review" (November 1980) pp. 11–21.

Mr. ORR. Very briefly, and without trying to be technical at all, the table shows that the U.S. labor force grew from 62 million workers in 1950 to 104 million workers today, and is projected to grow to 122 million workers in 1990. Young workers, those between the ages of 16 and 24, grew from 11 million workers in 1950, or 18.5 percent of the total labor force, to 24 million workers today, up to 23.5 percent of the total labor force. By 1990, there will be over 22 million young workers, which will constitute 18.5 percent of the total labor force, the same percentage as in 1950.

The lower birth rates following the post-war baby boom will result in fewer young workers in 1990, 22 million compared to 24 million today, and correspondingly more middle aged workers, 85 million in 1990, as compared to 65 million today.

The effects of this changing age composition of the labor force will be a reduction in the supply of young and generally less skilled workers. The situation can only be characterized as a labor shortage, however, in the sense that although there will be over 22 million young workers, employers will not have the same numbers of young workers available in 1990 as are available today.

In the absence of immigration, the market can be expected to make adjustments in the form of upgrading of jobs, capital investments, higher wages, etc., and these adjustments can reduce the need for young workers.

Senator SIMPSON. During these recent years where refugee admissions have constituted a significant portion of overall immigration numbers, we find that many refugees are employable, and yet they seek public assistance. Two years ago that dependency rate was 49 percent among Indochinese. In 1982 it is over 70 percent. That is troublesome.

What steps is the Department of Labor taking to assist in the employment of refugees?

Ms. HOUSTOUN. Mr. Chairman, the Department has been sensitive to the change in the skill level of Indochinese refugees. When the first wave came in in the mid-1970s, the involvement of the Department was primarily in the area of job placement. There was little difficulty in finding employment for these highly skilled Indochinese, many of whom spoke English. When it became clear, in the late 1970s the second wave of Indochinese refugees were low-skilled, had difficulty in finding employment, and in many cases had serious language deficiencies, the Department's role changed. Our work with this second flow of Indochinese refugees has involved primarily training. For examples, there are, I think, 1850 Indochinese refugees now in the Job Corps, where a total of 2000 slots have been provided for them. Basically our participation in refugee assistance changed from job placement and labor-market information efforts to one of basic competency training.

We have therefore also provided some ESL training for Job Corps instructors, developed standard for refugee eligibility in CETA programs, and undertook efforts to ensure that refugee sponsors were aware of the availability of these programs. Generally, however, we do not treat refugees in need of employment assistance as a special population of the disadvantaged. The goal is integration. Therefore, they go into ongoing programs, which we try to modify to fit their special needs.

Senator SIMPSON. I understand that, but still there is that dependency rate which I think is now exactly around 71 percent and rising so significantly over these last several months, really. We have testimony from the voluntary agencies and others. This has got to be of concern to this country, I think very much so, because that is not the way it was intended to be.

Anyway, the administration is proposing raising the current ceiling on numerically limited immigration from 270,000 to 310,000 through these additional numbers from Mexico and Canada. How are we to justify that at a time when we still do not know what the labor market effect on legalization will be, and especially when current unemployment among Americans is so high?

Wouldn't it be more prudent to wait until our economy has hopefully righted itself before bringing in additional numbers?

Ms. HOUSTOUN. Mr. Chairman, I have to defer that question—it is a policy question—until Mr. Lovell's return.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes, please. You are not going to respond? You are just going to refer it out into the wind?

Ms. HOUSTOUN. This is a policy issue, sir.

Senator SIMPSON. So there is no one down there at that end of the table——

Ambassador ASENCIO. May I intrude?

Senator SIMPSON. Oh, yes, go ahead.

Ambassador ASENCIO. You know, Mr. Chairman, I have opinions on everything.

Senator SIMPSON. I am aware of that.

Ambassador ASENCIO. It would seem to me that the administration is trying to establish legal channels for what is after all a classic case, according to many, of supply and demand. Our thought was that unless the overall package proposed by the Administration was considered as a package—and this is an important part of it—we would not be able to solve the undocumented alien question. The package is designed to address different parts of the illegal alien situation either through legalization, through employer sanctions, through a limited temporary workers' program, but also by establishing in effect double ceilings, on the basis of the principle of geographic contiguity and foreign policy interests in the northern hemisphere, and it is a means of trying to sop up what would under ordinary circumstances be a contribution to the illegal alien question.

So, paradoxically, you have a situation where in order to cut down the total number of immigration entries into the United States, including illegal, in effect you are raising slightly the total legal immigration numbers. The result will be lower the overall numbers, and at the same time to allow that to happen by a means that is controllable and, of course, subject to review and subject to the legal process.

[The following responses to questions submitted to the Labor Department were received for the record:]

Q--1 The Administration is proposing raising the current ceiling on numerically limited immigration from 270,000 to 310,000 through additional numbers from Mexico and Canada. How can you justify doing this at a time when we still do not know what the labor-market effect of legalization will be and especially when unemployment among Americans is so high. Wouldn't it be more prudent to wait until our own economy has improved before brining in additional numbers?

A--1 The increase we are proposing in legal immigration is very small, only 40,000. It is especially small when compared with the very large-scale flow of undocumented workers who have been entering this country each year. Our chief aim in the legislative package that we have submitted is to bring immigration under control and to curb future flows of illegal immigration. At least half of all illegal immigration has its source in Mexico, with whom we share a 2,000-mile land border. Our proposal to slightly increase the number of immigrant visas available for relatives and workers from our two neighbors is premissed on our commitment to regain control over our borders while recognizing our unique historical relationship with these contiguous nations.

Q--2 How many immigrants are we currently admitting under the third and sixth preferences? Would you expect this number to change as a result of the Administration's proposal for streamlining current labor-certification procedures?

A--2 Pursuant to section 203 of the INA, a maximum of 54,000 visas are now available on a world-wide basis to third and sixth preference immigrant workers and their spouses and minor children, with a total of 27,000 visas available for each of these two preferences. (Each preference is allocated a maximum of 10 percent of the total number of visas available under the preference system.)

In reviewing recent third and sixth preference admission levels, is is useful to remember that:

(1) There were no third or sixth preference immigrants from the Western Hemisphere until 1977, when the 1976 Amendments, which extend the preference system to this hemisphere, went into effect. Before then, there were 17,000 third preference and 17,000 sixth preference visas available to workers and their dependents from the Eastern Hemisphere. Immigrants seeking admission

as workers from the Western Hemisphere were subject to the 120,000 overall ceiling for that hemisphere, and to labor certification, but they were admitted, along with relatives, on a first-come, first-served basis, and employers were not required to petition INS for their admission;

(2) Between January 1977 and October 1978, there were separate preference systems and ceilings for the two hemispheres; hence, unused third or sixth preference visas for one hemisphere could not be used by immigrant workers from the other hemisphere;

(3) The 1980 Refugee Act slightly reduced the total number of visas available for third and sixth preferences, from 58,000 to 54,000; and

(4) Nonpreference immigrants with labor certification are also admissible as workers if visa numbers are available. Though numbers have not been available since the 1978 Amendments enacted a world-wide ceiling and preference system, significant numbers of nonpreference immigrants were admitted from the Western Hemisphere in 1977 and 1978, and from the Eastern Hemisphere during most of the decade.

Recent admission levels of third and sixth preference immigrants have been as follows:

	FY 1976	FY 1977	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980
3rd pref.	9,815	6,357	4,822	5,075	n/a
6th pref.	5,881	4,083	7,705	11,623	
spouses & children	16,286	11,176	13,768	21,011	
TOTAL	31,981	21,616	26,295	37,709	?

Employer petitions for labor certifications are not subject to any numerical restrictions. Recent labor certification levels have been as follows:

	FY 1976	FY 1977	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980
All Certs.	25,649	27,126	16,661	21,354	28,921
Sch. A	7,697	11,547	1,169	1,655	1,256
As % of Petitons	68%	77%	88%	91%	92%
Petitions	37,854	35,311	19,037	23,519	31,359

Streamlining the labor-certification procedures would not affect the admission levels of third or sixth preference immigrants, since they are set by section

203 of the INA. That is, changes in labor certification procedures can at most change the number of aliens eligible for admission as third or sixth preference immigrants; they do not affect the number of third or sixth preference admissions.

The admission levels of third and sixth preference immigrants would, however, be slightly affected by the Administration's proposal to establish separate limitations of 40,000 each for Mexico and Canada. If this proposal were enacted, 23,000 visas for third preference and 23,000 visas for sixth preference would be available for immigrants from all countries except Mexico and Canada, and 8,000 visas for third preference and 8,000 visas for sixth preference would be available to Mexican or Canadian nationals. Thus, a maximum of 62,000 visas would be available for third and sixth preference immigrant workers and their dependents.

Q--3 Some experts have testified that illegal workers are employed disproportionately in the same occupations and geographical regions as the most disadvantaged of U.S. workers--minorities, youth, and women. What effect does the Department of Labor expect the Administration's legalization program to have on the U.S. labor market, particularly those at the lowest levels?

A--3 The available data do indicate that illegal aliens are employed disproportionately in the same occupations and geographical regions as are U.S. disadvantaged workers. The Department does not believe, however, that a legalization program is likely to have a significant impact on the U.S. labor market. Most illegals in the United States are already employed--employment is the reason why they came and the reason why they stay. Their principal labor-market impact has therefore already been felt and absorbed.

Q--4 Immigrants have historically exhibited a significant level of upward mobility in terms of employment in the U.S. Would you expect this to be true of those who attain legal status through the legalization program?

A--4 It's extremely difficult to make sound or useful generalizations about the upward mobility of the tens of millions of immigrants who have come to this country, often with very different skills, at very different periods in our economic development. The rags-to-riches or factory worker-to-doctor mobility of the unskilled, to which I think you are referring, was however typically a second-generation phenomenon, at best.

This is not surprising. It takes time, as well as ambition, to acquire the skills, the experience--and, often, the capital--that are needed to "make it." It will similarly take time for those undocumented workers who are granted legal status to gain much upward mobility. Moreover, given the unprecedented requirements of our advanced technological society for substantial formal education and expertise, this is likely to be a much slower process for unskilled immigrants and their families today than it was a century or half-century ago. This in turn, suggests that the upward mobility that will be experienced by today's unskilled immigrants is likely to be in low-capital and labor-intensive small businesses, e.g., auto bodyshops, dry cleaners, "mom and pop" grocery stores, and so forth.

Q--5 Would you expect significant numbers of current illegal workers to move out of low-level jobs once they are legalized, and if so, what effect will this have on labor markets and production in those areas where they are concentrated?

A--5 The available data consistently indicate that Mexican illegals have less than a primary school education and that illegals from other Caribbean or Latin American nations have completed only an average of 8 years of school, as compared with the average U.S. worker, who has slightly more than a high-school education.

The upward mobility of legalized undocumented workers is going to be severely constrained by their substantial lack of education and skills. While one can expect some movement of legalized illegals out of seasonal farmwork and private household work into more stable jobs in light industry or in services, such movement is likely to occur only over time and to be limited in scope to better-paying or more secure low-level jobs.

There are some data supporting this view. The Baca/Bryan 1979 survey of 1414 undocumented Mexicans in Los Angeles found that their respondents' desire to acquire legal residence was not associated with a desire to change jobs, excluding the women employed as domestics, who aspired to jobs as operatives (e.g., as garment workers), only a minority of their respondents had aspirations beyond their current semi-skilled operative ceiling.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes. Let me come to Mr. Herriot since we are running late—I have some other interesting questions. I will have to furnish some of those in writing because I have a time problem, and I will do that and ask you to respond to those, each of you on the panel.

Mr. Herriot, you stated in your testimony that there will be a supplement to the November 1979 current population survey which will provide the only basis for determining the extent of assimilation of second generation immigrants. We would be interested in that as to how assimilation will be measured in the survey, and we would appreciate your forwarding that to us when those results might be available.

But what rates of emmigration does the Census Bureau use in computing the net immigration figures? As an example, what would the gross numbers of immigration be to produce a net immigration figure of 500,000?

Mr. HERRIOT. I am sorry. I cannot answer that. Although these types of statistics are produced in my area, immigration is not my area of technical expertise. I have brought along a couple of people who work for me—Jeffrey Passel and Jacob Siegel—and they know a lot more about these matters.

I would be happy to see if one of them can answer your question. If not, we will be happy to send an answer in writing.

Senator SIMPSON. Why do you not just furnish that in writing to us?

Mr. HERRIOT. OK.

Senator SIMPSON. I will try to stay with more of the demographic questions rather than immigration policy. But does the United States have a population policy which would seek population stabilization at a certain number by a certain date in the next century? Is that considered?

Mr. HERRIOT. Did you say do we have one?

Senator SIMPSON. Is that ever considered, yes.

Mr. HERRIOT. Considered by the Census Bureau?

Senator SIMPSON. Yes. Or the Population Division of the Bureau of Census specifically.

Mr. HERRIOT. Well, what we attempt to do is to measure population change, both in numbers and composition, the characteristics of the population, and report this in various ways to policy people such as yourself and people in the administration who we believe might find them useful in the formulation of such policy. But that would be the extent to which we would get involved in those matters as an agency.

Senator SIMPSON. I think just because of time limits I will furnish some questions in writing to you and ask you to respond. Some of the things that I will be interested in knowing, you mentioned the Census Bureau is continuing research and developing better estimates of illegal immigration. Perhaps you can elaborate on those efforts for us and inform us when those results might be available. And also, how registration of illegal immigrants in any legalization program might be structured to provide us more information on that group of people and what types of information could be obtained. And I think I will just do that and get that to you.

And I thank you.

Mr. **Herriot**. We would be happy to provide the answers, sir.

[The material follows:]

1. You stated in your testimony that a supplement to the November 1979 Current Population Survey will provide the only basis for determining the extent of assimilation of second generation immigrants. How will assimilation be measured in this survey and when will the results be available?

The November 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS) does not measure assimilation *per se*; rather, it will provide data which can be used to compare the characteristics of first-generation, second-generation, and third-or-higher-generation Americans. The data currently available from the November 1979 CPS supplement are basically population figures for those three "generational" categories for various countries of origin. They are scheduled for publication in March 1982. A second, more detailed report based on the November 1979 Current Population Survey is planned, but timing and funding are uncertain. The data for this report will be available in early 1983 if funding is available. A public-use tape from the November 1979 CPS supplement containing individual records which can be tabulated by analysts according to their own specifications is currently available.

Three types of studies of assimilation of second-generation "immigrants" will be possible:

1) Data from the November 1979 CPS supplement will permit comparisons of first-generation immigrants (foreign-born persons), second-generation "immigrants" (natives of foreign or mixed parentage), and third-and-higher generation persons (natives both of whose parents were born in the United States). The degree of assimilation of the second-generation "immigrants" can be obtained by comparisons of these nativity groups with respect to educational attainment, literacy, use of English, occupation, income status, and other social and economic characteristics. Tabulations for about 14 countries are currently planned, and data for other countries will be available in unpublished tables.

2) Data on the social and economic characteristics of foreign-born persons and second-generation persons by country of birth or origin from the 1970 census have been published in the report on *National Origin and Language* (PC(2)-1A). Comparison of these data with the data from the November 1979 Current Population Survey would show the relative changes in educational attainment, occupation, income, etc., for foreign-born persons and second-generation persons over the nearly 10-year period between the census and the survey.

3) A third approach to measurement of assimilation involves comparing the data on foreign-born persons in the 1970 census (from the report on

National Origin and Language) with data from the November 1979 Current Population Survey for foreign-born persons who immigrated before 1970. This comparison permits analysis of the assimilation of immigrants during the intervening period as measured by changes in educational attainment, income, occupational level, etc., for persons who immigrated in the same years. Although changes in these characteristics for particular individuals cannot be traced over the time period, changes for period-of-immigration groups can be identified.

2. What rates of emigration does the Census Bureau use in computing net immigration figures? As an example, what would the gross numbers of immigration be to produce a net immigration figure of 500,000?

Since 1970, an annual level of 36,000 emigrants (native as well as foreign-born) has been used by the Census Bureau in its population estimates program. Recent research has demonstrated, however, that foreign-born emigration alone was much higher--1.1 million for the decade, 1960 to 1970, and 1.3 million for 1970 to 1980. Accordingly, the Census Bureau is in the process of updating the estimates of emigration used in its population estimates program. The estimate of total emigration is being revised to 160,000 a year for each year since 1979. Of that total, roughly 85 percent would be foreign-born persons. Gross migration of 660,000 would yield, at this level of emigration, a net immigration figure of 500,000.

3. Does the United States have a population policy which would seek population stabilization at a certain number by a certain date in the next century?

In replying to this question, I speak from a knowledge of the general situation rather than from any particular responsibility or role of the U.S. Bureau of the Census in formulating, monitoring, or implementing policy.

The United States Government does not have an overall population policy and specifically does not have a policy seeking stabilization of the national population at a certain number by a certain date. None of the population projections published by the Bureau of the Census should be interpreted to imply that there is an official position regarding the desired ultimate size of the future U.S. population.

This is not to say that the U.S. Government does not have both explicit and implicit policies regarding various aspects of population change. For example, we have much explicit policy relating to immigration and mortality, i.e., policy expressed in laws, administrative regulations, and Federal programs pertaining directly to immigration and mortality. We have some explicit policy relating to fertility (e.g., Federal programs to promote maternal health thru child spacing) and much implicit policy relating to fertility, i.e., policy expressed in laws, administrative regulations, and Federal programs relating to other areas of national concern but having an effect on fertility behavior, such as tax law and housing programs.

The President's Commission on Population Growth and the American Future recommended (1972) that the U.S. Government adopt a policy of achieving population stabilization, but this recommendation was not acted upon. Now a bill introduced in the Seante by Senator Hatfield, S 1771, and a similar bill introduced in the House by Representative Ottinger, HR 907, seek to establish a national population policy looking toward stabilization of our national population.

4. You have mentioned that the Census Bureau is continuing research aimed at developing better estimates of illegal immigration. Could you please elaborate on these efforts and tell us when the results will be available?

Some empirically grounded research, as distinct from conjecture, has been conducted to estimate the size of the illegal alien population in the United States but, to date, the problems involved have proved intractable. The Census Bureau has both conducted its own research (e.g., Robinson, 1980) as well as reviewed and monitored research conducted outside the Bureau (Siegel, Passel, and Robinson, 1980). Many of the research findings have been of questionable accuracy and most have lacked precision, i.e., the range of estimates have proved to be quite large. In view of the extreme difficulty of the estimation problem and the clandestine nature of the illegal alien population, associated with the illegal alien's distrust of and unwillingness to cooperate with authorities, it is unlikely that the expenditure of far greater resources than have been expended to date would necessarily yield accurate estimates of either the size of the illegal alien population or the number entering the country.

The Census Bureau does have several research efforts in progress which may eventually yield some information on the size of the illegal alien population. One such effort involves first developing an estimate of the alien population legally resident in the country from immigration and naturalization records as well as from estimates of mortality and emigration. The difference between the 1980 census count of aliens and the estimate of the legally resident alien population then represents an estimate of the number of illegals counted in the 1980 census and consequently a minimum number in the country. This estimation procedure requires nativity data from the sample phase of the 1980 census; these will not be available before late 1982. However, similar calculations using the November 1979 Current Population Survey have demonstrated the utility of the technique; they indicate the presence of at least one and a quarter million illegal aliens.

Research conducted at the Bureau (Robinson, 1980) compared trends from 1960 to 1975 in age-sex-specific death rates for areas and populations suspected of including illegal aliens with those assumed not to include many illegals. The research was successful in that the presence of illegals could be detected with the technique. However, the results provided only a very broad range of estimates of the size of the illegal alien population. This work has been updated to include data through 1978 but the available estimates still encompass an extremely wide range.

The Bureau is also investigating the possibility of analyzing data from Mexican censuses, vital statistics, and surveys conducted by the Mexican government. Demographic analysis of Mexican vital statistics and comparison of the expected number with Mexican census data may provide rough estimates of the combined number of persons who were missed in the Mexican census or who migrated to the United States illegally. However, the application of the analytic techniques may require such a large number of untestable assumptions that the results will not be particularly useful.

One other possible source of information is the Census Bureau's program for measuring coverage of the 1980 census. The Post-Enumeration Program (PEP) consists of a case-by-case match of samples from the Current Population Survey with the census as well as a re-enumeration of a sample of households included in the census. The results of the PEP, although subject to error, will provide an estimate of the total population in the United States. The other major portion of the 1980 Census Evaluation Program involves the application of demographic analysis. This technique involves developing an estimate of the population of the United States from data essentially independent of the 1980 census, such as birth, death, and immigration records, prior censuses, administrative data, and sample surveys. Although also subject to error, demographic analysis can provide a reliable estimate of the legally resident population. Thus, comparison of the PEP results with the results of demographic analysis may provide an indication of the number of illegal aliens in the United States in 1980 in addition to providing an assessment of the potential errors in both estimates.

The Census Bureau has pursued and will continue to pursue research into the size of the illegal alien population. However, to date, the Census Bureau's research has not developed any techniques which promise to provide adequate estimates. Unfortunately, the ranges of error for any reasonable estimation techniques are very broad and no breakthroughs seem imminent.

References:

Siegel, Jacob S., Passel, Jeffrey S., and Robinson, J. Gregory, 1980. "Preliminary Review of Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal Residents in the United States," U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, The Staff Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Appendix E: Papers on Illegal Immigration to the U.S.

Robinson, J. Gregory, 1980, "Estimating the Approximate Size of the Illegal Alien Population in the United States by the Comparative Trend Analysis of Age-Specific Death Rates," Demography, 17(2,May): 159-176

5. How could the registration of illegal immigrants in a legalization program be structured to provide more information on this group of people? What types of information could be elicited, and how valuable would this be?

In any legalization program, illegal aliens would have to come forward, identify themselves, and provide some evidence of residence in the United States. Certain basic information could be collected from all registrants and more extensive, detailed data could be collected from a sample of the illegals. By making the completion of the questionnaire or information form a condition of legalization, the collection of relatively accurate and complete data could be assured.

Basic demographic data such as age, sex, and country of origin should be collected from all illegal aliens. In addition, information on place of residence, date (month and year) of entry into the United States, and place and method of entry (entry without inspection, tourist visa, work permit, etc.) as well as any previous contact with the Immigration and Naturalization Service should be collected from all registrants. These data could prove of some value in providing the most fundamental information about the extent and nature of the problem, validating previous research findings, and possibly aid in assessing the degree of compliance with the program.

More extensive data on social and economic characteristics would be useful in assessing the impact of past illegal immigration and of the legalization program on U.S. society. Such information as occupation, industry, education and training, income, money sent abroad, employment, and utilization of public services in the United States should be collected from a sample of illegals. Detailed migration, income, and employment histories (including experience in country of origin) could also be collected on a sample basis. Data on social characteristics, such as family structure, other relatives in the United States, English language ability and usage, and fertility, collected from a sample of the illegals would provide information relating to assimilation and integration into mainstream society.

All illegals in the country will not respond to a legalization program because of distrust, ineligibility, uncertainty as to their status, or other reasons. Data collected from registrants may provide some method of broadly assessing the numbers and characteristics of non-registrants. It is unlikely, however, that data from any legalization program would provide an extremely accurate and precise estimate of the total number of illegal aliens in the country.

6. What was the total number of migrant farm workers enumerated in the 1980 Census? We have been told that this number decreased by half from 1960 to 1970.

According to the definition used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the term migrant farm workers includes all persons who leave their home county, stay overnight, and do farmwork for cash wages or salary. The 1980 census did not attempt to identify migrant farmworkers. The most recent published data comes from a supplement to the December 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS). Another supplement was conducted in December 1981, but those data are not yet available.

According to the 1979 survey, there were about 217,000 migrant farm workers in the United States. The majority of the migrant farmworkers in December 1979 were most likely native Americans who travelled across county or state lines to find temporary work. This number constitutes about 8 percent of the total hired farm working force. This proportion did not change significantly during the seventies, but was lower than the 10-14 percent range of the sixties.

Since 1960 the number of migratory workers declined by almost 50 percent. The number rose from about 400,000 in 1960 to a high of 466,000 between 1964 and 1965, and then dropped steadily between 1965 and 1970 to around 200,000. The number has remained relatively stable at around 200,000 since 1970. The 1964-65 rise represented a temporary adjustment to the termination of the Bracero Program, which enabled Mexican nationals to enter the United States to do temporary farmwork from 1951 to 1964.

7. You have stated that the 1980 census counted nearly 6 million more persons than were expected in 1980 on the basis of the 1970 census and 850,000 more persons than the estimated total legally resident population in 1980. Since Census doesn't consider the legality of a person's status in counting him, what is the distinction between the two figures of 6 million and 850,000?

The Census Bureau estimated the change in population based on births, deaths, and net immigration, excluding illegal immigration, for 1970-1980 at 17,507,000, derived as follows:

Births (registered)	33,244,000
Deaths	-19,322,000
Net legal civilian immigration*	+ 3,018,000
Net military movement to the U.S.	+ 567,000
Population change, 1970-80	17,507,000

The addition of this amount of change for 1970-1980 to the 1970 census count of 203,235,000 gives an estimated population of 220,742,000 for 1980.

1970 census	203,235,000
Net increase, 1970-80	+17,507,000
1980 estimate based on 1970 census	220,742,000

The 1980 census count of 226,505,000 exceeds this estimate based on the 1970 census count by 5,763,000, or nearly 6 million persons:

1980 census	226,505,000
1980 estimate based on 1970 census	220,742,000
Excess of 1980 census	5,763,000

The estimation procedure just described does not take into account the entire legally resident population, however. First and most importantly, the 1970 census was estimated to have an undercount of about 4,656,000 persons. Second, in developing the estimate of the total legally resident population for 1980, a small allowance was made for unregistered births; this correction adds about 255,000 persons. By adding these two figures to the estimate for 1980 based on the 1970 census count, an estimate of 225,653,000 for the total legally resident population in 1980 is obtained:

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*Includes alien immigrants and refugees, as well as emigrants, net movement from Puerto Rico, and net movement of civilian citizens.

Estimate for 1980 based on the 1970 census	220,742,000
Undercount of the 1970 census	+ 4,656,000
Unregistered births, 1970-1980	+ 255,000
Estimated legally resident population, 1980	225,653,000

Thus, the 1980 census count, which is assumed to include some illegal aliens, exceeds the estimated legally resident population for 1980 by about 850,000:

1980 census count	226,505,000
Estimated legally resident population, 1980	225,653,000
Excess of 1980 census	852,000

8. If we were to enact the Administration's immigration proposals, what would be the net immigration assuming 310,000 numerically restricted immigrants, 150,000 numerically unrestricted immigrants, and 150,000 refugees and asylees--a gross number of 610,000 persons coming to the U.S. annually?

At this time, there is too little information available on the number and characteristics of emigrants to predict accurately the level of net immigration under the Administration's immigration proposals. The level of emigration is a function of a number of factors which reflect not only the individual decisions of new immigrants but also those made by other foreign-born residents and natives. Emigration rates vary among these groups. Some classes of immigrants have higher emigration rates than others; for example, persons admitted for permanent residence are more likely to emigrate than refugees, for whom the return to the country of origin is probably not a viable alternative.

If we consider the pool of persons likely to emigrate, it is the recent immigration, i.e., over the previous 5 to 10 years, that would probably provide the majority of emigrants. However, only a relatively small number of persons who entered the United States in a particular year decide to emigrate that same year. Economic and political conditions in the United States as well as in the countries of intended residence, usually the countries of origin of the former immigrants, would also affect the level of emigration.

Apart from the uncertainties of prediction, our ability to measure emigration in future years is severely hampered by a lack of current data, resulting in part from budgetary restrictions. However, the Administration's proposed levels of immigration do not differ enough from the recorded levels of recent years to seriously modify our view of the current level of emigration (160,000). Thus, given similar conditions, the net immigration would be approximately 450,000-475,000. (These figures make no allowance for the net movement of citizens, particularly from Puerto Rico and other outlying areas, and for net illegal immigration.)

Senator SIMPSON. And to the other members of the panel from the administration I greatly appreciate always your helpful, willing cooperation to testify; and we will shortly complete our formal hearing process and then we will have the greatest sales job in the history of modern man on our hands.

It is also good to see you, Ms. Meissner, back there. We miss you at the counsel table, but we will probably get to you once again.

Thank you very much, and I apologize again for my tardiness. Thank you.

Now, the next panel consists of Loy Bilderback of Zero Population Growth, Washington; Thomas Espenshade, the Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.; and Charles Keely, the Population Council of New York.

We are running a bit late. We will try to go forward now with the last panel of the morning.

It is nice to have you here. We appreciate your willingness to present your background to the subcommittee. And so we will just proceed in the order of the agenda, Mr. Bildberback first.

We do have the time, the strength, and the apparatus. We will begin the process.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LOY BILDERBACK, ZERO POPULATION GROWTH

Mr. BILDERBACK. I am Loy Bilderback. I have worked on Latin America, primarily Central America, population problems for the last 8 years, and I have been particularly concerned with the immigration to the United States from Mexico and the Caribbean for about the last 4.

I have to take exception with the recommendations of the administration. I want a cap, I want a very firm cap, and I am one of those ordinary citizens who cannot understand the differences in the various categories.

My definition of immigrant is one who comes to the United States to stay, regardless of the category or nature of their admission. My primary concern is that the population of the United States, the growth of the population of the United States be halted as soon as possible and a slow reduction initiated through public policy.

Currently, with 230 million people, the age structure, the total fertility rate, all of this sort of thing, suggests that we can afford a net immigration of a quarter of a million people per year, a gross immigration perhaps of 300,000 or 325,000 given the counterflow. Any immigration, any prolonged immigration beyond this level is going to be destructive to the fabric and fiber of the Republic. We are now living by spending resource capital. I do not simply mean petroleum. I mean topsoil, I mean ground water, things that nobody is arguing there are alternatives for.

We have got to bring ourselves into balance with our resources. We have got to start living on the basis of resource income instead of spending capital; and we cannot do this with an infinitely growing population.

We can afford a level of immigration. At the moment I would suggest that that is about a quarter of a million per year. So I am not saying no immigration at all, but that has to include everybody who is admitted into the Republic, and we cannot make exceptions for the convenience of the various parts of government.

We have to decide how many people we are going to let in. We are going to have to stick to that, and that is going to be an extremely difficult policy to write and an extremely difficult policy to administer, but it is one of those things that simply has to be done.

Again, when I say 300,000 or 325,000 annual gross, I mean everybody whether they are Russian ballet dancers or Haitian peasants or whatever. We can afford a level of immigration, but it has to be restrained or we are going to have an unreasonable growth in population.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Bilderback.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilderback and material subsequently submitted follow:]

Testimony Before the Immigration Subcommittee,
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
January 25, 1982

FACTORS GOVERNING THE ANNUAL SIZE OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES*

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The number of immigrants admitted annually to the United States should be set in law. It should be set in conjunction with national vital rates, so that population growth will be halted as soon as possible and a slow decline initiated. If we can hold our current total fertility rate of 1.8, we could afford a net annual immigration of 250,000 and a gross number of admissions perhaps as large as 300,000 or 325,000.[1] The number of immigrants admitted each year will have to be adjusted periodically in keeping with changing birth, death, and emigration rates. No other criteria should be allowed for the calculation of annual immigration size.

The maintenance of even the current population at 230 million is being achieved by reduced levels of consumption--particularly in housing--and by the expenditure of precious resource capital. The more people there are in the United States, the faster this depletion will take place and the more difficult will be the inevitable adjustment to living within our resource income. Petroleum is the usual example of a non-renewable resource that Americans are wastefully depleting, but it is not the only one nor is it even among the more crucial to our long-run, national survival. As agricultural economist Lester Brown has put it, "Civilization can survive the exhaustion of oil resources, but not the continuing wholesale loss of topsoil."[2] We would point to the irreversible loss of prime agricultural land to urban growth and urban sprawl and the depletion of ground water as further examples.** The most dangerous waste is that of the once-abundant stock of natural populations and species, the great variety of living organisms that are working parts of the ecological systems upon which our society and humanity depend.[3]

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*Many of the issues treated here are dealt with at greater length in Ehrlich, Paul R., Loy Bilderback, Anne H. Ehrlich The Golden Door: International Migration, The United States and Mexico, Wideview Books, New York, 1981.

[1] Leon Bouvier, "The Impact of Immigration on U.S. Population Size," Population Trends and Public Policy, #1, (Population Reference Bureau) January, 1981. This short, readable study lays out all reasonable permutations of its subject and their consequences.

Government policy in immigration, as in everything else, must be based on the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. Cornucopian optimists will tell you that imminent wonders of science and technology will solve problems of resource depletion and crowding. We answer that the record of technology is uneven and unreliable. The nuclear power industry has promised lower electric bills for the last 35 years. While the cost of home computers has plummeted, the price of a home has soared beyond the reach of most young, American families. While we have developed the recoverable space shuttle for cheaper, distant exploration, the cost of driving an automobile has gone from negligible to substantial. We must plan our future responsibly and conservatively on the basis of what we have in hand, not on the basis of utopian schemes of what we would like. We can raise our level of immigration if and when technology has made it clearly affordable. We must not do so simply in anticipation of some happy turn of events.

All categories of immigrants must be contained within this figure of 300,000 to 325,000--refugees, relatives of U.S. citizens, film directors, Haitian peasants, Russian dancers, Basque sheepherders, and everyone else. Whom we admit is much less important than how many. We must have a level of immigration that will first stabilize and then lead to a slow decline in the size of the American population.

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[2] Lester Brown, Building a Sustainable Society, W. W. Norton, New York, 1981, p. 13.

**Ground water, properly exploited, is a renewable resource, but the way we are now mismanaging it makes it effectively non-renewable.

[3] Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, Extinction, Random House, New York, 1981.

Traditionally, immigration legislation has been second only to the Internal Revenue Code in wrinkles and loopholes but no one gets very upset about violations of the immigration code. We are talking about everyone born in a foreign land who comes here to stay. Attorney General Smith told you last summer that we have "lost control of our borders," and until that is corrected, we cannot expect much from fanciful numbers fixed in law.

Any flexibility in the total number of immigrant admissions will lead to abuse and to the continuance of a destructive population growth in the United States. For illustration, I need point only to the "parole power" of the Attorney General which the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 intended for occasional, case-by-case exemptions, but since 1956 has been an avenue for wholesale admissions. The parole power was intended to provide a trickle but led to a torrent.

A problem that must be faced is whether or not America benefits from temporary, foreign labor. We feel that at this time it probably does, but others who are equally well informed--former Labor Secretary Ray Marshall, for example--disagree. The question has not been properly framed and the data have not been gathered. However, should you become convinced that temporary foreign labor is desirable, make sure it is temporary. Given the experience of the European Common Market countries, this will be very difficult to do. Any filtration out of the temporary foreign work force into the permanent population has to be counted in the 300,000. The same thing holds true for any other group, like students, who are granted temporary residency here.

The refugee question will remain the tough one. In 1952, it was so tough that your predecessors consciously ignored it and since then the Congress has passed at least ten different refugee admission acts, each one a stop gap. Dag Hammerskjold characterized this as the "Age of the Refugee." Throughout the world, there are millions of people in camps meeting the U.N. definition of refugees, and there are tens of millions who would flee their situations if they had half a chance. The United States cannot materially lessen this suffering by granting admissions to our country. They are too many and our resources are too limited. The 150,000 or so Marielitos we got from Cuba are nothing compared to the influx we would get from the rest of Latin America should we open our borders.

As we pointed out in The Golden Door,[4] large scale international migration is a source of social and political instability as well as a result. The volume of international migration the world has sustained in recent years is the highest in history. If we were to admit only enough people to keep the population of the rest of the world from increasing, the U.S. population would reach 500 million by June of 1985 and ten years from now it would be over a billion. The United States cannot admit enough people to make any real difference. Neither can it play traffic cop to the world-wide flow of population. What the United States can do is craft its own policies to reduce the flow.

Domestically, the United States can make itself less attractive as a destination for migrants by enforcing existing labor laws. Ending the benefits to employers of hiring illegals would be a big step in the right direction.

Every foreign policy initiative of the U.S. should be evaluated from the aspect of its impact on population flow. As a first step, there must be a reversal of power relationships in the President's cabinet. The Attorney General must start telling the Secretary of State how many admissions he is going to be allowed to facilitate his foreign policy instead of the Secretary of State dictating immigration policy to the Attorney General. We are not simply referring here to Mr. Haig and Mr. Smith. They inherited a relationship of their offices that goes back to 1945. No longer, however, can immigration remain the hand servant of foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy must start serving the needs of our immigration program. (See Golden Door, pp. 71 ff.)

We must abandon the specious distinction between "economic" and "political" refugees. A person fleeing a disintegrating economy and a repressive regime in Eastern Europe is the same as a person fleeing a disintegrating economy and a repressive regime in Central America. The fact that General Jaruzelski is surrounded by men who spout Marxist foolishness and President Duarte is not, is a distinction without a difference.

The world is full of men and women who seek nothing but an opportunity to earn a livelihood by honest, hard work, and the United States should do everything its resources will allow to help them. However, their wholesale admission would soon destroy the Unites States' capacity to help anyone.

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[4] Pp. 12 ff; 32ff.

Our position is restrictionist, indeed, we are arch-restrictionist, but that does not mean we embrace every restrictionist argument. We disavow and wish to dissociate ourselves completely from nativist, xenophobic, and racist arguments for the exclusion of ethnic, regional, or linguistic groups.

As we described at length in The Golden Door,[5] it is a shameful truth that historically racism has been the most potent single force in shaping U.S. immigration policy. We have made great strides in overcoming this since the reforms initiated by President Kennedy 20 years ago, but the dark shadow of bigotry still obscures our true immigration problems. Do any here believe that we would greet an illegal flood of Poles with the same cavalier callousness we have shown the Haitians? Enforcement of immigration policy must be firm, speedy, even-handed, and color blind.

On a related topic, Americans should stop worrying about phantom issues like the Hispanicization of the Southwest or bilingualism. One of us lives in one of the provincial capitals of Joel Garreau's Mex-America[6] and he is not worried. The influx of Hispanics has enriched our lives with food, music, and exemplary family ties. They have enriched our economy with their hard work. We are better off because they have come, just as Italians or Irish enriched Boston, Philadelphia, and other parts. South Florida has some problems, but these are caused by the failure to enforce the Neutrality Act and the narcotic laws as well as by the influx of immigrants.

One of us wrote his views on this to Senator Simpson several months ago, and we have taken the liberty of appending them to our written testimony today.

In conclusion, let us emphasize that the U.S. population must be reduced in size as soon as possible. At 230 million, it is far over optimum given the way we live. Current reproductive patterns put a manageable U.S. population within our grasp. Immigration is an increasingly important component of American population growth. Immigration policy, then, is a critical part of population policy.

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[5] Ch. 2, passim.

[6] Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston, 1981.

What must be done is to get the number of births plus immigrants slightly below the number of deaths plus emigrants. Americans must recognize the fundamental trade off between births and immigrants. Insofar as Americans want the pleasure of more children, they must forego the admission of immigrants. If they wish to express their compassion for others by admitting immigrants, they must reduce births. To do otherwise would be to continue the destruction of our national fabric and with it our capacity to take care of ourselves or anyone else.

Some Alternative Views on Assimilation in Response to the Statement of Senator Alan K. Simpson in The Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.

by

Loy Bilderback
Professor of History
California State University, Fresno

I define assimilation as the orderly progress of an immigrant toward constructive participation in the social, economic, and political life of the United States. It is a subject that has not received the attention it deserves from the social sciences and there exists no theoretical framework for describing it or for measuring and judging the problems stemming from it. My views are simply those of one who has studied the problem.

Naturalization as in index of assimilation. I studied this a few years ago and, using a different methodology[1] than that in the report, I found the following:

Immigrant groups	% of immigrants 1966-70 naturalized, 1971-75
All	30%
Germans[2]	45
Mexicans	12
Canadians	14

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[1] I have asked Ralph Thomas to send me the paper on which the naturalization rates in the Report were based, but I fear he could not find it in the rush of closing down the Select Commission. I would be very interested in knowing if they calculated the rates for Canadians.

[2] Germans had the highest rate of naturalization of any major group except Cubans who were admitted and made eligible for naturalization by so many different ground rules that they are not comparable to the others.

The significance of this is that Canadians, most of whom are English speakers, gain naturalization at about the same low rate as Mexicans but no one worries about their assimilation!!!

There are many reasons for persons seeking or not seeking naturalization that have nothing to do with assimilation.

--Europeans attach a great significance to "having their papers in order" because they come from societies where this is important. It is not important for Mexicans and Canadians (nor Americans).

--I have an Italian-born friend, a naturalized American who has previously held Salvadoran and Egyptian citizenship. He now holds U.S. citizenship, along with Italian, because he runs a large ranch owned by a Zurich-based investment consortium and his citizenship is their hedge against California outlawing the foreign ownership of farm land.

--A Canadian colleague who had been in the United States for twenty years became naturalized only when he found he was ineligible to serve as principal investigator on a government-funded research project if he was not a U.S. citizen.

--A Panamanian colleague who lived here for ten years became naturalized only when he decided to emigrate to Costa Rica and felt he would be better off there as an "American" than as a "Panamanian."

--I have an Hungarian-born colleague, naturalized twenty years ago, who refuses to vote because he does not understand our political system. I have assured him that this is no bar to political participation for a real American.

--Mexicans can compromise their children's and their own inheritance rights to property in Mexico by naturalization.

--There is little meaning to naturalization except the symbolic. I know of little except protection from the remote possibility of deportation or internment in time of war, the right to vote, and certain, rare employment opportunities to be gained from naturalization.

I trust I have made my point. Although I have sought it, I know of no systematic evidence that naturalization means anything in terms of assimilation.

Language and assimilation. The preponderance of linguistic and social scientific evidence indicates that the long-term survival of a minority language is much more a result of the failure to assimilate than it is a cause. The experience of Canada is illuminating.

--The French-speaking Quebecers have been politically separated from France since 1763 and have felt a cultural estrangement since the 1790's. No significant emigration from France has occurred for well over two-hundred years. Although pockets of French-speakers outside Quebec have disappeared, French is alive and well within the Province.

--While Quebec insists on a bilingual Canada, they are equally insistent on an exclusively French-speaking Quebec because they see bilingualism as a threat to their cultural heritage!!!

--Finally, we have the Eastern Townships, a pocket of tenacious English-speakers in the South of Quebec who have been completely surrounded by French speakers and governed by French-speaking provincial authorities for over a century. Their English language is similarly alive and well.

I see no danger for the United States in the problem of Canada--where French is the language of Quebec and English the language of success--because immigrants come here to succeed. For the immigrant, success is in the work place where the good jobs require English and for the immigrant's children success is in the schools where English is the only language that will get you very far.

Bilingualism and biculturalism. I believe that language is primarily a utilitarian tool. Languages survive when they are useful in everyday life and wither away when they are not. The formal efforts of governments or private groups can do very little to keep a language going or to stamp it out. Basque is alive and well in the North of Spain despite a centuries-old campaign from Madrid to get rid of it. Cornish died out in Southwest Britain early in this century despite considerable efforts to keep it going. The Swiss are fighting a losing battle to save Romanche, an obscure derivation from Latin, by subsidizing newspapers and formal instruction in schools.

Hebrew has been brought back as a modern language in the last fifty or seventy-five years after centuries as a "fossil language"[3] kept alive only in the context of religion. But this success was based on utility. Jews came to Israel from Morocco and the Yemen, the United States and Russia, as well as points in between. If they were going to make their society work they had to have a common language.

Gaelic is a living language in some rural parts of Ireland and its establishment as the national tongue was a chief goal of the Irish nationalist movement. It is now sixty years after the formation of the Irish Free State and it is no more widespread today than it was in 1920 despite tremendous effort in the public schools. English is the language in which the Irish express their bitterness toward the British.

I predict that bilingualism/biculturalism in the schools of California will serve the ends of assimilation regardless of the intent of the sponsors. What I see being fought out right now in my community and on my campus--in the name of bilingualism--signals the fatal weakening of Spanish as a living language. Spanish has kept going here for over a century with no subsidy or special nurturing. As Spanish fails Chicano and Mexican-American leaders seek its institutionalization, or fossilization, in the curriculum of the schools. Their motives are many. Some fear losing the good things in their culture while those who would be leaders fear losing their constituencies. The latter are fearful for good reason. The days of Spanish in the Southwest are still many, but they are numbered.

Conclusion. Assimilation is a difficult experience for those who are undergoing it. The immigrants themselves and their children do not like to admit how hard it was and the rest of us don't either. It is hard for all groups.

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[3] A fossil language is one that may serve some use in the society but which no one learns at home and this contrasts with a living language which people grow up speaking.

The prejudice against and rejection of Irish Catholics is often discussed and the 1960 election of John Kennedy cited as their triumph of assimilation. What is not cited is that the first descendant of a German Protestant immigrant to become President was Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. The chronological pattern and the size of the Irish and German immigrations are very similar.

Assimilation is not something that can be achieved simply by the will of the immigrant. The assimilation of Black Americans was forbidden or discouraged by law in most of the United States until very recently. The distinctiveness of Americans descended from Japanese and Chinese immigrants has been heightened by legal bans on their ownership of land in many states and their denial of access to citizenship until well into this century.

The subtlety and complexity of assimilation, however, is seen in the much stronger tendency of Chinese than Japanese to congregate in urban ghettos though each was subjected to similar harassment.

The main body of society has always been suspicious of the political loyalty of immigrants but this suspicion has never been born out. The Kaiser's Germany tried to manipulate the German-born element in the United States to prevent our entry into World War I, but to no avail. Almost everyone today acknowledges that our relocation of the Japanese from the West Coast in 1942 was not necessary.

Today the unease is over the Hispanics, particularly the Mexicans. I know people who actually believe that there is a plot to return the Mexican Cession of 1848 to Mexico. Furthermore, they are convinced that Leonel Castillo's appointment as INS Commissioner was part of that plot.

Mexicans and the other Hispanics from Central America and the Caribbean are coming here in large numbers and they will come in numbers far larger than we can accomodate. A cursory examination of the demographic and economic figures from those regions will demonstrate this. We cannot absorb them, but it is not their peculiar ways that is the problem, it is their sheer numbers.

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February 1, 1982

FEB 9 1982

Senator Alan K. Simpson
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Simpson:

I would like to clarify two things from my testimony before you on January 25, 1982. First, Phyllis Eisen of ZPG suggested I explain the seeming discrepancy between my recommendation of a 300,000 to 325,000 cap and previous ZPG witnesses who had recommended 400,000. Second I would like to explain why I feel so strongly about the cap including refugees.

My figure on the cap comes from Leon Bouvier's projection that 250,000 net annual admissions, while maintaining a total fertility rate of 1.8, would stop U.S. population growth and initiate the kind of slow population reduction we advocate. I added 20% to 30% (50,000 to 75,000) to Mr. Bouvier's figure to balance the number of immigrants who do not remain here.

The number of annual admissions is neither the only nor, within limits, the most important variable in projecting the long-term impact of immigration on population. If the great bulk of immigrants were young people just entering childbearing years Mr. Bouvier's 250,000 would be far too large. If the group were composed mostly of older people the cap could be well over 400,000. Similarly, the reproductive patterns of the cultures from which the immigrants come could make a big difference. I would expect a given number of Swedes to contribute less to population growth than the same number from most Latin American countries.

ZPG and I feel that when all of the relevent variables are balanced, an annual immigration level in the low to middle hundreds-of-thousands will allow us to re-establish the American population at a size consistent with our resource income.

On the matter of whether the cap should cover refugees, I am disturbed that men like Charles Keely, Mr. Espenshade, or Michael Teitelbaum, whose work I admire, do not share my sense of the immediacy or magnitude of the problems we face in the immigration/refugee issue. This difference is at the heart of our differing recommendations on including refugees under the cap.

I think that between five and ten years from now we will be faced with a demographic-migration upheaval in the Western Hemisphere, and in its Northern half particularly, that is unparalleled in human experience. I would like to explain why I think this is going to happen, which, in turn, is why I feel we must include refugees under the cap.

1. The attached graph, prepared by the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) tells much of the story. While rates of birth and growth in Latin America have been dropping since 1960 and before, momentum in the age structure causes a continuing rise in population from 216 million in 1960 to 381 million today and projected to 565 million in 2000 and well over 800 million by 2020. These projections assume continued declines in birth and growth rates.

2. International migration is not caused by births, but by those born maturing and seeking jobs. The Latin American work force is growing at a rate much faster than the population as a whole, for example:

THE LATIN AMERICAN POPULATION AND WORK FORCE, 1981-2000

	Increase in Population, 1981-2000	Increase in Work Force, 1981-2000
Latin America, all	55%	71%
Central America and Panama	76%	92%
Haiti	70%	62%
Mexico	66%	99%
Dominican Republic	57%	81%
Cuba	20%	40%

Source: CELADE, Boletín demográfico, No. 29, January, 1982, Santiago, Chile.

3. The absolute numbers of persons entering the work force, 1981-2000, are much greater than the numbers for 1961-80. The unemployment and underemployment rates for all of Latin America now total about 30%. They are somewhat higher for the countries listed below, except Cuba.

CENTRO LATINOAMERICANO DE DEMOGRAFIA

AMERICA LATINA SITUACION DEMOGRAFICA EVALUADA EN 1980

Estimaciones (1960-1980) y Proyecciones (1980-2025)



Serie A, N°168
Febrero de 1981

celade

GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICAN WORK FORCE (MILLIONS)

	1961-1980	1981-2000
Latin America, all	44.3	81.8
Central America and Panama	3.3	6.7
Haiti	.8	1.8
Mexico	8.5	19.3
Dominican Republic	1.1	1.6
Cuba	.8	1.3

Sources: Calculated from 1960 figures, International Labor Office, 1950-2000 Labour Force, Vol. III, Latin America. Geneva, 1977; 1980 and 2000 figures, CELADE, Boletín demográfico, No. 29, January, 1982, Santiago, Chile.

These figures show me that we are dealing with something big and immediate. If 800,000 added to the Haitian work force in the last twenty years leads people to risk their lives in open boats, what will the increase of 1,800,000 in the next twenty years cause? If Mexico could not accommodate its additional 8,500,000 workers of the last twenty years without sending substantial numbers North, how are they going to deal with the 19,300,000 to be added in the next twenty years, etc., etc., etc?

Large-scale international migration will not be the only result of these increases. There are going to be a lot of political changes, some of them chaotic. A lot of these people are going to fit any reasonable definition of "refugee." The United States will not be able to accommodate enough of them to alleviate the situation without wrecking any orderly immigration program. We must not hold out false hope to these people. We must not encourage them, as individuals, to think, "Well, maybe next year..."

I hope these clarifications are useful.

Yours very truly,

Loy Bilderback
Professor of History

swb

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Espenshade, please.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS ESPENSHADE, THE URBAN INSTITUTE

Mr. ESPENSHADE. Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement, and with your permission I would like to summarize that briefly.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection, that statement will be put in the record.

Mr. ESPENSHADE. My name is Thomas Espenshade. I am a Senior Research Associate at The Urban Institute. I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify on the issue of setting numerical limits on immigration into the United States.

Let me state at the outset that my testimony is based on the results of nonpartisan analysis, and any views that I express will be mine and not necessarily those of The Urban Institute.

My testimony concerns the level of birth rates and the level of immigration as they relate to long-run population size. At the present time in the United States the rate at which women are bearing children is low enough that, in the absence of immigration or emigration, the U.S. population would eventually start to decline. In the language of the demographer, birth rates or fertility rates are "below replacement."

At the same time, the number of immigrants to the United States exceeds the number of emigrants from our country so that we have a situation of positive net immigration.

The central point that I want to emphasize in my statement this morning is this: if current conditions persist indefinitely—that is, if U.S. birth rates stay below replacement at some constant level, and if the volume of immigration to this country is fixed, the U.S. population will eventually achieve a constant size. In the long run, in other words, we would have a situation of zero population growth.

The case is actually more general than this. It is possible to show, either through population projections or through formal demographic analysis, that any fixed level of birth rates, as long as they are below replacement, coupled with any fixed-level of immigration will in the long run lead to a population of constant size.

What this means is that there are numerous combinations of fertility and annual net immigration that yield the same size of a stationary or a fixed-size population. For example, suppose that the United States wanted to aim for an eventual population size of 230 million people, a total not far from its current size. Annual immigration of 1.5 million and a total fertility rate of 1.53 is compatible with this outcome, as is annual immigration of 250,000 and a total fertility rate of about 1.97. To achieve 230 million people in the long run with our current total fertility rate of about 1.85 would require on the order of 625,000 annual net immigrants.

What my analysis suggests is that for policy purposes, numerical limits on immigration to the United States could be tied to recent fertility experience. During periods when fertility is declining, numerical limits could be raised, and vice-versa.

Tying numerical limits on immigration to recent experience of birth rates in the United States has, I think, a number of advantages. It avoids the difficult problem of predicting how U.S. fertility will behave in the future. Second, it allows for flexibility in setting immigration limits. And finally, such a policy would be fairly easy to implement. Immigration levels could be adjusted on the basis of simple demographic criteria.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Espenshade.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Espenshade follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE

I am Dr. Thomas Espenshade, a Senior Research Associate in the Human Resources Policy Center at The Urban Institute, a nonprofit research organization located in Washington, D.C. My colleague, Dr. Leon F. Bouvier from the Population Reference Bureau, and I are pleased to have the opportunity to testify on the issue of setting numerical limits on immigration to the United States. Let us state at the outset that our testimony is based on the results of nonpartisan analysis. Moreover, any views that are expressed are wholly ours, and not necessarily those of The Urban Institute, the Population Reference Bureau, or their sponsors.

Our testimony concerns the level of birth rates and the level of immigration as they relate to long-run population size. At the present time in the United States, the rate at which women are bearing children is low enough that, in the absence of immigration or emigration, the U.S. population would eventually start to decline. In the demographer's language, birth rates or fertility rates are "below replacement." At the same time, the number of immigrants to the United States exceeds the number of emigrants from our country so that we have a situation of positive net immigration. The central point to emphasize is this: If current conditions persist indefinitely, that is, if U.S. birth rates stay below replacement at some constant level and if the volume of immigration to this country is fixed, the U.S. population will eventually achieve a constant size. In the long run we would have a situation of zero population growth.

The size of this eventual stationary population depends critically upon both the assumed level of birth rates and on the assumed level of immigration. But as long as birth rates are below replacement (as they are today) and as long as the annual level of immigration is held constant, a population with a fixed size will be the outcome. Interestingly, the size and composition of today's population affects neither the conclusion that a stationary population will eventually materialize nor the size that population will have.[1]

To illustrate our point, we have shown in Table 1 the varying sizes of a stationary population one would obtain by mixing alternative combinations of fertility rates and levels of immigration. The total fertility rate (TFR) is roughly equivalent to the average number of lifetime births per woman, and any value of the total fertility rate below about 2.1 corresponds to fertility below replacement. For each level of birth rates, we have combined five immigration assumptions, ranging between annual totals of 250,000 and 1.5 million. For example, if fertility rates remain constant at their present level of about 1.85 births per woman and if the annual volume of immigration to the United States is 750,000, the U.S. population would eventually achieve a fixed size of about 265 million persons. However, the population would first grow to a larger size before settling back to 265 million.

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[1] The technical details of the above arguments are set out in T.J. Espenshade, L.F. Bouvier, and W.B. Arthur, "Immigration and the Stable Population Model," Demography, February 1982.

Notice in Table 1 that, for a fixed level of immigration, population size increases as birth rates rise. And, for fixed birth rates, population size increases with the assumed level of immigration. These relationships can be grasped more easily if they are graphed as in Figure 1. Here we have plotted a portion of the data in Table 1, showing just those values of the total fertility rate between 1.4 and 2.0. Most, if not all, western industrial nations with fertility rates below replacement fall in this range.

The usefulness of Figure 1 is that it can be used to demonstrate the policy trade-offs between fertility and immigration with respect to the size of the eventual stationary population. For simplicity, suppose that the United States wanted to aim for an eventual population size of 230 million, a total not far from its current size. Figure 1 shows that there are numerous combinations of fertility and annual immigration that can produce such a total. Annual immigration of 1.5 million and a TFR of 1.53 is compatible with this outcome as is annual immigration of 250,000 and a TFR of about 1.97. To achieve 230 million people in the long run with our current total fertility rate of about 1.85 would require on the order of 625,000 annual immigrants.

This analysis suggests that, for policy purposes, the numerical limits on immigration to the United States could be tied to recent fertility experience in the United States. During periods when fertility is declining, numerical limits could be raised, and vice versa. A policy akin to this is currently in effect in Canada. As of 1977, Canada had a new immigration act. The number of immigrants has been determined to be an annual minimum of 100,000 with the actual figure to be adjusted each year to achieve a desired population growth (given the current rate of fertility) and to take into account existing economic conditions.[2]

Tying numerical limits on immigration to recent experience of birth rates in the United States would produce a number of advantages. It avoids the difficult problem of predicting how U.S. fertility will behave in the future. It allows for flexibility in setting immigration limits. And, finally, such a policy would be easy to implement; immigration levels could be adjusted on the basis of simple demographic criteria.

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[2] Carl F. Grindstaff, Population and Society: A Sociological Perspective. West Hanover, Massachusetts: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981, p. 129. In addition, in 1978, Australia announced a new immigration policy which was expected to attract some 210,000 immigrants during the subsequent three years. This new population policy was in response to a situation of below-replacement fertility and declining immigration levels. The Australian Government announced that it would implement a "triennial rolling immigration program" which would commence with the period from 1978-79 to 1980-81. Such a rolling program approach would allow for flexibility on an annual basis in achieving overall population targets for the three-year period. (See United Nations, World Population Trends and Policies: 1979 Monitoring Report. Volume II, Population Policies. Population Studies, No. 70. New York, 1980, p. 59.

Table 1. Ultimate Stationary Population Size (000's)

Total Fertility Rate	Annual Immigration Assumptions (000's)				
	250	500	750	1000	1500
0.0	12,876	25,753	38,629	51,505	77,258
0.2	13,818	27,637	41,455	55,273	82,910
0.4	14,989	29,978	44,967	59,956	89,934
0.6	16,479	32,958	49,436	65,915	98,872
0.8	18,440	36,881	55,332	73,762	110,643
1.0	21,140	42,280	63,420	84,560	126,840
1.2	25,093	50,186	75,279	100,372	150,558
1.4	31,433	62,866	94,299	125,732	188,598
1.5	36,307	72,613	108,920	145,227	217,840
1.6	43,192	86,381	129,572	172,762	259,143
1.7	54,068	108,135	162,202	216,270	324,405
1.8	74,419	148,838	223,256	297,675	446,512
1.85	88,229	176,458	264,688	352,917	529,376
1.9	115,641	231,282	346,922	462,563	693,844
1.95	165,376	330,752	496,128	661,504	992,256
2.0	294,166	588,332	882,498	1,176,664	1,764,996
2.05	1,468,444	2,936,888	4,405,333	5,873,777	8,810,666

Source: T.J. Espenshade, L.F. Bouvier, and W.B. Arthur, "Immigration and the Stable Population Model," Demography, February 1982. The assistance of Cary Davis of the Population Reference Bureau in performing these calculations is gratefully acknowledged.

Figure 1. Eventual Stationary Population Size Reached with Different Combinations of Net Immigration and Below Replacement Fertility



Senator SIMPSON. And now, Mr. Keely. It is nice to have you again here. I know you have great interest in this area.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES KEELY, CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE POPULATION COUNCIL

Mr. KEELY. My name is Charles Keely. I am a senior associate with the Center for Policy Studies of the Population Council in New York. I am testifying today at the invitation of the subcommittee in my personal capacity.

The witnesses have been asked to comment on three areas of concern about numerical limits on immigration to the United States. The first is the mode of fixing limits in legislation; the second, the comprehensiveness of numerical limits; and third, the criteria affecting the numerical limits.

On the first question, of fixing limits in legislation, I suggest that a numerical limit on immigration visas be invoked. I suggest, however, that the limit be for a 5-year period with a sunset provision. Responsibility should be given to an Immigration Council to adjust the annual allotments to avoid unnecessary delays in bringing people here.

The scope of the annual adjustment by such a council may be limited to achieve a prudent distribution of the 5-year period over the whole period.

On the comprehensiveness, the provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act and the efforts made to improve the consultative mechanism to set annual refugee admissions by members of both Houses during this year's consultation provide adequate congressional oversight.

The numerical limits should be restricted to immigration per se. Refugee admissions should be set under the provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act with the continued act of congressional involvement in the consultative mechanism.

The second issue, about the comprehensiveness of the limit, is whether immediate families of U.S. citizens currently exempt from the numerical ceilings should be included in the overall limit. My preference would be to continue the current exemption. In a practical sense, however, given recent demand for exemption of immediate family members, total limits that included them could be set.

Although I prefer the continued exemption, in practice a ceiling of 450,000 visas, excluding refugees, may achieve the desirable target of minimal delay in reuniting American citizens, families and still meet other family reunion and labor policy goals.

Under the criteria three pairs of criteria were suggested to witnesses. I would like to add two others. We should not forget that family reunion is a criterion for immigration limits. That criterion, whatever the scope of relationships agreed on as appropriate, implies some more or less lower limit. The lowest, I assume, would be a limit that allows a citizen to bring in his spouse and minor unmarried children. As one spreads the net, the citizen's parents, the spouses and minor unmarried children of permanent resident aliens, and so on, the lower level will increase.

The issue of foreign policy, which I would also like to add, must be taken into the equation. I refer the committee to my written testimony. I merely say here that to relegate foreign policy considerations as merely marginal considerations for this country's economy is to live in another age.

On economic criteria I feel that what is being searched for is some sort of indexing, a trigger rate of unemployment, for example, that would lead to an automatic reduction by a formula set in law for immigration levels. In practice such a trigger could only generate a lower limit with a time delay. It is based on a rather static view of the labor force dynamics and the role of foreign recruitment for economic growth. Simplistic indexing based on no theoretical foundation to justify modifications in an overall ceiling is to relinquish responsibility.

Demographic criteria have also received a great deal of attention recently. Immigration levels that I suggest in my written testimony, the 450,000, and considering emigration plus current fertility levels, lead us to a declining population, peaking first at about a level of 275 million. Some would argue that stabilizing or reducing the U.S. population is a mistake. Others reply that whatever level is chosen is too low for reaching their goals. Demographically, however, I suggest a continuation of the current steady course.

It is often said that today's immigration takes place in an America much different from the heyday of mass immigration, and so it does. But so, too, are today's immigrants very different. They are not by and large the huddled masses. In addition, the personal, business, and agency networks dealing with immigrant settlement are different as night and day from earlier networks.

Research by Barry Chiswick, for example, on immigrant earnings and Frank Bean's fertility research for the Select Commission on Immigration shows that integration and assimilation do take place. Contrary to what some would insinuate, the absorbative capacity of the United States is in fact working. The indicators are all in that direction.

On language, the issue is one of language policy in the United States, not really immigration. I fail to see how to translate the unsolved social issue of bilingualism into a specific immigration level.

I would end, Mr. Chairman, by reminding the subcommittee that immigrants also generally add another intangible, namely reinvigoration of the commitment to the kind of society we live in. The political and economic values and opportunities of this country are precious commodities. Freedom fighters, those ambitious people and energetic people who set down roots, here are quite aware of that fact. Their presence does not diminish our heritage and our life. It revitalizes them in an increasingly interdependent world.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Charles B. Keeley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES B. KEELY

Mr. Chairman:

My name is Charles B. Keely. I am Senior Associate at the Center for Policy Studies of the Population Council in New York. I am testifying today at the invitation of the Subcommittee in my personal capacity.

The witnesses have been asked to comment on three areas of concern about numerical limits on immigration to the United States: (a) the mode of fixing limits in legislation; (b) the comprehensiveness of numerical limits; and (c) the criteria affecting the numerical limits.

The Mode of Fixing Limits in Legislation

I assume we all agree that each nation state has the right to control entry to its territory. Since the United States began to impose numerical limits on immigration with the quotas on Eastern Hemisphere visa applicants in the 1920s, the practice has not really been seriously questioned. In fact, the policy thrust has generally been to include more and more classes of applicants under a ceiling. The imposition of a ceiling on the Western Hemisphere in the 1965 Immigration Act and the subsequent legislation on a worldwide ceiling are notable examples. Exemption of certain groups, to be discussed below, has not been a basic questioning of the practice of fixed ceilings on visas. Rather it has been an attempt in realistic and practical ways to meet diverse goals.

There is no overriding argument to abandon numerical limits. Specific limits, however, need not be etched in stone. Therefore, I suggest limits on immigrant visas continue to be specified in law but subject to a sunset provision to insure Congressional attention to this important element of policy.

It is possible to continue the practice of a Congressionally fixed limit (but with a sunset provision) and still maintain some flexibility. The Congressionally fixed limit could be for 5 years, for example, permitting an Immigration Council to authorize use of visa numbers, within certain bounds of descretion, depending on annual demand. The proposal for an Immigration Council with this responsibility, among others, was fully discussed in the Select Commission. So too was the concept of fixing a limit on visas not for each single year but for a number of years and permitting limited flexibility exercised by an Immigration Council to avoid purely arbitrary delays. The Congress may wish to limit the exercise of flexibility to certain classes (e.g., immediate family of permanent resident aliens or occupationally related migration where delay in meeting a certified labor need could hurt the employer and thus the American economy).

In short, I suggest keeping a numerical limit on immigration visas in law. I suggest, however, that the limit should be for a five-year period, giving responsibility to an Immigration Council to adjust the annual allotment to avoid unnecessary delays. The scope of annual adjustments may be limited to achieve a prudent distribution of the five year total over the whole period.

The Comprehensiveness of Numerical Limits

The very nature of refugee movements and the international apparatus to respond to them requires flexibility. The provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act and the efforts made to improve the consultative mechanism to set annual refugee admissions by the members of both Houses during this year's consultations provide adequate Congressional oversight. There is also, of course, the appropriations process available to influence refugee admission levels. Both the Executive and Congress are well aware of the implications of any announced level of refugees given the numerical limits for visas in law and the visa demands and backlogs. To include refugees in an overall numerical limit would give a false sense of security about controlling gross immigration flows, would unduly inhibit the conduct of foreign policy, and could inhibit meeting other immigration goals of family reunion or needed labor detrimental to national interests. Therefore, the numerical limits should be restricted to immigration per se and refugee admissions should be set under the provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act with continued active Congressional involvement in the consultative mechanism.

The second issue is whether immediate families of US citizens, currently exempt from numerical ceilings, should be included under the overall limit. My position is that those exempt immediate family members of citizens should be admitted without delay. I see no reason for spouses or children of a

US citizen to be separated. It is not in our interest to keep families separate or to inhibit or prevent in effect the marriage between a US citizen and a foreign national because of delays in permitting the foreign spouse to reside in the U.S. My preference, therefore would be to continue the current exemption.

In a practical sense, however, given recent demand for exempt immediate family members, a total limit that included them could be set. Given a sunset provision, the practical impact of such a course of action could be assessed. If the current numerical ceiling of 270,000 visas were increased by 150,000, with perhaps an additional 30,000 numbers for proposals like increased visas for Mexican and Canadian applicants, there should be no practical problem. A limit of 450,000 visas (which translates into approximately the same gross immigration per year) is reasonable in my opinion. (More on the criteria below which lead me to that conclusion.) Given emigration on the order of 75,000 to 100,000 a year - a reasoned estimate based on demographic analysis and not just a guess - net immigration would be approximately 350 to 375,000. Refugee admissions - even at this year's announced level of 140,000 and assuming no refugee returns - would bring net immigration including refugees to about 500,000 a year.

In sum, although I would prefer continued exemption of immediate families of citizens, in practice a ceiling of 450,000 (excluding refugees) may achieve the desireable target of minimal delay in reuniting American citizens' families and still meet other family reunion and labor force goals of immigration policy.

Criteria

Under criteria for setting a limit, three pairs of factors were listed in the notes to witnesses: labor force and economic criteria; demographic and regional considerations; and social and cultural factors. Before addressing these criteria, I want to discuss two other types of criteria: family policy and foreign relations.

A major goal of U.S. immigration policy has been and continues to be reunion of family members of citizens and permanent resident aliens. Although there is disagreement over the degree of relationship that ought to qualify for preferential treatment in access to visas, there is no disagreement on the principal. Who would advocate that this country should adopt a policy that forbids citizens to be joined by spouses and children? Would it be serious policy to permit immigration of a person with needed skills to contribute to the health of this economy and yet deny that person the opportunity to have his or her family here?

On a more general level, it makes no sense to wring our hands over the state of the family in this country and yet not foster those American traditions in various ethnic groups which take family bonds and obligations seriously. I emphasize that these traditions are American traditions, just as American as traditions which only emphasize the nuclear family with, at best, attenuated obligations to other relatives. Of course, this does not settle the specific issue of whether adult brothers and sisters of citizens should continue to enjoy a fifth preference benefit. Since these are not hearings on the preference system, I shall not go into that subject. Nevertheless, we should not forget family reunion as a criterion for immigration limits. That criterion, whatever the scope of relationships agreed on as appropriate, implies some more or less lower limit. The lowest, I assume, would be a limit that allows a citizen to bring in a spouse and minor, unmarried children. As one spreads the net to citizens' parents, spouses and minor, unmarried children of permanent resident aliens, and so on, that lower limit increases.

Foreign policy must also be taken into the equation. Of course, the issues of illegal migration and/or temporary labor can complicate this picture. Nevertheless, in some instances a much reduced immigration level can contribute to instability. It is in the US interest for this not to happen, not just for political or military reasons, but also, to put it bluntly, to protect American investment, markets, and sources of supply. Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica serve as convenient examples of economic and politio-military interests that need to be taken into account. There is no easy way to index exactly how these considerations get factored into decisions. To relegate foreign policy considerations as merely of marginal interest with little direct impact on this country's economy is to live in another age.

On labor force and economic criteria, I fear that again what is being searched for is some sort of indexing - a trigger rate of unemployment, for example - that would lead to an automatic reduction by a formula set in law on immigration levels. Such a scheme was suggested by David North and Allen Le Bel in their monograph for the National Commission on Manpower Policy entitled, "Manpower and Immigration Policies in the United States" (Special Report No. 20, February 1978). In practice, such a trigger could only generate a lowered limit with a time lag. It is based on a rather static view of labor force dynamics and the role of foreign recruitment and immigration in economic growth. Similarly, economic indexes, e.g., the rate of inflation, would be rather blunt instruments to try to fine tune immigration flows in order to have any serious impact on the economy as measured by national performance rates.

All this does not argue that labor force and economic criteria are of no importance. If anything it supports the idea of a sunset provision for immigration ceilings. But judgments are necessary, based on evaluations of immigration's impact on local, regional and the national economy and the performance prospects of the economy. Simplistic indexing based on no theoretical foundation to justify modifications in an overall ceiling (disregarding age, experience, U.S. shortages, etc.) is to relinguish responsibility.

Demographic crtieria have gotten a great deal of attention recently. The Bouvier study is often cited. A favorite projection seems to be that net immigration of 750,000 and total fertility of 1.8 will lead to 100 years to a population of 300 million, 40 percent of whom will be immigrants or descendants of post-1980 immigrants. I recently sent the Chairman material from the December 1981 issue of Population and Development Review by Nathan Keyfitz questioning the utility of population projections beyond 20 years, even with a good data base. The proportion of post-1880 immigrants and their descendants in the U.S. approaches the figure cited above. It is well to remember that a Select Commission on Population Growth and the American Future was established in 1970 because of fear of a 300 million population in the year 2000 - 80 years before the projected figure above. Does anyone in this room believe that these very hearings and legislation introduced in Congress makes the assumption of net immigration of 750,000 each and every year for the next 100 years a reasonable assumption?

The 500,000 figure for net immigration I discussed above and current fertility levels leaves us on a path to a declining population, peaking at a level about 25 million below that magic 300 million level. The limits to immigration which will result from these hearings, I am confident, will be consistent with a path to stabilizing the U.S. population. Some would argue that stabilizing or reducing U.S. population is a mistake. The doomsdayers, on the other hand, can only reply that whatever level is chosen is not low enough for reaching their goals. For them the issue is not whether the immigration level that one can reasonably expect to be proposed is compatible with an end to population growth but whether it is fast enough for them.

The question of regional considerations, I presume, refers to U.S. regions. Since control over internal mobility raises grave constitutional questions, I would refer the Subcommittee and its staff to the papers on that issue in the volumes of papers published by the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future.

Social and cultural factors introduce a domain even more nebulous than "economic" criteria. Do we mean assimilibility? Is the issue language and policy on language usage? The list could go on but let me touch on only those two.

It is often said that today's immigration takes place in an America much different from the heyday of mass migration. And so it does. The economy is different; the labor needs and absorptive capacities are different. But so are the immigrants. Today's immigrants are by and large not the "huddled masses." The proportion of professional, technical and kindred workers among immigrants is much higher than in the US labor force. Immigrants come because of family ties or with skills that put them in an international network that permits a US employer to apply for them to get certification of need. Legal immigrants are not poor peasants getting off the boat, with a piece of paper naming a city for which they are asking directions. The personal, business and agency networks dealing with immigrant settlement are different as night and day from earlier networks.

Research by Chiswick on immigrants' earnings show remarkable integration for immigrants and their offspring. In 13 years, immigrants make more money that native born of similar educational background. Immigrant fertility, in general, in the prime childbearing years was lower than U.S. white fertility in 1970. To be sure there were ethnic differences but Frank Bean in research for the Select Commission showed similar and lower fertility by education for high fertility immigrant groups compared to native born. Except for vague fears, what does underlie the integration/assimilation issue, especially in the face of such findings noted above?

On language, the issue is one of language policy in the U.S. not immigration. Even if there were zero immigration from now on, the issue would still be joined. You might also note that the proportion of German speakers in the 1850s and 1860s was as high as Spanish speakers among todays immigrants (about 35 percent). The issue is certainly not new.

More concretely, how does one translate fears about language into policy? Would English language competence be required of all or only some classes of visa applicants? If some, which ones and why? While I feel the issue of bilingualism is important and a consensus on policy needs to be built, I fail to see how to translate that unresolved social issue into a specific immigration level.

In sum, the experience under current immigration law seems to me to indicate that family and labor force need`, along with concern about demographic, economic and cultural factors, indicate that a gross level of immigration at 450,000 plus refugees is not just sustainable but meets the interests of the nation. In fact, I think a somewhat higher number could be sustained without harm to the polity, the economy,or the society. My conclusion is not based on trying to blindly index immigration limits to other indicators, an exercise without a firm foundation in theory. Rather it is based on the kinds of judgments I have outlined above. Situations can change and my view should appropriately alter. But the kinds of criteria outlined above - family policy, foreign policy, labor and economic needs, demographic considerations and social and cultural factors - lead me to my conclusion. I also want to reemphasize that my conclusion is based on judgment not abitrary, non-theoretical indexing that panders to fears generated by the latest dip or rise in a nation-wide statistic.

I would conclude by reminding the Subcommittee that immigrants also generally add another intangible, namely reinvigoration of the commitment to the kind of society we live in. The political and economics values and opportunities of this country are precious commodities. Freedom fighters, boatpeople, ambitious and energetic people who set down roots here are quite aware of that fact. Their presence does not diminish our heritage and our life, it revitalizes them in an increasingly interdependent world.

Senator SIMPSON. It is always good to hear commentaries from demographers and those who deal with numbers in their life's work, especially with such diverse views as you three. Not diverse. I think there is quite a commonality there. However, the issue of numbers is certainly one to consider, and we must do it in a way which is not discriminatory or inhumane. I think that is what the subcommittee is up to.

About 20 years ago there was much consternation among demographers and policymakers that the U.S. population was growing geometrically, and there was a concerted effort to reduce fertility rates. Apparently that was successful or being considered successful, and we see that in many ways.

It is becoming very clear that despite the baby boom and so on, that now we are below what is known as replacement level. I might ask each of you what is the latest in the "state of the art 'in terms of what a stabilized U.S. populaton might optimally mean. I'm going to ask each of you that question.

Mr. BILDERBACK. I would say something below 230 million. That depends on how we want to live, and it depends on how we want to deal with resources and how prudent we want to be for the future.

But everything I say is predicated on the assumption that, generally, the norms of consumption now existing will continue to exist. But I would say something below the level of approximately 230 million.

I would like to make one other point, and that is, yes, we are below replacement level at this moment; and I think the other two gentlemen here will agree with me. The age structure of our population is such that even at current reproductive levels, our population is going to continue to grow into the next century. So even though we are at replacement level, it does not mean that we are not going to have a continuing growing population for a while.

But my answer to your specific question is, I would say, no more than 230 million.

Senator SIMPSON. Would you care to respond to that question, Mr. Espenshade?

Mr. ESPENSHADE. As far as I know, based on scientific or academic work, there really is no way of telling what the optimum size of U.S. population would be. It depends on a number of different factors. Economists usually define the optimum size of a population in terms of that size that would maximize per capita income, but the size that would maximize per capita income today is not necessarily the size that would maximize per capita income five years from now because underlying conditions are constantly changing.

Moreover, focusing on the optimum size of a population overlooks other important aspects of the population. It overlooks the regional distribution of the population. It overlooks the age composition of the population, the ethnic distribution of the population.

In sum, I am not aware of any reliable way to determine what the optimum size of the U.S. population should be.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you.

I regret I have not referred to each of you as Doctor, even though all of you do hold that title, and I apologize for that.

Now, do you have a response to that, Dr. Keely?

Mr. KEELY. I agree with Mr. Espenshade, Mr. Chairman. I think one has to choose the criteria first.

Senator SIMPSON. In setting—let me ask each of you this one. In setting overall numerical restrictions, if that is done is there any demographic argument to seeking to avoid a domination of immigration to the United States by a relatively few countries or to encourage a great diversity in the immigrants coming in?

Mr. KEELY. I am not sure. Are you saying how it can be done?

Senator SIMPSON. Is there any demographic argument for seeking to avoid a domination of immigration into the United States by a few countries rather than to encourage a diversity in the immigrant stream?

Mr. KEELY. I do not think there is a demographic reason, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Any comment on that?

Mr. ESPENSHADE. I have one thought. Until you asked the question I really had not reflected on it. But as Mr. Keely pointed out in his statement, there is evidence that when immigrants come to the United States, regardless of their country of origin, that their fertility levels gradually adjust to U.S. fertility levels, but there is some time lag.

Senator SIMPSON. When you say gradually, that has always interested me. What is that? Because in the figures which Dr. Bouvier cites, he uses that term. Certain projections are based on the fact that when their fertility rate in the coming years comes down to meet ours—it had always seemed rather improbable to me other than in a long, long period of time.

Mr. KEELY. One way to answer that question, Mr. Chairman, very simply is that the women of prime childbearing age from the 1970 census who were foreign-born had lower fertility than those women born in the United States. That is in the aggregate. Their fertility was lower. I have not seen the figures from the 1980 census yet.

So the point is that obviously it depends on the age of the woman when she comes to the United States. Certainly, immigrant women, foreign-born women in prime childbearing ages as of 1970 had lower fertility than the native population of the United States.

Senator SIMPSON. I interrupted you.

Mr. ESPENSHADE. I was trying to recall some research that Dr. Frank Bean at the University of Texas has done on this question in connection with the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. And if memory serves, he based his analysis on results both from the 1970 census and also from the 1976 survey of income and education where he compared the fertility of immigrants from Mexico and their descendants with the fertility of native white Americans.

Frank Bean's findings were that the fertility of immigrants was higher than the fertility of native whites; that the fertility of their children was also higher than white fertility in the United States. But by the subsequent generation, in other words, the grandchildren of the Mexican immigrants, had fertility that was for all practical purposes indistinguishable from the fertility of American whites. So that suggests that after about two generations there has been more or less complete assimilation of Mexican fertility.

The only point that I wanted to make in response to your question would be that if the composition of immigrants is oriented toward countries that have low fertility to begin with—Western European countries, for example—then other things equal, that would probably mean slower subsequent growth of the U.S. population than if the country of origin was more oriented toward high fertility countries.

Senator SIMPSON. That total fertility rate, which is, you know, equivalent to the average number of lifetime births per woman, I guess you would all state that any value of total fertility rate below that figure of about 2.1 would correspond to fertility being below replacement.

Mr. BILDERBACK. In the long run.

Senator SIMPSON. Three nodded heads there on the record.

Mr. KEELY. By definition that is correct.

Mr. BILDERBACK. By definition that is correct, but what happens, what really happens in a real life population depends on the age structure of that population. In the long run you are right.

Senator SIMPSON. Dr. Espenshade, I might ask you, in calculating net immigration flows, what emigration assumptions did you substract from the gross immigration figures?

Mr. ESPENSHADE. I have not made separate calculations of the gross in and out; I have just used the net figure for the projections.

Senator SIMPSON. You also mentioned that we would require an immigration level of 625,000 at current fertility rates to stabilize a population of 230 million. I was interested in your previous remarks, but again, how long do you think that might take? How large would the U.S. population be before this stabilization?

Mr. ESPENSHADE. Well, I have not made an exhaustive study of the time path that would be followed by the U.S. population in arriving at its ultimate size in each of the fertility immigration scenarios that I've talked about in my written statement, but I have made one calculation based on the assumption that 400,000 net immigrants would come to the United States, and there is an assumed fertility rate slightly below the current level, somewhere between 1.8 and 1.85 lifetime births per woman.

In that kind of situation the U.S. population would first grow to a maximum size of about 260 million to 265 million people, and after that begin a long decline. a gradual decline. The population would ultimately level off at about 108 million people under today's total fertility rate and an assumed net immigration of 400,000. But that takes a long time to happen.

As I mentioned, the population would first grow to a maximum size of about 262 million. That process would take about 40 years, with the maximum being reached in the year 2022. Then the population would begin to decline, reaching 216 million about the year 2097, and then continuing on its path to an even smaller population.

I have not made a calculation that answers your specific question: How long would it take for 230 million people to be achieved if we had 625,000 net immigrants, but based on a somewhat similar calculation, I would guess somewhere between 400 and 500 years, certainly not in our lifetimes.

Senator SIMPSON. Dr. Bilderback, you mentioned that ZPG favors a net immigration of 250,000 annually as long as the current fertility rates remain the same. Yet I think according to Dr. Espenshade's calculation of that, it might lead to a stabilization of the U.S. population at only something like 75 million. Would that be desirable from your group's perspective?

Mr. BILDERBACK. I have not seen Mr. Espenshade's projections. I do not know at what point stabilization will be achieved. The basis of my selection of these numbers was from the Bouvier study for the Select Commission which you made reference to. I am not a demographer; I am a social scientist who sometimes has to do demographic-like things. Demographers are compelled to talk of the long run, and I remember John Maynard Keene's admonition, in the long run we are all dead.

I am very concerned about immigration policy to the end of this century. I am very concerned about population problems to about 2020. Since we revise the immigration policy in this country about every 30 years, I am focusing on the intermediate future. I would say 170 million is probably not going to maximize per capita income; but on the other hand, the figures that I have given just might allow us to keep the ship together into the next century or until the next time Congress meets to review immigration policy. I am not concerned with the long run.

I do not know if that answers your question or not.

Senator SIMPSON. It is interesting. I appreciate it.

Dr. Keely, in addition to the fertility rate, are there other demographic criteria which of course would be employed in determining numerical restrictions on immigration?

Mr. KEELY. I guess you could take any set of demographic criteria, whether you want to limit the age, some restrictions or perhaps some preferences on the basis of age. I could think of a whole list of them. I am not so sure, Mr. Chairman, whether trying to tinker with those kinds of things would have an appreciable effect on the overall demographic impact. And I am hard pressed to justify in my own mind the administrative costs and the amount of time and effort going into being creative enough to develop these various sorts of things for the impact that they have. They would be relatively minor kinds of impact.

Senator SIMPSON. You state, too, Dr. Keely, that a much reduced immigration level can contribute to instability within the U.S. foreign policy domain.

Mr. KEELY. Yes.

Senator **Simpson**. And to what extent can the United States realistically address its foreign policy concerns through its immigration policy?

Mr. **Keely**. Well, it certainly cannot handle all of the foreign policy concerns, clearly. But my point is this, Mr. Chairman: If a significantly reduced immigration were to lead to political instability, we ought to know that beforehand. It may not change our course of action, but we ought to realize that that has important indications for American investments, for markets, for sources of supply.

In a similar way, American foreign policy could have implications for generating refugees. It may not change our foreign policy, but we ought to be aware. That is my point. Simply and purely, at least we ought to know what we are in for when we do something, even if it does not change our course of action.

However, I would suggest that, for example, continuing immigration along current lines at current levels even with current country ceilings probably is a good thing, and to cut back sharply would have some important implications, for example, in the Caribbean. We ought to be aware of that. I am not suggesting we have to raise anything. All I am saying is if we go in the opposite direction, we ought to be aware of some of the impacts in a place like say Jamaica or the Dominican Republic.

Senator **Simpson**. Yes.

Mr. **Bilderback**. Could I add something to that, sir?

Senator **Simpson**. If you wish, yes.

Mr. **Bilderback**. The Caribbean is one of the areas I have been working on for years. I agree with everything that Mr. Keely said. The thing that concerns me is that I do not believe that we can admit enough people from the Caribbean Basin to make any systemic difference. I think the growth in the work force there in the next 20 years is going to be so horrendous that we must not think in terms of absorbing surplus workers. There are simply too many of them coming. And as I said in my written remarks, we have got to do everything we can to help people find a livelihood. We cannot admit enough. We cannot look upon admissions to the U.S. work force as one of the elements that we can use to relieve pressure because the size of the problem there is too large.

Senator **Simpson**. Yes. One of the things at the previous hearing that fascinated me was when we talked about what we must consider as the unemployment pressures in the developing nations is that those developing nations will need 600 million to 700 million new jobs between 1980 and 2000 just to keep unemployment from rising from its present position; and that is more than all the combined jobs in the industrial world in 1980. That one right there is enough to think about.

Mr. **Keely**. Mr. Chairman?

Senator **Simpson**. Yes.

Mr. **Keely**. I would like just to point out that in a similar fashion to Ambassador Asencio of the previous panel, I am not suggesting that U.S. immigration is going to solve this issue of the growth of the labor force, nor is this the only thing that I would advocate. However, it is one part of the package, and that package consists of other kinds of things, including U.S. aid, the development of trade, private investment and so forth, all of which is part of the package to try to answer these issues.

I obviously am in no way suggesting that 20,000 immigration visas is going to solve the problem in Santo Domingo or Jamaica. However, it is one contribution that can be made.

Senator **Simpson**. Another thing for entry into the decision process of what we are discussing, and that is numbers. What will be the effect or what will we see when you work into your formula the cutting back sharply of illegal immigration?

Yes. Dr. Keely first and then Dr. Bilderback.

Mr. **Keely**. I assume that we are going to cut back sharply on illegal immigration. I expect that that is in a sense the kind of silent issue that is with us in these hearings. My assumption is that if illegal migration continues at very high rates that we would have to take a look at our legal immigration policy. But I am assuming when I suggest 450,000 visas plus refugees that that is in the context of controlled legal immigration.

Mr. **Bilderback**. I think you have touched on something very real. If we gain control of our borders and in some manner eliminate the illegal alien from the American work force, we are going to increase unemployment in the donor countries perceptibly. This is one reason I think that we have to view immigration in totality. By that I mean the impact of that is going to be very serious. I think properly maybe the Foreign Relations Committee should be the recipient of some of this.

We are going to create tremendous problems in Jamaica and in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, in every country of the Caribbean Basin if we stop the flow of illegal workers. And that is something, on the other hand, that we do have to do. And I think we are going to have to go into some sort of disaster mode in order to deal with the problems we are going to face there in the next 10 or 15 years.

I look at the demographic reality of the Caribbean Basin as a catastrophe, as a disaster. The growth in the work force there for the next 20 years is going to be, well, 80 percent larger than the growth of the work force there in the last 20 years; and those people are not going to sit still and starve to death to accommodate the United States of America. They are accustomed to looking to us for employment, and we have created that idea in their mind. We are not going to be able to continue to take the same proportion of their workers that we have. We just cannot afford to do that. And at the same time, we have got to understand that those people have to have a livelihood.

Mr. **Espenshade**. Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Simpson**. Yes, Dr. Espenshade.

Mr. **Espenshade**. Let me say in answer to your question, in the analytic work that I described this morning I have not made a distinction between legal immigrants, refugees, or undocumented workers. I am concerned in this analytic work with the total number of people coming to the United States regardless of the category they are in. So if we are successful in controlling the number of illegal entrants to this country, then of course you could increase the total number of legal immigrants or refugees and end up with roughly the same demographic implication.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I assure you that I would like to continue to pursue that in even another hearing, but now I have been advised we have a quorum call, and I will have to go report in on that. And I do have some other questions. Let me submit those to you in writing rather than hold you here.

I very much appreciate your coming, and I regret—well, it was not too bad a delay actually. But I did have some other questions. The quorum call prevents me from getting those in, and I do not want to hold you here.

I guess that issue of population stabilization is a puzzler to me, and the fertility of those coming here is going to match ours, the issue of our labor needs in this next 30 to 40 years; and those are things that I will develop in some further questions and submit those to you and ask you to respond. Your details will be very helpful to us.

I thank you very much.

That will conclude the morning hearing. We will proceed then at 1:30 with a panel consisting of Leonel Castillo and Garrett Hardin and Aristide Zolberg.

Thank you so much, all of you.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the hearing was recessed for lunch, to be reconvened at 1:30 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SIMPSON. The hearing will come to order. We will now proceed with the first panel after the luncheon break, which consists of Leonel Castillo from the Immigrant Aid Society, Inc., of Houston, former Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a man I have met in that capacity when I had been here just a very few weeks. I will never forget that discussion about the issues that we are confronted with today. At that time I never dreamed I would be involved in immigration matters very much at all. Anyway, it is nice to have you here.

And Garrett Hardin, Chairman of the Environmental Fund of Washington, D.C. It is nice to have you here, sir.

And Aristide Zolberg of the University of Chicago, a man I have enjoyed hearing at a conference in Williamsburg.

So if you will proceed under the time limitations, then we will go forward with some questions.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LEONEL CASTILLO, IMMIGRANT AID SOCIETY, INC., HOUSTON, TEX.

Mr. CASTILLO. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate the chance to be here. I have a short statement and then will be more than happy to try to respond to any questions. I thought it would be best to begin with what I consider one of the most radical statements on immigration, that by Pope John Paul II in a papal encyclical issued on September 15 of last year in which he says: "Man has a right to leave his native land for various motives and also the right to return in order to seek better conditions of life in another country." He goes on to say that the most important thing is that the person be treated the same way he is at home in the other country.

Obviously, the Pope is talking in high ethical terms and not in practical legislative terms. In fact, the numbers of immigrants and refugees allowed into the United States exceed those allowed into any other country voluntarily, and our record is unsurpassed. Nevertheless, you do want some answers to questions that are very pressing: how many and which ones?

It is my belief that the numerical limit should be set in law. I understand full well that the relationship of the ceiling set by law sometimes has very little relationship to the actual number who come in; but nevertheless, there should be a limit, and this limit should be reviewed periodically as it is being reviewed now.

I do not believe that we can index the limit very well to economic and demographic variables as some countries have done, as Canada does, because the variables are subject to so many interpretations and they are so temporary in nature that not only could they cause endless litigation, but they could become almost impossible administratively.

The numerical limits which are finally adopted should be flexible enough to allow any administration, regardless of political persuasion, to implement its particular philosophic stance.

It should be comprehensive. It should include all groups or forms of immigrants, permanent residents and refugees as well. I believe in a set number being set aside for refugees.

The current unlimited provisions for family unification purposes have an important humanitarian and practical effect and should be continued. This, of course, has a very obvious impact when you discuss how many actually come in. Without these family unification provisions, the current problems in uniting Mexican and Filipino families in particular would be even greater than they currently are.

There are some people who believe that we can and should adopt a set of objective criteria for determining qualifications for admission.

Now, the argument is made, for example, that immigrants should be prohibited from coming into areas which are economically depressed. In fact, the argument could be as easily made that these are the very areas that need an infusion of human capital.

I do not see any way that a law can be developed that would base admission on social or cultural factors. These criteria appear to me to be even more slippery than the economic variables. I will be interested in hearing more about that.

The possibility for abuse with economic and cultural variables is very great, and of course, we need special provisions for persons in emergencies. It is my opinion that the emphasis should be on family unification and much less on labor need. The current labor certification process is simply inadequate and has almost no real relationship to the flow of immigrants. I would like to, of course, preserve the concept that immigrants are not likely to becomed public charges, and I would recommend that the law be strengthened in terms of the responsibilities of the sponsors.

To deal with the realities of the increased flow now and in the future with or without legalization from our neighbors to the south, I believe that an immediate granting of at least 40,000 more visas to Mexico, not necessarily linked to the Canadian numbers, just direct numbers to Mexico would be helpful, as would a temporary resident program which would allow for more access and flow to and from the United States.

One final point, and that is a factor that is often overlooked in discussions of this type is that of the resources needed to admit large numbers of the current mix or of any significantly different mix of people. And in order to generate the funds to process these persons I would urge that you consider the gradual and careful imposition of user fees and entry and departure fees as are used in many countries of the world, and actually levy costs according to services being offered by INS, State, and Customs.

A report prepared by David North for the Select Commission indicated that over $200 million of additional revenues could be generated quite easily by imposition of fees on just some of the services that are now being provided. I believe that a great portion of the Immigration funding and personnel problem could be resolved if Immigration could be made more elastic and responsive to the actual needs.

With those few comments I would be prepared and eager to answer any questions as you see fit.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Castillo.

[The prepared statement of Leonel J. Castillo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEONEL J. CASTILLO

On September 15, 1981 Pope Paul II issued the papal encyclical "On Human Work" in which he wrote:

> "Man has the right to leave his native land for various motives--and also the right to return--in order to seek better conditions of life in another country.
>
> "The most important thing is that the person working away from his native land, whether as a permanent emigrant or as a seasonal worker, should not be placed at a disadvantage in comparison with the otherworkers in that society in the matter of working rights."

In terms of the actual numbers of immigrants and refugees allowed into a country, and the general legal protections accorded them, the United States has a record which is unsurpassed by any country. In order for the world to someday reach the high purposes he outlined a much greater degree of economic and political justice must first be achieved. Until this is reached, we must make our policy based on our ability to apply principles to specific situations.

This Subcommittee wants to know the answers to two simple questions: How Many? and Which Ones?

HOW MANY?

It is my belief that the numerical limit of immigration should be set in law. There should be a provision in the law that would require the periodic review of these numbers. While it would be reasonable to hope that someday the limits could be indexed to economic and demographic variables, this does not seem very practical at this time. Not only are the variables themselves subject to many interpretations, they are also so temporary in nature, that the interpretations or decisions made on the basis of these variables could become the source of endless litigation and enormous administrative difficulties.

The numerical limits which are finally adopted should be flexible enough to allow any Administration,of whichever political persuasion, to implement its philosophic stance. The numerical limits should be comprehensive and should include all forms of immigrants, permanent residents and refugees as well. A set number should continue to be set aside for refugees. The current unlimited provisions for family unification purposes have an important humanitarian and practical effect and should be continued. Without the family unification provisions, the current problems in uniting Mexican and Filipino families, in particular, would be even greater than they are.

There are some persons who believe that we can and should adopt a set of 'objective' criteria for determining qualifications for admission. The argument is made for example that immigrants should be prohibited from coming into areas which are economically depressed. In fact the argument could as easily be made that these are the very areas that need an infusion of human capital.

I would strongly oppose any provision of the law which sought to grant admission based on social or cultural factors. This criteria is even more slippery than the economic variables. The possibility for abuse is so great and our history is so replete with movement away from this type of thinking, that we should not include social-cultural criteria.

There is obviously a need for a special provision in the law which will allow for the acceptance of persons in specially defined emergencies.

WHICH ONES?

In my opinion the emphasis should be on family unification and much less so on labor need. The current labor certification process is simply inadequate and has almost no relationship to the immigrant flow. To preserve the concept that immigrants are not likely to become public charges, I would recommend that the law in regard to the responsibilities of sponsors be strengthened. To deal with the realities of the increased flow, now and in the future, from our neighbors to the South, I would grant at least 40,000 more numbers to Mexico, and move to create a temporary resident program which allowed for for more access to the U. S.

One factor that is often overlooked in discussions of this type is that of resources needed to admitlarge numbers of the current mix, or of any significantly different mix. In order to generate the funds needed to process these persons I would urge this Subcommittee to consider the gradual and careful imposition of user fees and entry and departure fees, and actual costs levies for a number of services now offered by INS, State, and Customs. A report prepared by David North for the Select Commission indicated that over $200 million dollars of additional revenues could be generated quite easily by the imposition of fees on some of the services that are now being provided.

Senator SIMPSON. Professor Hardin, please.

STATEMENT OF GARRETT HARDIN, CHAIRMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT FUND, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. HARDIN. As a former professor of human ecology, and biology, I would like to tackle this on what I regard as fundamental grounds and not spend any time on detailed figures.

The fundamental problem is how does a nation produce its next generation of citizens? It can do this either by fertility or by importing ready-made people from elsewhere. As far as the population is concerned, a body is a body, and it does not matter whether it is produced by breeding our own or taking from other countries. The ability of a nation to sustain population growth is expressed in terms of just the sheer number of people, not by their origin.

When we come to immigration, as has been said by many others, I think it is very silly to make a distinction between asylees, displaced persons, exempt categories, reuniting families and so forth with respect to the impact on population. So whatever number is agreed upon should be the total number; then it is a matter of negotiation how to divide this among the various categories.

The basic idea we should keep in mind in evaluating this problem is connected with the idea of economies of scale and diseconomies of scale. All of us are used to the idea of economies of scale. We know that if we build a million automobiles, we can sell them cheaper per automobile than if we only build 800,000. This is so widely known that most of us think that economies of scale are the rule, but as concerns the problem we are dealing with here, we face a diseconomy of scale that simply will not go away. This is the diseconomy of scale when it comes to dealing with messages—messages between human beings.

I can illustrate this very simply by the history of the United States. Back in 1790 each Representative was the representative for 35,000 Americans, on the average. Now each Representative represents over half a million Americans.

How does he do this? Well, he does it by getting a lot of aid. In the case of Congressmen, on the average they have 27 aides; in the case of Senators, on the average, 68 aides. It takes all these people to get the work done. If, say, a Senator now wanted to be in close contact with all of his constituents, he would find it impossible. One of the Senators from my State reports that last year he received over a third of a million communications from his constituents. Out of curiosity I figured out that if he neglected all of his other senatorial duties and merely read these communications 10 hours a day, 50 weeks a year, he could have allowed 25 seconds for reading each one. Well, that is why he has 68 aides. I do not need to tell this audience that.

In the case of the White House staff, back in 1933 the staff consisted of 37 people. In 1981, there were 1,700 people—needless to say, not all housed in the White House, but all part of the staff. While the population of the United States increased by 70 percent, the population of the White House increased 4,500 percent. If this goes on for another cycle of a 70-percent population increase, there will then be some 78,000 people working in the titular White House. This is impossible, so what will happen? This we will devise various other ways of dealing with the messages. What these all add up to is a loss of democracy, a loss of contact between constituents and leaders. This is a diseconomy of scale that no amount of cleverness can get rid of. This is why population is a serious problem.

One last remark that I will make in this connection: a distinction can be made with respect to immigrants and people who reproduce themselves by their own fertility. Immigrants are more of a threat to national unity than are the people that we raise ourselves.

By whatever name we call the process, immigrants have to be acculturated if we are going to have domestic peace. In this regard, laws that have been passed in recent years have been counterproductive. Bilingual education laws, intended to ease the transition to the native language, have in practice often been used—and are, I think, increasingly used—as a divisive factor. The people in bilingual education encourage the ones that they are teaching to keep their own language.

Well, this sort of divisiveness I think is extremely dangerous. We have the example of Quebec French, we have the example of Northern Ireland, we have the example of Belgium. I think this is a path we simply should not go down.

Thank you.

Senator Simpson. Thank you very much, Professor Hardin.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hardin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GARRETT HARDIN

My name is Garrett Hardin. I hold the position of professor emeritus at the University of California in Santa Barbara; I am also Chairman of the Board of the Environmental Fund in Washington, D.C. My testimony is a personal opinion and should not be construed as the position of either of the organizations with which I have the honor to be associated.

I speak as a biologist whose specialty is human ecology, which may be defined as the study of the ways in which potentially limitless human demands can be reconciled with the real limits of the world in which we live. Technology slowly extends some of the limits, but prudent people do not spend tomorrow's income today. At any moment in time the carrying capacity of a bounded portion of the world (for instance, a nation) is limited. Transgressing a rational limit produces poverty; worse, it lowers the limit in the future. For instance, continuously growing row crops on the thin soil of sloping land that is best suited to grazing produces such a loss of soil that the land becomes unsuitable for both farming and grazing. Overpopulation produces powerful commercial and philanthropic pressure to farm to the maximum, which means that some land will be farmed unwisely. Our duty to our children requires us to resist such pressures. It is wiser to see that the pressures do not develop in the first place. We may not be able to prevent the pressure-producing needs for food and fuel from developing in foreign lands, but as a sovereign state it is within our power to keep the pressure out of the United States. We can keep it at a distance, in the lands where it is being generated.

Our attitudes are now being shaped by visual images more than they were in the past. Pictures are useful, but they can easily mislead. It takes imagination to see the whole truth. Consider the following. A television camera zooms in on a wretched immigrant who is trying to find a new life in a new land. Our hearts bleed for him; but bleeding hearts must be coupled with thinking minds. We must see beyond the single image presented by the camera. We must, in imagination, see the million or more faces that cross our borders each year. We must also see the much larger population of our own people whose livelihood and possession of the land are threatened by the newcomers.

Being human, we want to help others. But how many others can we help? A million each year? Two million? Ten? Television, with its tunnel vision, cannot deal effectively with the innumerable impacts of multitudes. It cannot show the host of residents who are pushed aside to make way for newcomers. For years our unemployed have numbered in the millions. Currently they amount to about eight million by official count (which is always an underestimate of the true number). Immigrants can be admitted only at the expense of present residents. Unfortunately for the publicizing of the truth, the people whose jobs are threatened most by immigration are not the people who aim the TV cameras or comment on the news over the air and in periodicals. The jobs of the commentators are not threatened by immigration. Only the most imaginative and courageous of the media people ever try to deal with the most important problems posed by immigration.

Each immigrant brings a pair of hands with him, usually very willing hands. But he brings no natural resources, no energy. Despite popular language, people do not produce energy. People can only consume or destroy useful energy. The average American uses--consumes--destroys-- energy equivalent to some 56 barrels of oil per year. If an immigrant comes in at age 20 and uses only half that amount of energy for the remaining 50 years of his life he really should bring 50 X 28 = 1,400 barrels of oil with him, if he is to play fair with his hosts. No immigrant does. All immigrants hasten the day of resource exhaustion in the host country.

IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

It should be obvious by now that immigration and population growth are Siamese twins. Although immigration has special consequences of its own, most of the benefits and costs are common to the two processes. Before considering the particular values of immigration it will be well to discuss the consequences of population growth, from whatever source, in countries that already have achieved sizeable populations.

In the long run, physical resources are limiting factors to population growth, but long before these resources "run out" the body politic is adversely affected by human factors. The health of a society depends on the movement of messages and materials. Movement creates traffic problems. In our planning for the future we repeatedly fail to allow for a fundamental property of traffic. We are so used to the pleasant truth that manufacturing processes enjoy economies of scale that we forget that all growth in traffic is afflicted by diseconomies of scale. In manufacturing, bigger is often better. In traffic, more is worse.

Increase the traffic on city streets,and up goes the per unit cost (in time delays and fuel burnt). Changing the system of traffic may slow down the rate of worsening, but it cannot stop it. For instance, changing to one-way streets in a crowded city helps the flow of traffic, but at the expense of more miles traveled and more fuel burnt. Cloverleafs on freeways have a similar effect, and the capital cost of creating them is great. As traffic in materials increases, diseconomies increase.

Traffic in messages also suffers from diseconomies of scale. Democracy can survive only if those who occupy positions of power know what the people are thinking. Two hundred years ago a Senator or Congressman could do his job almost by himself. He could easily keep his finger on the public pulse. Today (as of 1979), the average Senator has 68 aids, the average Congressman 27. A rather thick barrier has been interposed between the finger and the pulse.

Let's look at the White House. In 1933 the President had a staff of 37; in 1981, the number was about 1,700. Of course, the population of the United States has grown too, but not as much. While the U.S. population increased by 70 percent the White House staff increased by 4,500 percent. That is a spectacular diseconomy of scale.

The implications should be obvious. The greater the traffic in messages the greater the delays and the more numerous the misunderstandings. As the size of the body politic grows there is an increase in the probability of violent corrections to mistakes made in message transmission and understanding. The threat of chaos increases the temptation to abandon democracy and go to a centralized, totalitarian government. Increased size severely limits the ability of a public official to maintain sensitive, meaningful contact with his constituents. Whether he is a Republican or a Democrat matters little: population increase is the culprit that threatens democracy.

The laws of human ecology are not as precise as those of physics, but they are precise enough to raise important warning flags. Given our present administrative organization, if the U.S. population increases another 70 percent (to 390 million), how many helpers would we expect to find in the Executive Office of the President? Seventy-eight thousand! The mind boggles. Of course we know what will happen during the course of such population increase: the reality (if not the name) of democracy will be abandoned. (We may well ask, to what expent has this happened already?)

It is a matter of record that increase in the size of a community brings disproportionately large increases in the costs of transportation, crime, crime control mechanisms, and bureaucracy. Anarchy and chaos are the unhappy alternatives offered to those who do not want to pay these costs. Everyone who defends an increase in the population of our country should ask himself if he is not unwittingly working for the destruction of democracy?

IMMIGRATION

An increase of a million in population is an increase of a million, whether it comes from immigration or native fertility. I shall presently present grounds for thinking that increases through immigration are more threatening to democracy than increases in fertility, but first another matter needs to be dealt with.

We would like to help other people; but are our resources equal to their needs? The World Health Organization says there are 800 million seriously malnourished people in the world. Hair-splitting critics question the figure, but dividing it by two (or multiplying by two) would not change the practical significance of the fact that the number of malnourished in the world is about three times the population of the United States.

What about poverty? By U.S. standards, at least 2.5 billion people are terribly poor. That's more than 10 times the population of the U.S.

Suppose we tried to solve problems of malnutrition and poverty by taking the sufferers in as immigrants: how rapidly could we do this? At the present time, the total rate of immigration (including legals, illegals, refugees and all other categories) is between one and two million per year. A quick survey of the poorest nations shows that they are increasing by about 65 million per year. Conservatively estimating that only two-thirds of this increase is among the poorest classes, this means that the wretchedly poor are increasing by more than 40 million per year.

To cure poverty elsewhere by immigration into our country the rate of immigration would have to at least equal the rate of production of more poor. Can we admit more than 40 million immigrants per year, year after year? When we think of the social disorder following the introduction of a million or so immigrants per year in the last two years it seems obvious that immigration into the U.S. is no "solution" to be embraced by Americans who are concerned with civic order and the patrimony of their children.

An objection may be made: "Isn't it better to do a little for others than to do nothing?" As the question is worded, one would have to answer, Yes. But let us not forget that every action is a message. By drawing off the excess population of other countries as immigrants into our own we send a message to the rulers of those countries that we feel responsible for the problems they have generated. Rulers will henceforth be less inclined to try to solve their own problems. A "liberal" immigration policy by the U.S. delays the acceptance of responsibility by other peoples. Of all the things we can take from others, nothing does them as much harm as taking responsibility away from them. Such was the error of colonialism. That is also what is wrong with a "liberal" immigration policy. This brand of liberalism destroys the roots of reproductive responsibility in other countries and the basis of democracy in our own.

Bluntly put, at the present advanced stage of national development the ideal rate of immigration would be very close to zero per year. But ours is a less than ideal world and compromises must be made. When exceptions are to be made, how do we make them without inviting abuse? I have some suggestions to make.

I think that the Congress should set an absolute limit to the number of immigrants admitted each year, leaving some discretion in the distribution among the admitted categories to the Executive branch. It should be stated clearly that "immigrants" is understood to include not only legal immigrants but illegal immigrants (estimated as best we can), refugees (political or economic), and every other category of individual who contemplates remaining in the country as a worker and/or permanent resident. (Bona fide tourists and students would not be included.) If the Administration admits more refugees in one year it must correspondingly reduce the number admitted in other categories. Under exceptional circumstances, part of next year's allotment could be used this year. But this debt would have to be paid back by lowering the number of entries in the following year. We cannot allow such borrowings to accumulate. We have seen the destructive effects of a snowballing national debt on the economy. A snowballing immigration debt would be even more dangerous.

In developing policy Congress needs the guidance of an Office of Population and Immigration set up by itself. Enacting fresh legislation is time-consuming and fatiguing, so this should not be done every year. To insure that the philosophy of the law does not lag too far behind the changing situation any legislation enacted should be in "sunset" form, expiring automatically in, say, three to five years. To insure that bad practice does not arise by default, in the absence of fresh legislation the permitted number of immigrant entries should fall to zero at the expiration of a sunset law. This feature will insure the continued attention of Congress.

Central to the deliberations of the Population and Immigration Office would be the concept of "carrying capacity," the foundation stone of ecological thinking. In human affairs, carrying capacity is inversely related to the quality of life, however defined. The higher the norm adopted for the material quality of life, the lower the carrying capacity. If Americans want to continue to live on 150,000 calories of energy per person per day the carrying capacity of their environment is less than it would be were they satisfied with half that. The concept of carrying capacity necessarily, and quite properly, implies value judgments.

Can carrying capacity be increased by altering the environment? Certainly, for some things--but at a cost (which must itself be figured into the calculations). The carrying capacity of highways can be increased by making capital investments that diminish for a time the quantity of other goods. The necessary calculations are complex but not beyond the ability of a computer society.

Among the variables entering into the deliberations of a Population and Immigration Office would be the following: industrial productivity and the means of improving it, the level of unemployment, trends in crime and crime control costs, and the dependency ratio and other demographic facts.

Though we would like to help people in distress, the needs of other nations should, as a matter of policy, be virtually excluded from the deliberations of the Population and Immigration Office. The reason for this perhaps shocking recommendation is simple: if foreign needs are given appreciable weight the immigration problem becomes insoluble. We cannot permit American immigration policy to be set by foreign nations.

TRIBALISM AND NATIONAL SURVIVAL

The functions of any nation, considered as a whole, include the all-important one of producing the next generation of citizens. We can do this either by producing babies of our own and raising them to maturity, or we can import adult bodies from elsewhere. There are those who recommend the latter course on economic grounds: immigration, they say, allows us to impose the costs of raising people on other nations thus increasing our prosperity. Setting aside all moral considerations I submit that the economic benefit of such a policy is an illusion. A democracy can survive only if it has an irreducible minimum of consensus in many areas--political ideals, social customs, ethical ideals and a mutually understood language. Much as we may admire diversity it is a fact that most immigrants from cultures markedly different from our own impose high acculturation costs on society. (Businesses and individuals who benefit from immigration pay few of these costs.) The public purse is not bottomless, and we can stand only so much disorder.

In evolving immigration policies we must take very seriously the dangers of tribalism. I use the word "tribe" to stand for any group that perceives itself as a group, placing significant group aspirations above the interests of the nation of which they are a part. A race, a religious sect, a social class or a language-group can be a tribe in this broad sense. Other things being equal, a larger group has more tribal power than a small one. Publicity that emphasizes group differences fosters tribalism (though the conscious purpose of the publicity may have been quite different). The legitimation of multiple alternate languages in education, voting and the courts encourages tribalism and slows down acculturation. The motives behind today's drive toward "bilingual education" were no doubt noble, namely to increase the pride and ease the transition of immigrant families into the national culture. In practice, "bilingual education"--really polylingual education--has often delayed acculturation and strengthened tribalism. Telling examples of the dangers of tribalism are all around us: eastern Canada, with its conflicts between French and English; Northern Ireland, where

Catholics fight Protestants; and Belgium, where Flemings and Walloons continue the conflicts of centuries. These are not the worst of the tribal conflicts on the world scene, but they are bad enough to make us pause before thoughtlessly strengthening tribalism in the United States. The periodic bloodshed in a country like Northern Ireland makes the front page of the newspaper but, overall, this may not be the worst aspect of tribalism. At a less visible level, the non-negotiable demands made by all parties to a conflict can seriously interfere with political, social and commercial activities, greatly lowering industrial productivity and prosperity and laying the ground for explosive violence later. Tribalism is almost a one-way street: beyond a certain point, greater tribalism comes easily, a reduction in tribalism all but impossible.

The growing polylingualism of our nation encourages the growth of tribalism. Further immigration can only worsen the prospects for national unity. Prudence dictates that we put a halt to the present march toward tribalism before the point of no return is reached.

National survival in the world of tomorrow will be determined by the trends we permit to continue today. Americans are now acutely aware of the competitive advantage of the Japanese in international markets. There are many facets to this hard fact, one of which is relevant to the problems discussed here: the divisive force of tribalism is far weaker in Japan that it is in America. A simple statistical comparison underlines this assertion.

In the United States there is one lawyer for every 500 people; in Japan, the figure is 1 per 10,000. America evidently requires 20 times as many lawyers per capita to keep the social machinery going.

Are the Japanese inherently less competitive, less aggressive than we? Most unlikely. The true cause of the difference is related to cultural unity. The Japanese share common ideals and a common culture to an extent scarcely imaginable to Americans. Commonality allows them to settle most disputes by informal means, out of court and even without lawyers.

We need not begrudge American lawyers their livelihood, but we must not blink the fact that litigation is a social cost, not a benefit. Cultural diversity is desirable at low levels, but at high levels it breeds tribalism and increased social losses due to the high cost of traffic in adversary messages. Of course, after due deliberation we may deem the benefits worth the cost. But let us not forget that as a nation we must compete with other nations that are committed to different conclusions.

The United States now admits more immigrants than all the other nations in the world together. How long can we survive under this policy?

Senator SIMPSON. We will now go to Dr. Zolberg, please.

STATEMENT OF ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Mr. ZOLBERG. Thank you, Senator.

I will address myself to two questions: one, the issue of whether cultural criteria ought to be taken into account; and second, I will address myself a little bit to the numerical limits question.

From the founding to 1965, American immigration policy was an outward projection of our internal racism displayed along with the flag. It was only as a result of protracted internal struggle that the racial features of immigration policy were eliminated in 1965, which was also the year of the Civil Rights Act.

These long overdue moral achievements must not be reversed. Although relations between the racial communities in the United States remain difficult to manage, little of this can be attributed to the impact of current immigration. In fact, ordinary selection operates to insure that incoming nonwhites generally adapt more successfully than their indigenous counterparts.

The historical role of race, religion, or national origins in the assessment of the suitability of immigrant groups for incorporation into American culture has now been taken up by language. Somewhat paradoxically, it was largely the exclusion of Asians and the restrictions on the new immigration from Eastern Southern Europe which prompted the emergence of a sizable linguistically deviant group after World War I as American enterprise looked to neighboring pools of cheap labor in search of substitutes for them, thus recreating a cultural situation akin to that encountered in the Germanic Midwest a century earlier.

Now, the emergence of a linguistic minority whose distinctiveness is compounded by its somewhat ambiguous racial status and whose national visibility exceeds its actual size because it is encountered like an archipelago against leading metropolitan centers, evokes the sort of concern whose earlier manifestations have been reviewed.

The American language has come to unify the heterogenous racial and religious sentiment of earlier immigration. Are the effects of the current wave likely to jeopardize this achievement? The answer is negative for several reasons.

First of all, the challenge is not as overwhelming as the spectacular publicity accorded it by the media makes it out to be. Surveys indicate that slightly less than 10 percent of U.S. residents commonly use a language other than English in daily life, and the proportion who know no English at all is of the order of 1 percent.

More detailed studies would undoubtedly reveal that this residue consists largely of the newest arrivals and of older and isolated persons, as was the case with earlier waves of immigrants.

Second, while it is true that the large proportion of Spanish speakers among current arrivals makes language maintenance somewhat easier than it was for some of their predecessors, this is probably more than balanced by the increased pressure on them to acquire English rapidly.

This is so not only because English is firmly in place as the dominant language of the United States to a much greater extent than was the case let us say in the 19th century, but because of the paramountcy of English as a second language throughout the world, including Latin America.

In addition, the necessity of acquiring English for access to the more desirable segments of the labor market is self-evident to all immigrants. Furthermore, in contrast with earlier arrivals, immigrants today are settling in a society with nearly universal primary and secondary education. There is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that notwithstanding the unfortunate inadequacies of the public education we mete out to the poor, it does by and large succeed in rendering them English-speaking. And finally, current immigrants are exposed to English to an unprecedented extent by way of the overwhelming effects of television.

Although the United States should not merely rest on its laurels, it is the case that it has met challenges of this sort more successfully than most other countries, and that its institutions do reflect the results of such learning by experience.

How successful will we be this time around will depend more on the wisdom and justice of our relevant domestic policies than on our immigration laws. For example, it is quite self-evident that the overall character of a 10 percent Hispanic minority half a century hence will be determined overwhelmingly by the experience of the one already in our midst.

I would like now to turn very briefly to the question of numerical limits. In my view the feature of immigration that is most disturbing to even unprejudiced Americans is its unpredictable actual size. This is partly a consequence of inefficiently constructed legislation.

Assuming somewhat boldly that undocumented boundary crossing will in fact be significantly reduced so that numerical limits will bear a greater relationship to social reality than they do at present, it would be reasonable to reconceptualize them as a comprehensive moving average target with the average feature operating in the manner of income averaging familiar to many taxpayers in and out of the Congress.

The key to this scheme is the compressibility of ordinary immigration, a matter over which the exercise of administrative control is possible, and which on balance creates lesser hardship and fewer policy problems than the imposition of rigid numerical limits on the other two components.

Incorporating the notion of a sunset provision, a target might be established on a decennial basis in the year when census figures become available. The target might be on the order of 600,000. This would consist of three components: a basic immigration over 350,000, slightly more than at present; an estimated component of 125,000 for family reunification; and also an estimate of 125,000 reserved for refugees.

Should the latter two in fact exceed the estimate in any given year, the surplus would be deducted from ordinary immigration in subsequent years; in reverse, savings from either of the estimated components could be passed on into the future as well.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zolberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG

CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS IN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

Sudden upsurges of immigration above the accustomed level, usually accompanied by perceptible changes in its composition, have tended to evoke in the United States as in other receiving countries two quite distinct sorts of concern. The first is largely economic, including most prominently the putative impact of the incoming flow on different segments of the labor market, as variously evaluated by employers and workers. Other witnesses will undoubtedly address themselves to that subject. The second is cultural, pertaining to the putative impact of the flow on the established religious, racial, and linguistic character of the receiving society--in short, on its identity. Although there is widespread agreement on the importance of this aspect of immigration, public discussion of it is hampered by the inherent lack of precision of such qualitative considerations; by the persistence of myths, be they benevolent or malevolent; by the notorious history of U.S. enactments in this sphere; and by the explosive political potential any discussion of the desirability or undesirability of certain religious, racial, or linguistic groups entails. Nevertheless, it is better to consider the subject in a forthright manner than to do so in veiled code, or to shove it under the rug. The concern is a legitimate one, amenable to reasonable analysis. In this presentation, I shall initially address myself to the current situation, assuming that the level and composition of immigration--including all its components, legal and illegal, ordinary arrivals and refugees--are likely to remain roughly as they are today, and then turn to the implications of this analysis in relation to numerical limits, with some suggestions as to how they might be rendered more manageable.

The impact of the cultural composition of immigration on American identity appeared on our political agenda long before the country became independent and has remained a perennial issue, albeit shifting from one focus to another. At the time Alexis de Tocqueville put American democracy on the world map half a century after the Founding, he referred to its population as "Anglo-Americans." The body politic was for all purposes white, English-speaking, and Protestant. The importation of African slaves was prohibited early on, for reasons of racial undesirability as well as on humanitarian grounds; and should free blacks have arrived, they would have been ineligible for citizenship by naturalization. This reflected a fundamental belief, shared by Northerners as well as Southerners, concerning the degeneracy of Africans as a result of enslavement, and of their consequent unsuitability for membership in a self-governing republic. This belief even prompted half-hearted efforts to return them to their ancestral land. The ineligibility also applied to Native Americans, some of whom immigrated from Canada, as well as to Asians when we opened up a Pacific gate. There is little need to dwell on the subsequent history of efforts to deport the Chinese when no longer needed on the West Coast and to minimize Asian immigration more generally, culminating in the outright prohibition enacted in 1921 and 1924, notwithstanding dire warnings that this would irreparably harm our relations with Japan. From the Founding to 1965, American immigration policy was an outward projection of our internal racism, displayed along with the flag. It was only as the result of protracted internal struggle that the racial features of immigration policy were eliminated in 1965, which was also the year of the Civil Rights Act. These long overdue moral achievements must not be reversed. Although relations between the racial communities remain difficult to manage, little of this can be attributed to the impact of current immigration. In fact, ordinary selection--occupational qualifications and so forth--operates to insure that incoming non-whites generally adapt more successfully than their indigenous counterparts.

Concern with the religious composition of immigration was aroused most dramatically by the arrival of German and especially Irish Catholics after 1815. From about 1830 on, this ascended to the very center of national politics, where it remained until 1860, reappearing again in the 1880's. Initially, many Americans of British descent probably merely expressed thereby the deep prejudices of their ancestral island toward its subjected neighbor. But there was more to it than that. In Europe, the Catholic Church was aligned with political reaction; and although the papal condemnation of liberalism in 1832 was directed at France and Spain, it could be read as applying to Jacksonian democracy as well. That the incipient Catholic hierarchy in the United States explicitly endorsed the liberalism from which its church benefited, as did other minorities, was to little avail as the cultural politics of American Catholics gave further cause for suspicion. Notwithstanding formal separation of Church and State, public schools were generally imbued with a Protestant religiosity; Catholics provoked outrage by demanding the removal of the Bible--a Protestant Book--from the classroom; and when this failed, they launched their own parallel educational system, thereby confirming fears that they were intent upon creating a state within the state. Although the resulting hostility generated repeated efforts to restrict immigration and to inhibit naturalization of the newcomers, they were defeated during the pre-Civil War era by the Catholics' skillful use of democratic institutions and the insatiable hunger of industrialists, transporters, and real estate speculators for immigrants.

By Mr. Dooley's time, the Irish and the Germans had become "Anglo-Saxons"; but, when coupled with eastern or southern European origins, Catholicism--together with orthodoxy and Judaism--was thought to render immigrants unassimilable into the American mainstream. It took over a century for the religious issue to wane from the political arena, by way of adaptation on both sides. The transformation of Roman Catholicism in the United States into American Catholicism--an evolution which affected in turn the Church as a whole, as a result of the contributions of the American episcopate to the liberal camp--was mirrored by gradual acceptance of Roman Catholicism as merely another denomination. Similar interactions occurred with respect to other immigrants religions as well--in the case of Judaism, too late to avert tragedy--until religious pluralism, in a somewhat secularized incarnation, became a positive hallmark of American culture. When this prevailed, religion ceased being of concern in the sphere of immigration as well.

The erstwhile role of race, religion, or national origin in the assessment of the suitability of immigrant groups for incorporation into American culture has now been taken up by language. There is no gainsaying that, accompanying the shift from rural and agricultural society to urban and industrial, and especially to suburban and post-industrial, language has in fact become intrinsically more important in social relationships. It is therefore not surprising, in retrospect, that the linguistic heterogeneity of immigrants was of little concern until the XXth century; bi- or multilingual labor bosses, acting as intermediaries, sufficed. French and

Spanish survived, at least at the level of popular speech, among Americans of long standing in the regions where they had once been the language of colonial rule; and German became established as an alternative to English in many parts of the Midwest in the latter half of the XIXth century. Somewhat ironically, if a number of other languages associated with the "new immigration" did not thrive, this was largely the result of the Catholic Church's determination to impose English as the exclusive medium of instruction in its parochial schools, so as to surmount any remaining doubts concerning its Americanism as well as to provide a lingua franca for the diverse groups composing its world. Moreover, the very linguistic diversity of the waves arriving around the turn of the century--even among those originating in the same country--militated against the maintenance of any one of their tongues. English, of a sort, quickly became the medium of inter-group communication within the urban mosaic.

German, the most successful second American language, was forcibly eliminated from the scene by legislative fiat at the state and local level at the onset of World War I. Over the next three decades, this was combined with a forceful emphasis on Americanization; the repeated experience of military service; the drastic restriction of European immigration; and a vast expansion of the white-collar sector, for ascent into which a modicum of education in English was a sine qua non. In this manner, on the morrow of World War II, the United States had become a mostly monolingual country.

Mostly, but not entirely. Somewhat paradoxically, it was largely the exclusion of Asians and the restrictions of the "new immigration" from eastern and southern Europe which prompted the emergence of a sizable linguistically deviant group, as American entreprise looked to neighboring pools of cheap labor in search of substitutes for them. Within a few decades, the great Puerto Rican and Mexican migrations, expanding from rural to urban locales, and to which others from Central America and the Caribbean were added later on, recreated a cultural situation akin to that encountered in the Germanic Midwest a century earlier. The Hispanic presence is likely to persist for some time, whatever the future shape of immigration law, as Spanish-speakers have constituted a little more than one-third of ordinary immigration during the past decade, to which must be added the recent Cuban wave and the permanent residue produced by the comings and goings of Puerto Ricans and of undocumented temporary workers from Mexico and elsewhere.

The emergence of a linguistic minority, whose distinctiveness is compounded by its somewhat ambiguous racial status--45 per cent define themselves as other than white, a proportion that might be higher ~~was~~ had the question been asked of the white majority--and whose national visibility exceeds its actual size because it is scattered archipelago-like amidst leading metropolitan centers, unavoidably evokes the sort of concern whose earlier manifestations have been reviewed. Much as French became the cement that bound disparate provinces into the nation-state par excellance, so the American language came to unify the heterogeneous racial and religious sediment of earlier immigration. Are the effects of the current wave likely to jeopardize this achievement?

The answer is negative, for several reasons. First of all, the challenge is not as overwhelming as the spectacular publicity accorded it by the media makes it out to be. Surveys indicate that slightly less than 10 per cent of U.S. residents commonly use a language other than English in daily life; and the proportion who know no English at all is of the order of one per cent. More detailed studies would undoubtedly reveal that this residue consists largely of older and isolated persons, as was the case with earlier waves of immigrants. Secondly, the fact that the large proportion of Spanish-speakers among current arrivals makes language maintenance somewhat easier than it was for some of their predecessors is probably more than balanced by the increased pressure to acquire English rapidly. This is so because not only is English firmly in place as the dominant language of the United States, but because of its paramountcy as a second language throughout the world, including Latin America. In addition, the necessity of acquiring English for access to the more desirable segments of the labor market is self-evident to all immigrants, including peripatetic undocumented ones who aspire to move from the kitchen to the dining-room in the course of a future stay. In contrast with earlier arrivals, immigrants today are settling in a society with nearly universal primary and secondary education. There is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that, notwithstanding the unfortunate inadequacies of the public education we mete out to the poor, it does by and large succeed in rendering them English-speaking. And, finally, current immigrants are exposed to English to an unprecedented extent by way of the overwhelming effects of television.

The incorporation of any culturally distinctive wave of immigration constitutes a challenge for the receiving society. Although the United States should not merely rest on its laurels, it is the case that it has met challenges of this sort more successfully than most other countries, and that its institutions do reflect the results of such learning from experience. How successful we will be this time around will depend more on the wisdom and justice of our relevant domestic policies than on our immigration law. For example, much has been made of the fact that the Hispanic minority, now of the order of 6.5 per cent, will grow in half a century to as much as 15 per cent if immigration remains "uncontrolled," and even to somewhat over 10 per cent should the Administration's pending proposals be not only enacted, which is possible, but effectively implemented, which is less likely. Such figures implicitly raise the specter of a sort of "Hispanic Syndrome," communicating the idea of an undesirable critical mass that is likely to get out of hand. Leaving aside the value judgment involved in such projections and their accuracy, it must be emphasized that they assume that the present 6.5 per cent will not evolve. Yet it is self-evident that the overall character of a 10 per cent Hispanic minority half a century hence will be determined overwhelmingly by the experiences of the one already in our midst.

This is not to say that immigration policy makes no difference. In my view, the feature of immigration that is most disturbing to even unprejudiced Americans is its unpredictable actual size, itself partly a consequence of inefficiently constructed legislation. Assuming, somewhat boldly, that undocumented boundary-crossing will in fact be significantly reduced, so that numerical limits will bear a greater relationship to social reality than they do at present, it would be reasonable to reconceptualize them as a comprehensive moving average target, with the "average" feature operating in the manner of "income averaging" familiar to many taxpayers, in and out of the Congress.

Incorporating the notion of a "sunset provision," the target might be established on a decennial basis in the year when census results become available. Using recent levels as a baseline for the purposes of illustration, the target might be of the order of 600,000. This would consist of three components: (1) A basic immigration of 350,000, slightly more than at present; (2) An estimated component of 125,000 set aside for family reunion; (3) Another estimated component of 125,000 reserved for refugees. Should the latter two in fact exceed the estimate in any given year, the surplus would be deducted, over a period of years, from the basic component, with the proviso that it not be reduced below 200,000 in any given year of the decennial period. Similarly, "savings" from either of the estimated components could be passed on into the future as well. The key to this scheme is the compressibility of ordinary immigration, a matter over which the exercise of administrative control is possible and which, on balance, creates lesser hardship and fewer policy problems than the imposition of rigid numerical limits on the other two components. In effect, the American people would know to expect a total immigration of not more than six million over the coming decade; and the implementation of this choice would be rendered more effective by the availability of an element of flexibility amounting to 25 per cent of the total.

Senator SIMPSON. Several questions, if you will.

Mr. Castillo, you state your belief that a numerical limit on immigration should be set in law and should include all forms of immigrants, permanent residents and refugees. Then you state that you hope that a special number continue [illegible] be set aside for refugees and that current exempt family categories be preserved.

Under those circumstances how will we be able to legislate a fixed number? Do you have any specific advice to the subcommittee on a number which might be sufficient to address those observations of yours?

Mr. CASTILLO. I think the current number that we have or some slight variation, roughly 300,000, with our current experiences on numbers of family members who might be eligible would give us in fact an annual immigration of much closer to half a million easily, depending again on what we do for total numbers of refugees. So I think we end up with that figure.

What makes it difficult to come up with an actual figure is that if there is a legalization program and if we have more numbers for Mexico, that would mean a larger number of persons who could come in for family unification purposes than anyone is projecting here. And the problem is that no one knows right now just exactly how many persons would fit that. But I would not move to increase by any measurable amount the current level, the current cap.

Senator SIMPSON. Our problem is how do we have an overall cap if we have a separate allocation for refugees? And that is a quandary. Then of course, there is legalization. Certainly every single immigration reform proposal has recommended some form of legalization. The terms are different, the times are different, the family reunification aspects are different, the definitions are different. But nevertheless, if there is a legalization, under current law the family reunification which might be generated could be extraordinary. No one really ever furnishes much information to us on that, what that number of human beings will be after legalization if the present preference categories remain unchanged. That is a tough one.

But you have presented your opinion that in determining numerical limits, the emphasis should be more on family reunification and much less on labor need. And yet currently the figure is that 80 percent of immigrant admissions are based upon family reunification.

So what additional percentage would you believe would be allocated for family members? Your views would be important to me.

Do you have anything on that?

Mr. CASTILLO. There are two major groups where there are large backlogs in the preferences for family unification, and these two countries have backlogs in some preferences that reach up to 10-year waits. But in total numbers it is very likely that most of this backlog will disappear if there is a legalization and if there are some additional numbers for Mexico.

The difficulty that I have is that if it does happen, we may then create a new group of persons who are eligible indirectly as a result of the family relationships. And I guess because of the uncertainty of these figures I would be very hesitant to increase the number at all from the current levels.

Senator SIMPSON. As you may be aware, I have continually indicated an emphasis on family reunification, but I believe that we should give preference to immediate family members only. I do not believe that in the United States, adult brothers and sisters, particularly those who are married, are considered part of the nuclear family unit. Therefore, there is discussion of dropping completely the fifth preference, and that is receiving a good deal of attention by the subcommittee.

But we find that as we look at that, the definition of nuclear family should be ours under legislation and not a definition prescribed by a sending country, if that word "sending" is not misused there.

So, you know, I would like your thoughts on that. If we did remove the fifth preference, we might be able to allocate more visas to the higher family preferences such as second preference. And I would appreciate your thoughts on that.

Mr. CASTILLO. I believe that in terms of priorities, persons who are coming under second preference should be accorded a higher priority. Spouses and children, I believe, could be both in an emotional sense and logical sense shown to be more important for purposes of family unification.

I would not rule out the brother and sister relationship, but I would certainly not give it as much priority as the spouse and children.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, you heard perhaps some of the witnesses today advocating an increase in the numerical quota for Mexico. The administration proposes 20,000 for each, Mexico and Canada, and you are proposing 40,000 for Mexico.

Again, one of the elements in the testimony again that has been of great interest is the very low rate of naturalization among Hispanics, on the order of about 12 percent. I would appreciate any comments you might have on why that rate is in that percentage, as well as sharing with us the efforts of your organization, which is the Hispanic Immigrant Aid Society, in raising that naturalization rate, if that is a purpose to be attained.

Mr. CASTILLO. I have written a number of articles on this subject. Al Velarde from El Paso has done a good bit of work whereas I did more of the writing. And there are a number of factors that have led to the serious delay in naturalization of Mexican nationals especially.

In the last figure I showed an average of up to 30 years' residency in the United States before people became U.S. citizens. Some of the factors have to do with prejudice and historical discrimination questions, people feeling they would not be treated any better if they were U.S. citizens than they would be as Mexicans. Others have to do with just problems of administration, no one really trying to change the procedures. Some have to do with proximity. And over the years some factors had to do with ignorance; that is, a lot of people really believe that to become an American citizen you had to spit on the Mexican flag. And that of course is not true, but people believe it. And then there are a number of other myths and a lot of ignorance about naturalization.

I believe that is changing, and now there are groups such as us and others who are promoting naturalization who believe that it is in everyone's best interest to have more and more citizens; but the effort is slow. We are not seeing any major programs yet. I hope that we will in a few years see these.

The efficiency package change will help regarding witnesses, but that is a small step. I believe the years in the United States by Mexican permanent residents will decline in the future.

Senator SIMPSON. You stated in your testimony that the numerical limits as finally adopted should be flexible enough to allow any administration, of whichever political persuasion, to implement its philosophic stance. That is a quote. I am concerned that it is that kind of flexibility which has resulted in increasingly higher levels of admissions than were ever specified in the law originally, especially with regard to the misuse of the parole authority.

To what degree should immigration levels be determined by philosophical stances? And I wonder what degree—if that would mean undermining the congressional responsibility to fix those limits of immigration.

Mr. CASTILLO. I think the various administrations as they come in promote either a policy that calls for more action from one part of the world or another, and they all end up with some emergency of some sort, whether it is Cubans, Haitians, Hungarians, or whoever. They need to be able to respond.

I think by having a cap on refugees the administration can realize how many of these emergencies it can respond to, and by consultation with the Congress can come to some resolution. I do not believe that the administration can or should or would try to run around the Congress. I think the consultation is critical.

But from my experience, an administration can take a position on a particular country in allowing people in from that country or from an area of the world that may not be in consonance with a prior administration. I do not necessarily feel that is bad. I think that is the political system, and people are likely to implement changes.

So I would say some general limits as we try to set in the refugee provisions would still be helpful, because if not we just do not have any way on how to decide how to deal with the 13 million or so refugees in the world.

Senator **Simpson**. Well, I certainly hope the consultation process will prove to be what the Congress intended—and it did work very well this year. At least the recommendations that both Senator Kennedy and myself presented were carefully considered.

The consultation process can work and will work, you know, if we do not try to balloon the figures, which we have attempted to do in other situations under all administrations. But I thank you.

Now, Professor Hardin, I might ask: You stated that population increase is the culprit that threatens democracy. In your view, what would be the ideal population size or optimum population size to preserve or assure that our system would prevail?

Mr. **Hardin**. Well, perhaps I am being unduly pessimistic, but I would say rather less than our present population. I feel a great concern with things that are going on now that I do not see our getting control of even if our population did not increase, which of course it is doing all the time.

No firm number can be arrived at, because one of the things involved here is the social system that you are presupposing. For example, if a population is extremely uniform in its culture, it can take more people with less social disruption. A simple evidence of this is found in the numbers of lawyers per population in Japan compared with the United States. In the United States there is one lawyer for every 500 people. In Japan it is one for every 10,000 people.

Now, that does not mean that the Japanese are any less aggressive than we are, any less egotistic or anything of that sort. But the fact is, they have a single culture; there are no minority groups of any size at all in Japan, extremely small ones like the Ainus, but no large ones. And it is a uniform culture. As a result of this they can settle most of their disputes, not only out of the courtroom, but even without lawyers.

I do not know how that would go down with the Congress, many of whose Members are lawyers. But I do not think this should be seen as an attack on professional lawyers. It is just that the number of lawyers you have is an indication of the amount of social disorder in society.

Senator **Simpson**. I have a great desire to agree with that. [Laughter.]

Even though I were one. [Laughter.]

But you know, there is a disassemblage by more of my colleagues around the scene than if there were not. That is a curious statement. But we had some interesting testimony on that issue of attorneys with regard to the Cuban-Haitian issue, the Haitian issue especially, the asylum petitions, the procedures, the due process given under our present law, which is under the present act, under the present legal procedures and case law. The due process afforded to an asylum petition is more than would be given to any citizen, naturalized or native or permanent resident.

So I hear that clearly. It is a provocative statement.

But the panel this morning told us that the U.S. fertility rate is below replacement, that our population size would decline without a positive immigration rate. If the fertility level remains the same, how can we preserve our numbers, which if they fall below a certain level might also serve to jeopardize our situation as a democratic society?

Mr. **Hardin**. Well, I think here you have to take account of the fact that what happens to the fertility rate this year has no effect on the work force for another 18 years. So you have plenty of time to adjust for that. So if the fertility rate falls in 1982, we should start thinking of taking in extra immigrants if we need them for the work force in the year 2000, not before.

So any sort of an indexing should be with a time delay of about 18 years. Now, that would have the advantage that since you can see the trouble coming—the shortage in the labor force coming up a good 18 or 20 years before it happens, we might well find ways of doing without the importation of more bodies, we might find ways of developing more labor-saving machinery, as indeed we are doing all the time. The prospective labor shortage very likely would never turn up anyway. We have plenty of time to adjust for falling fertilities, one generation, to be exact.

Senator **Simpson**. You also stated that the increases in immigration are more threatening to democracy than increases in fertility, and you cite a phrase, "tribalism" as a contributing factor. How might you respond to Dr. Zolberg's assertion that the United States has handled successfully this challenge, integrating each successive wave of immigrants, and that factors in today's institutions will insure that newest wave, which will be—are the Hispanics—will also be successfully integrated?

Mr. **Hardin**. He may be right. But I am concerned with the difference in public attitude now compared with, say, 50 years ago, when the assumption on the part of a great many Americans—maybe most Americans—was that the immigrant was wrong. Now that was not a nice assumption to make, but that is what people thought.

Whereas now, with the ACLU, the Voting Rights Act of 1973, and so on, the assumption is that, if anything, the immigrant is right and he should be sympathetically treated. That is fine, we should treat him sympathetically. But if we do, he gets the message and he says, "Oh ho" I do not have to integrate with the society, I will just keep right on with my old ways."

We are giving signals to these various groups that we are in favor of tribal pride, of their glory in being members of separatist groups. You see, if we tell them we approve of separation they will remain separate. This is just human nature.

The attitude of the general part of American society makes the risk greater now than it was 50 years ago.

Senator SIMPSON. We could go on to develop things in that area for quite a period. That is interesting commentary.

Just a final question—to what degree do you feel that foreign policy considerations should enter into decisions on numerical limits for immigration?

Mr. HARDIN. Well, I am out of my depth here. I do not feel very sympathetic to this view. I see this as another escape hatch to justify almost anything. My basic position is that the immigration policy of any country should be determined by that country itself and not by any other country.

Now, if a country wants to use this as a bargaining chip, fine. But it better be sure that it gets honest value in its bargaining. We would not ask Mexico to evaluate its immigration policy with respect to the needs of Salvador or Nicaragua or Bolivia or any other country. This suggestion would not be welcomed by them. I think we should treat ourselves in the same way.

Foreign policy should have very little influence on immigration policy, as I see it. One is for the outside of a country and one is for inside.

Senator SIMPSON. Very interesting, visiting with the Mexican officials just a week ago, that they continue to discuss the absolute significant interest of their—of those officials in their country that we take care and be assured that their people who are here are being treated humanely and properly.

And I responded to the fact that it is difficult to do that when they are here in an illegal status, being taken advantage of, afraid to use police systems and hospital systems in some cases, and certainly afraid to complain to their employer, who simply says, "I will just call the INS and we will take care of you."

And they continued to refer to the importance that we do something as a sovereign country, as they would, and they do not want to interfere with what we are doing on immigration. Yet some other Mexicans have some very significant advice for us; and yet their problems with their southern border are very difficult.

And to cite a hypothetical—I have hated those. I have always hated them. I hated them when I practiced law, so I hate to pop them on others.

But I said to the Mexicans: If you had 1 million U.S. citizens, just 1 million apprehended every year coming into your country, therefore not even knowing how many unapprehended are coming, but you would have apprehended 1 million, would not that become a serious problem to you? And there was an interesting array of responses to that.

Those are the figures that we deal with here. But it was a very interesting time, 4 days with President Lopez Portillo and his successor Miguel de la Madrid; very fascinating. I will have a full report, will I not? Yes; I will, of course.

Dr. Zolberg, how important is the element of cultural diversity in dividing up immigration numbers? Should the policymakers attempt to ensure equal distribution among various sending countries, or should we allow demand to determine who immigrates to the United States.

Mr. ZOLBERG. Well, I think, Senator, that the present arrangements, which do set a maximum, which of course might vary slightly according to presently pending proposals nevertheless would be the basic system. It seems to me that that is the one provision that we have established in order to ensure no sort of hogging by any one country or part of the world, and it seems to me that these are reasonably well established until proven totally disastrous, which I do not think they are.

Senator SIMPSON. Have you assessed the impact which immigration has on the social and cultural fabric of south Florida, as well as those communities which have been most heavily affected by immigrant flows in the past 20 years?

Mr. ZOLBERG. I think I will have to stay away from that one, Senator. I am not a specialist in Florida sociology, and I am sure you can get good information on that from other sources.

Senator SIMPSON. We have had some very interesting testimony from Floridians and south Floridians, and an interesting array of persons. That is a serious issue there that often dominates our mail to the subcommittee, the south Florida situation.

But let me ask you: You indicate, I think, what I would sense as confidence that Spanish-speaking immigrants and their descendants will become English-speaking. You indicate that. And how then do you regard the development of what has been presented to the Subcommittee as what appears to be a Spanish language-dominated area in Miami and the surrounding areas of south Florida?

Mr. ZOLBERG. I think I can address myself to that somewhat, Senator. I try to do so in the lengthy statement that I submitted by referring to the experience of the Germanic Midwest, in which I live and which I have studied somewhat historically. There was a time not very long ago when cities like Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago, and others throughout the Midwest, as well as many smaller towns and villages in that area, were heavily German-speaking, not only because for a period of nearly a third of a century, approximately a third of incoming immigration into the United States was from German-speaking parts of Europe, but also because a number of people who came from nearby parts of Europe already used German as a second language and, finding themselves in German-dominated areas in the United States, easily shifted over to German rather than English.

So we had at least one instance of such an experience. Now, that experience of course was brought to a very abrupt halt by legislative action, at the State level mainly, at the outbreak of World War I, and within a very short period of time German for practical purposes pretty much disappeared from the Midwest as a second language.

Now, what I have tried to argue is that there have been concentrations before of the same sort as the ones we find, let us say, in south Florida today. And what I have tried to say there is that what happens is largely—I mean, immigration constitutes a challenge. Whether that challenge is successfully handled or not is largely a function of our domestic policies.

I have not, since I was not asked to, taken a stand on the issue of bilingual education, which was referred to by some of the witnesses. And I think it is the case that there has been some ambiguity and confusion in that sphere, and we are aware now that the Administration and the various other committees of the Congress are trying to deal with that question.

So there is little doubt in my mind, and that is based on empirical evidence, that the vast majority of Spanish-speaking immigrants who have been coming to the United States certainly are very eager to have their children, for example, learn English as quickly as possible.

I think that even in Chicago, which now has a larger proportion of Hispanics in its public schools than of whites, as these categories are established, so it is becoming in that sense also an Hispanic city in many ways, that is quite clearly established. And this is what I am basing my rather optimistic evaluation on.

Senator **Simpson**. Yes; I hear that, and I remember my grandfather went to Chicago from Holland as an orphan, and I can tell the same story that anyone in this room can tell about immigration and the impact on our lives.

The "Post" is not published in Chicago any more, but I remember that. But in the past we had a high degree of success in assimilating in regards to our language and our public culture. And I make that distinction very clearly between our private cultures and our public culture.

But today it seems perhaps that legislatures, including this one, have given rise to factors which appear to be less conducive to such assimilation, and those would be: the bilingual or black cultural education being used other than as a transitional device; a greater concentration on a single language group if illegal immigration is considered; assuredly a higher tolerance of ethnic diversity; the proximity of Latin America, which is a real issue, which encourages continual contact—the countries very short miles away.

But do you believe, then, that those things, some of which are being promoted by and the executive and legislative branches of governments will influence whether the assimilation to our public culture and our common language of the Spanish-speaking immigrant will be as rapid or as complete as that of past immigrants?

Mr. **Zolberg**. Again, I think one can make two points about that. One is that all of the things you have cited, which I think are quite accurate, must be balanced by factors which provide perhaps greater incentives for the current wave of non-English speaking immigrants to acquire English than was the case for earlier waves.

When people worked on a farm mostly or in factories, labor bosses often mediated for a very long period of time. They were bilingual or multilingual and so on and so forth. Very often on the farm it was a homogeneous foreign language environment, where there was very little incentive to shift over for two or three generations.

Now—and I do not mean to make any sort of invidious comment on this—even an undocumented Spanish speaker working in one of the many restaurants in any one of our cities, who wants to move from a job in the kitchen on his first illegal sojourn to a job in the dining room on the second one is going to have to pick up some English. In other words, I am emphasizing here the very important role of language in the occupational sector, the importance of white collar work and so forth.

Almost any one of the promising avenues of upward mobility in American society now requires English language skills, even if—even if temporarily some cities have adjusted to these incoming waves by putting up bilingual services and so forth.

In other words, I am betting, so to speak, on the commonsense desire on the part of incoming immigrants to make it in American society. They can read, in whatever language, they can read what you have to do in order to make it. And I think that is a reasonably well established bet.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I am sure there are a few of those who would cover that one, somewhere, at least from the testimony I have heard in these very many hours.

A final question. How would you respond to Dr. Hardin's comment that significant levels of culturally distinct immigrant admissions to the United States lead to this tribalism, as he describes it, and a subsequent erosion of the basic principles of present society? How do you respond to that?

Mr. ZOLBERG. My major response, Senator, is that has indeed been the concern of established Americans at any phase in our history as far back as we can go, which I will try to do a little bit in my written statement and which I will not bore you with in detail here.

But I think it is understandable that, given a certain distribution of religious, racial, linguistic, heterogeneity, certainly the achievement of a certain level of heterogeneity in American society, or French or British society for that matter, any challenge to that evokes concern. I think that concern is understandable and, I would add, quite legitimate.

Now, American society has undertaken from its founding to deal with such challenges to a greater extent than others. So indeed, we have had more such challenges. We do have certain advantages as a consequence of it, namely that we have learned how to do it in a way that, for example, British society I believe has not.

So that the same degree of new heterogeneity in the United States is, if anything, relatively less problematic than it would be if it were to occur, for example, as was the case in Britain or, for that matter, in Japan, which was cited as an example of a homogeneous society. Japan in fact has had some immigration in the past and because of its very high homogeneity has been quite unable to cope with even the small minorities that it has.

So we have, on that score, learned a great deal, and there is absolutely no reason why in principle we should not be able to solve this new problem, as we have others.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I always appreciate having your remarks. You are an articulate and careful spokesman. And I guess we come right back to the thing that threads itself through this whole business. You told me about this many moons ago now, but really, as we try to do it without the historical perspective or a racist result—that phrase this morning, I think it was the gentleman from ZPG who said that in his written statement, that he was, you know, a restrictionist without question, but disassociated himelf completely from nativist, xenophobic, or racist arguments for the exclusion of ethnic, regional, or linguistic groups.

And I think that is, you know, where we all should be. Some are not there yet, but they are small voices and the groups that are asking for restrictions and limitations and caps are not involved in that, at least as I see it. Maybe that is a naive line, but I believe that is so.

So it is very helpful to have your testimony and I thank you very much for it. Thank you, all three of you, very much.

And the final panel consists of, Mr. Phil Comstock of the Citizens Committee for Immigration Reform, Washington, D.C., and Ambassador Marshall Green of the Population Crisis Committee of Washington, D.C.

We will take a short 5-minute break, if you will.

[Recess.]

Senator SIMPSON. We will proceed again now with Mr. Comstock and Ambassador Green, and we might just proceed in that order, please, as on the agenda. Mr. Comstock, please.

STATEMENT OF PHIL COMSTOCK, CITIZENS' COMMITTEE FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM

Mr. COMSTOCK. Thank you, Senator. In the interest of brevity, I will summarize my statement. Therefore, I ask that my full written testimony be made part of the record of this hearing.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. COMSTOCK. My name is Phil Comstock. I represent the Citizens' Committee for Immigration Reform. I also serve as executive assistant to the president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.

Both the Citizens' Committee and our union believe that it is in the best interest of the United States to continue a system under which some immigrants are numerically limited, but in which immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, special immigrants and refugees are exempt from numerical ceilings. We recommend an annual ceiling of 350,000 numerically limited immigrant visas, plus an additional 100,000 visas available annually for each of 5 years to help clear the present backlog of applications.

Of the 350,000 total visas, 250,000 should be allocated to the family reunification category and the remaining 100,000 should be issued to independent immigrants. We estimate that this, plus the numerically unlimited category of close family relatives and refugees would result in approximately 800,000 legal entries annually for the next 5 years.

While I am certain that our proposal raises some technical questions, I would like to focus my remaining remarks on a very central issue: the economic results which accompany immigration. This is an area of particular concern for the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.

For more than a century, the American garment industry has provided a very sizable portion of threshold opportunities for immigrants entering the industrial work force. Equally important, however, is the continuing role of the garment industry in providing employment for hundreds of thousands of Americans.

As officers of our union have noted in previous statements before this subcommittee, the hope for a better life is denied undocumented workers because of the permanent underclass status to which they have been relegated. Legal migrants, however, do not labor under the fear of discovery and deportation. Initially and for a short duration, they may accept wages and conditions which are less than normally accorded long-term residents.

Once they have gained a foothold, however, because they are unfettered by the exploitation which the undocumented are compelled to suffer, legal immigrants can participate fully in our economy. Such opportunity, coupled with their characteristic ambition and self-reliance, has allowed legal immigrants to prosper, creating benefits for all in the process, in stark contrast to our experience with undocumented workers.

This has led us to conclude that the major factor determining the economic effects of immigration is not the sheer numbers, but the degree to which immigrants have an opportunity to participate on an equal footing in our economic, political, and social life. We are likewise convinced that whatever initial increased competition for jobs might accompany the level of legal migration we advocate will very quickly be offset by the economic benefits which accrue.

Legal immigrants are not only jobseekers. They and their dependents are also consumers. Given the opportunity to earn a decent living, they will contribute significantly to demand, thus assisting in the creation of more jobs for all. This aspect of legal immigration is enhanced by our emphasis on family reunification. It is reasonable to conclude that children and many spouses who enter under this provision will not be active jobseekers. Their presence will, however, add to demand, while having a negligible effect on the competition for employment.

Legal immigrants, because they have no need to hide, no need to participate in the off-the-books economy, will also be taxpayers. The ambition and self-reliance which is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of legal immigrants belies the myth that they will become dependent on the public dole. Moreover, they show a disproportionate tendency in favor of entrepreneurial enterprise. The small businesses they have established have often helped to revitalize neighborhoods. Tax rolls have benefited and jobs are created that would not have otherwise existed.

This economic effect of legal immigration is especially important since small business provides more than 80 percent of all the jobs in the private sector.

Last, legal immigration provides a meaningful escape valve, in conjunction with a generous amnesty for all current resident undocumented workers, strict employer sanctions, and improved enforcement of existing immigration laws. A commitment to a reasonably sizable level of legal immigration could help diminish the flood of illegal immigration which has gripped our Nation in recent years.

Specifically, the addition of 100,000 entries per year to help clear the backlog of those who have already been approved would certainly reduce their incentive to forgo delays of many years and enter the United States without benefit of documentation. The same should be true for family members of U.S. citizens who, in the absence of reunification preferences, are confronted by separation from their loved ones, often for many decades.

Consequently, both the Citizens" Committee and the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union not only feel that the economic benefits of a generous legal immigration policy far outweigh the potential initial costs; we are convinced that such a commitment is an essential step in the formulation of a comprehensive, rational immigration policy.

Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much for your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Comstock follows:]

Prepared Statement of Phil Comstock

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Phil Comstock and I am here today representing the Citizens' Committee for Immigration Reform. The Committee, as you know, is a bi-partisan, national organization formed through the leadership of Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University, and a distinguished panel of co-chairmen, to promote a rational, just, humane and race-free immigration policy for the United States. I also serve as Executive Assistant to the President of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, a union of 350,000 people.

The Citizens' Committee for Immigration Reform believes that paramount to all other considerations, immigration policy should serve the national interest of the United States. Although this country has a long tradition as a nation receiving immigrants and refugees, it should remain so to the extent that the admission of immigrants is in our economic, social and cultural interests. Demand to migrate to the United States today is so great that it would not be in the national interest to admit all who wish to come, but at the same time we must determine in a just, humane and race-free way which groups of immigrants to admit.

Traditionally, persons migrating to the United States, whether legally or illegally, have come for one or a combination of three broad purposes -- to join family members already here, to better themselves economically or to escape persecution. Over the years, immigration law, in varying degrees, has provided for and encourages the entry of such persons as family members, workers and refugees. We believe it is in the best national interest for immigration policy to serve explicitly the goals of family reunification, economic growth consistent with protection of U.S. workers and cultural diversity consistent with national unity. We also believe that the United States should remain a champion of freedom from oppression through its refugee admissions policy.

The reunification of families should remain one of the foremost goals of immigration, not only because it is a humane policy, but also because bringing families back together contributes to the economic and social welfare of the United States. Society benefits from the reunification of immediate families, especially because family unity promotes the stability, health and productivity of family members. Family reunification provides a support system for newly arrived family members to help them in adapting to new ways of life in this country while still sharing some of the customs of their homelands.

WHILE AFFIRMING AND STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION IN IMMIGRATION POLICY, THE CITIZENS' COMMITTEE RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF ALSO PROVIDING FOR THE IMMIGRATION OF PERSONS WHO DO NOT HAVE CLOSE FAMILY TIES IN THE UNITED STATES. NOT EVERYONE IS FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO BE PART OF A RECENT MIGRATION CHAIN TO THIS COUNTRY, AND PERMITTING, AND INDEED ENCOURAGING, THE MIGRATION OF NEW GROUPS OF IMMIGRANTS BROADENS THE DIVERSITY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW IMMIGRANTS AND THE RICHNESS OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.S. CULTURE AND SOCIETY. BEYOND THESE CONTRIBUTIONS SUCH IMMIGRANTS CAN BRING SKILLS THAT ARE NEEDED IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH.

THIS NATION, ON THE BASIS OF ITS HERITAGE AND TRADITION, SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO BE A HAVENFOR REFUGEES FROM POLITICAL TYRANNY AND PERSECUTION. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES CAN ONLY PLAY A SMALL PART IN ACCEPTING SOME OF THE WORLD'S THIRTEEN MILLION REFUGEES, A STRONG REFUGEE POLICY AS A PART OF OVERALL IMMIGRATION POLICY, EASES THE BURDEN ON OTHER COUNTRIES OF FIRST ASYLUM, SUPPORTS THE UNITED STATES IN ITS EFFORTS TO REMAIN A CHAMPION OF FREEDOM, AND PROMOTES THE SPIRIT OF FREEDOM IN U.S. SOCIETY. REFUGEES, LIKE IMMIGRANTS, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE WELL-BEING OF ALL AMERICANS, EVEN THOUGH THEIR INITIAL ECONOMIC COST TO SOCIETY MAY BE HIGH.

BRIEFLY STATED, THE CITIZENS' COMMITTEE FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM BELIEVES THAT AT A MINIMUM, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PREMISES:

- THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMMIGRATE SHOULD BE OPEN REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY;
- IMMIGRATION POLICY SHOULD RAPIDLY REUNIFY SPOUSES AND MINOR CHILDREN;
- IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO REUNIFY CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS THAN THOSE THAT ARE LESS CLOSELY RELATED TO A U.S. SPONSOR;
- PLACE OF BIRTH SHOULD NOT IMPEDE THE REUNIFICATION OF CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS;
- THE REUNIFICATION OF FMILIES AND INDEPENDENT IMMIGRATION SERVE SEPARATE GOALS AND NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES;
- THE IMMIGRATION OF PERSONS WITHOUT PREVIOUS TIES IN THE UNITED STATES IS AN IMPORTANT GOAL IN ITSELF BECAUSE OF THE MANY BENEFITS THEY CAN BRING TO AMERICAN SOCIETY; AND

- o The United States as a champion of freedom and a wealthy nation with a tradition of immigration should continue to take more than its fair share of refugees.

Our Committee believes that it is in the best interest of the United States to continue a system where some immigrants are numerically limited but in which immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, special immigrants and refugees are exempt from numerical ceilings. We recommend an annual ceiling of 350,000 numerically limited immigrant visas and an additional 100,000 visas available annually for each of five years to help clear the large back-logs of immigrant visa applications which have developed under the current system. Of the 350,000 total visas, 250,000 should be allocated to applicants in the family reunification category and the remaining 100,000 should be issued to independent immigrants.

We recommend that immediate relatives of U.S. citizens; spouses and children of U.S. citizens; parents of adult U.S. citizens; and unmarried adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens should be admitted in the numerically exempt immediate relative category.

In addition, the Committee feels that the closest relatives of permanent resident aliens -- spouses and minor, unmarried children -- should be given preference in the numerically limited family reunification category and should not be subject to per-country ceilings. Adult, unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens should be given a separate preference but should be subject to per-country ceilings; elderly parents of permanent resident aliens should be granted a separate preference; married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their families should be granted a percentage of visas; and brothers and sisters of adult U.S. citizens and their families should continue to enjoy a preferred status.

We also recommend that provision be made for the immigration of persons without family ties in the United States -- the so-called independent immigrant. Within this group there should be "special" immigrants, immigrants with exceptional qualifications, investors and others who do not meet these criteria. This latter group would allow entry into the United States of persons who cannot now qualify because they come from countries without an immigration base in the United States. This will broaden the opportunity to emigrate and increase the diversity among immigrants, as well as enabling us to screen the pool of prospective immigrants for labor market impact to both protect U.S. workers and enhance economic growth.

OUR COMMITTEE FAVORS AN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM OF MANAGED FLEXIBILITY WITH EITHER A TOTAL ANNUAL NUMERICAL CEILING OR TARGET AND A LONGER RANGE CEILING, POSSIBLY OF FIVE YEARS DURATION. IF SUCH A SYSTEM WERE ADOPTED, ALL IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE ADMISSIONS COULD BE INCLUDED WITHIN AN EXPANDED ANNUAL NUMERICAL WORLD CEILING. IN ADDITION, LONG-RANGE CEILINGS COULD PERMIT FLEXIBILITY FROM YEAR-TO-YEAR, PROVIDING THAT OVER THE LONG-RANGE PERIOD THE CEILING WAS NOT EXCEEDED. THIS WOULD PERMIT INCREASED FLEXIBILITY IN UNPREDICTABLE SITUATIONS, SUCH AS EMERGENCY REFUGEE ADMISSIONS.

A FLEXIBLE SYSTEM WOULD ALSO PERMIT A GREATER DEGREE OF PLANNING CAPACITY FOR IMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS. GROWTH COULD BE MORE READILY CONTROLLED BY RAISING OR LOWERING THE OVERALL CEILING OR TARGET TO ACCOMODATE SPECIFIC DOMESTIC CONCERNS, SUCH AS THE FERTILITY RATE OR ENEMPLOYMENT RATES AND WORLD CONDITIONS.

UNDER SUCH A SYSTEM, AN ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISM TO OVERSEE THE OPERATIONS OF THE IMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS SYSTEM, TO STUDY FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND TO PERIODICALLY RECOMMEND CHANGES IN NUMBERS AND PRIORITIES WOULD BE NECESSARY. WE BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH THIS FUNCTION COULD BE CARRIED OUT BY AN EXISTING CABINET DEPARTMENT, IT WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE IF IT WERE UNDERTAKEN BY A SEPARATE ENTITY WITH BROADER POLICY AND FEWER OPERATIONAL CONCERNS.

THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY CONSIDERED THAT A FLEXIBLE SYSTEM OF IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE ADMISSIONS COULD BEST BE ADMINISTERED BY A SMALL IMMIGRATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPOSED OF SEVERAL PRESTIGIOUS COUNCILLORS AND A SMALL STAFF. WE THINK THIS IDEA STILL HAS MERIT AND WARRANTS SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

ECONOMISTS AND HISTORIANS GENERALLY AGREE THAT IMMIGRATION HAS CONTRIBUTED AND IS CONTINUING TO CONTRIBUTE TO OVERALL ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES. IT INCREASES THE RETURN TO WORKERS WHO DO NOT COMPETE WITH THE IMMIGRANTS AND TO CAPITAL HELD BY RESIDENTS, THEREBY INCREASING THE AVERAGE INCOME OF AMERICANS GENERALLY. TO THE DEGREE THAT IMMIGRANTS ARE SKILLED WORKERS, NOT ONLY OVERALL ECONOMIC GROWTH, BUT PRODUCTIVITY IS INCREASED ALSO. IMMIGRATION IN RECENT YEARS, ALTHOUGH THE SCALE HAS BEEN MUCH LOWER THAN THAT OF EARLIER PERIODS, HAS MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.

AS PROFESSOR JULIAN SIMON PUTS IT, THE NET ECONOMIC EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS AFTER FOUR OR FIVE YEARS AS A WHOLE IS "POSITIVE AND LARGE" AND WHEN WE VALUE THE STREAMS OF FUTURE COSTS AND BENEFITS THE WAY WE COMPUTE THE PRESENT VALUE OF ANY OTHER INVEST-

MENT, THE RATE OF RETURN FROM IMMIGRANTS TO THE CITIZEN PUBLIC IS OF THE ORDER OF 40 PERCENT PER ANNUM, A REMARKABLY GOOD INVESTMENT FOR ANYONE'S PORTFOLIO."

IMPLICIT IN PROFESSOR SIMON'S CONCLUSION IS A RECOGNITION OF THE SPECIAL QUALITIES WHICH HAVE GENERALLY TYPIFIED IMMIGRANTS TO OUR SHORES. THE DECISION TO LEAVE ONE'S HOMELAND, FRIENDS AND FREQUENTLY FAMILY REQUIRES AN UNUSUAL DEGREE OF MOTIVATION AND RESOLVE. FOR EVERY INDIVIDUAL WHO MAKES SUCH A DECISION, THERE ARE QUITE LITERALLY TENS OF THOUSANDS WHO REMAIN BEHIND, FOR WHOM THE POTENTIAL REWARDS ARE INSUFFICIENT OR THE NECESSARY SACRIFICES TOO GREAT. THOSE WHO DO COME ARE IN MANY WAYS SIMILAR TO THE EARLY AMERICAN POINEERS WHO LEFT THEIR FAMILAR SURROUNDINGS AND, WHO IN THE PURSUIT OF BETTER LIFE, WERE UNDAUNTED BY THE UNCERTAINTIES WHICH CONFRONTED THEM. MOREOVER, THOSE, WHO HAVE RECOUNTED THE HISTORY OF OUR NATION'S IMMIGRANTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY NOTED THEIR EXTRAORDINARY AMBITION, RESOURCEFULNESS AND SELF-RELIANCE - QUALITIES WHICH WE VALUE HIGHLY.

I MAKE REFERENCE TO THESE ATTRIBUTES BECAUSE THEY FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS WHICH ACCOMPANY LEGAL IMMIGRATION.

UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE AVAILABILITY OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESIDENTS IS A LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY CONCERN. DURING PERIODS OF RECESSION AND CONCOMITANT PERSISTENT HIGH LEVELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT, THERE IS A NATURAL TENDENCY TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION ON THE INCREASED COMPETITION FOR JOBS WHICH INITIALLY RESULTS ANY TIME ADDITIONAL WORKERS ENTER THE LABOR FORCE.

THIS IS AN AREA OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION. FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY, THE AMERICAN GARMENT INDUSTRY HAD PROVIDED A VERY SIZABLE PORTION, IF NOT THE MAJORITY, OF THRESHOLD OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMMIGRANTS TO BECOME ASSIMILATED INTO THE INDUSTRIAL WORK FORCE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IS THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE GARMENT INDUSTRY IN PROVIDING THE FIRST RUNG ON THE INDUSTRIAL SKILLS LADDER FOR HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF WHOM ARE WOMEN, MINORITIES, OR PERSONS WHO ARE RESIDENT IN ECONOMICALLY-DISADVANTAGED AREAS.

In the past decade, in the course of our organizational activities, Officers of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union have necessarily had contact with both recent legal immigrants and undocumented workers. We have found that each group shares the common aspiration for a better life, free from economic deprivation.

As Officers of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union have noted in previous statements before this Subcommittee the hope for a better life is denied the undocumented because of the permanent underclass status to which they have been relagated. Legal migrants, however, do not labor under the fear of discovery and deportation. Initially, and for a short duration, legal migrants may accept wages and conditions which are less than normally accorded long-term residents. Once they have gained a foothold, however, because they are unfettered by the exploitation which the undocumented are compelled to suffer, legal immigrants can participate fully in our economy. In the past, such opportunity, coupled with their characteristic ambition and self-reliance, has allowed legal immigrants to prosper, creating benefits for all in the process. This has led the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union to conclude that the major factor determining the economic effects of immigration is not the sheer numbers involved but the degree to which immigrants have an opportunity to participate on an equal footing in our economic, political and social life. We are likewise convinced that whatever initial additional competition for jobs might accompany the level of legal immigration we advocate will very quickly be greatly offset by the economic benefits which accrue.

Legal immigrants are not only job seekers. Legal immigrants and their dependents are also consumers. Given the opportunity to participate on an equal footing, to earn a decent living, they will contribute significantly to demand for the goods and services provided by the private sector, thus assisting in the creation of more jobs for all. The consumer demand aspect of legal immigration is enhanced by the emphasis on family reunification advocated by the Citizens' Committee For Immigration Reform. It is reasonable to conclude that children and many spouses, who enter under this provision, will not be active job seekers. Their presence should immediately add to demand while having a negligible effect on the competition for additional jobs.

Legal immigrants, because they have no need to hide, no need to participate in the off-the-books economy, will also be tax payers and on the basis of the best available evidence, ask for little in the way of Social Services. The ambition and self-reliance which is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of legal immigrants, belies the myth that they will become dependent on the public dole. Historically, legal immigrants have shown a disproportionate tendency in favor of entrepreneural enterprise, More recently, Vietnamese refugees who have settled in Arlington, Virginia, the Korean immigrants who settled in New York City and recent arrivals from Spanish-speaking countries who have settled in many sections of Brooklyn have continued this tradition. The small businesses they have established have helped to revitalized neighborhoods that only a few years ago were nearly abondanded. The tax roles have benefited and jobs were created that would not have otherwise existed. This economic effect of legal immigration is especially important since small businesses provides more than 80% of all the jobs in the private sector.

Finally, the level of legal immigration advocated by the Citizens' Committee For Immigration Reform, (estimated at 800,000 per annum for the next five years, inclusive of all categories of immigration and refugee entries), provides a meaningful escape valve. In conjunction with a generous amnesty for all current resident undocumented workers, strict employer sanctions and improved enforcement of existing immigration laws, a commitment to a reasonably sizable level of legal migrations could help diminish the flood of illegal migration which has gripped our Nation in recent years.

The addition of 100,000 entries per year for the next five years to clear the backlog of those, who have already been approved, would certainly reduce their incentive to forego delays of many years and enter the United States without benefit of documentation. The same should be true for family members, who in the absence of reunification preferences, are confronted by separation from their loved ones for many years. Moreover, a commitment to accept refugees as the need arises should mitigate our dilemma in addressing the distress of those who have suffered greatly and who are impelled to seek refuge at any cost.

FOR THESE REASONS, BOTH THE CITIZENS' COMMITTEE FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION NOT ONLY FEEL THAT ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF A GENEROUS LEGAL IMMIGRATION POLICY FAR OUTWEIGH THE POTENTIAL INITIAL COSTS; WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT IS AN ESSENTIAL STEP IN THE FORMULATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE RATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICY.

Senator SIMPSON. Ambassador Green, please.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN, POPULATION CRISIS COMMITTEE

Ambassador GREEN. Mr. Chairman, like Mr. Comstock, I too will summarize my statement and request that the full statement be made part of the record.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection.

Ambassador Green. My background is in diplomacy and demography and not in immigration and its impact on U.S. society and economy, although clearly there is a connection, as there is between all of the major events in the world, especially in a world where the population is now growing by 200,000 every day and will be growing by 250,000 to 300,000 a day by the year 2000.

This is obviously going to create great pressures on migration to the United States. President Reagan said last July that we are a Nation of immigrants and refugees, and "yet no free and prosperous nation can by itself accommodate all those who seek a better life or flee persecution as refugees. We must share that responsibility with others." Yet I see little evidence that others are going to share that responsibility with us. On the contrary, countries all around the world, almost without exception, are cutting down on immigration, in fact are forcing some people out, not only for economic reasons but also for political and social reasons as well.

Meanwhile, year after year, the United States is accepting for permanent resettlement about twice as many immigrants, including refugees, as the whole rest of the world put together Unfortunately that ratio is increasing.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, last year the United States received the largest number of immigrants in any one year of its entire history: 600,000 legal immigrants including nonquota; 200,000 refugees; and an estimated 600,000 illegal aliens.

This means that the population increase in the United States in 1980 was about 3 million, of whom 1.6 million was from natural increase and 1.4 million from net immigration. This far exceeds average growth rates of other developed countries. It means the United States is adding the equivalent of 12 Dayton, Ohios, to our population every year.

Against this background, Mr. Chairman, I believe that you have undertaken a long overdue review on immigration in the United States. It goes without saying that these studies have very little meaning unless something can be done about taking a firm hold on the problem of illegal immigration. Without that, it seems to me, the rest of this study has very little meaning.

Now, in response to your specific questions, I believe that there should be a limit on immigration fixed in law, and in that connection, I agree with the objective that was enunciated in Senator Hatfield's proposed bill, which is to promote the achievement at the earliest possible time of national population stabilization in the United States at a level which is consistent with the maintenance of a high standard of living and conservation of natural resources and environment.

Second, I believe the law should be restricted to immigration per se, with refugee limits set under the provisions of the Refugee Act, although I must add that I am somewhat of two minds on that particular issue. But on balance, I believe that the current Refugee Act, if properly administered by both the executive and legislative branches, is probably the best way.

And third, I agree with all the basic criteria that you mentioned in your paper. As I testified before the House Committee on Census and Population on May 12, 1981, we really do not know whether sufficient supplies of energy, water, food and mineral resources can be obtained in the future to support our large and growing population at its present standard of living. As a nation, our economic well-being, our national interests, and indeed, our security depend upon our ability to anticipate and adjust to changing domestic and international conditions. By failing to deal with the fundamental issue of population growth in our country, we face the prospect of having to respond to economic, social, and political events through haphazard, stopgap measures.

As Albert Schweitzer put it: "Man is losing the ability to foresee and forestall. He will end by destroying the Earth."

Thank you.

Senator Simpson. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Green follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN

Mr. Chairman:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee to testify on factors to be taken into consideration in determining limits of immigration to the United States.

My career as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer included assignments as American Ambassador to Indonesia and Australia and Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific. From 1975 to 1979, I was concurrently Coordinator of Population Affairs in the State Department, Chairman of the Interagency Task Force on World Population and Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Population Commission. Retiring from the Government in 1979, I continued to serve as Special Consultant to the State Department for Population, while also becoming a Director and volunteer member of the Population Crisis Committee, a non-profit private organization dealing with world population issues. In 1981, I also served as Chairman of the State Department's Special Advisory Panel on Indo-Chinese Refugees. In these capacities I have in recent years visited most of the world's populous countries, studied their programs, and discussed them with their leaders and authorities.

Before addressing, to the limited extent I can (since my work in population has related to countries other than the United States), the specific issues you have set forth for this hearing, let me offer a few generalizations on world population trends that have a bearing on our discussions here.

Between now and the year 2000, the world's population, now 4.5 billion, will grow by some 1,500 million people. About 90 percent of this increase will be in the developing or poorer countries of the world, including all the countries to our south in this hemisphere.

Although the world's population growth rate declined from 2 percent in 1970 to about 1.8 percent in 1980, in absolute numbers of people, the population growth is continuing to rise by approximately 200,000 persons daily today and probably by some 250,000 to 300,000 persons daily in the year 2000. The level at which the world population will ultimately stabilize will depend heavily on the determination and skill with which the world addresses the problem. But it will certainly double and may triple.

One of the most explosive consequences of continuous high population growth rates is large-scale unemployment and underemployment, especially in urban areas. Unemployment is already a serious problem in developed countries like the United States, but in the developing countries the problem is immense and rapidly worsening as tens of millions of people enter the job market every year, far in excess of jobs available or even likely to be available given high job-creation costs.

Growing unemployment and serious underemployment--which already, according to ILO, afflicts 30 percent of the labor force in the developing world and which is almost bound to affect higher percentages of the labor force in the future--will intensify pressures for migration to the United States. But there are other pressures.

Until recently, the poor in rural areas of the developing world accepted their lot in life with resignation and apathy. But with urbanization trends, modernization and expanding communications, that situation is changing. Many now seek a better life elsewhere, who in days past would have accommodated to their poverty.

Meanwhile oppression and brutality, starvation and natural disasters continue, generating their own flows of refugees and migrants, over half a million of whom have been settled from Indo-China in the United States in the past few years.

"We are," as President Reagan said last July, "a nation of immigrants and refugees . . . yet no free and prosperous nation can, by itself, accommodate all those who seek a better life or flee persecution as refugees. We must share that responsibility with others."

And yet I see little evidence that other nations will share that responsibility. On the contrary, most countries are cutting back not only on accepting refugees for resettlement but in terms of accepting temporary or "guest" workers on the scale they once did. Their reasons for doing so are not just economic. The following item appeared on January 3, 1982 in the London Telegraph:

> "Singapore is to phase out the employment in manufacturing industry of workers from India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and to employ only locally born workers by 1991. The Prime Minister said that this was being done because Britain, France and West Germany had inherited grave social problems by taking in foreign labor."

Meanwhile, year after year, the United States is accepting for permanent resettlement about twice as many immigrants (including refugees) as does the rest of the world combined. Unfortunately that ratio is increasing.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, last year the U.S. received the largest number of immigrants in any one year of its entire history: 600,000 legal immigrants (including non-quota), 200,000 refugees and an estimated 600,000 illegal aliens. Actually the number of illegals entering the U.S. each year is closer to 1.5 million but most of them return, mainly to Mexico.

This means that the population increase of the United States in 1980, using Population Reference Bureau estimates, was about 3 million, of which 1.6 million was from natural increase and 1.4 million from net immigration. This far exceeds average growth rates of other developed countries. It means that the United States adds the equivalent of 12 Dayton, Ohios to the population every year, or of another Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.

Against this background, Mr. Chairman, I believe that you have undertaken a long overdue review of factors that should be considered in determining numerical limitations on immigration to the United States. But it goes without saying that the results of these studies will have no meaning and will serve no purpose unless illegal immigration to the United States is brought under far more effective control than at present. Such massive flouting of our laws invites universal disrespect for the law, and serves thereby to enhance ever greater pressures for illegal immigration.

As I testified before the House Subcommittee on Census and Population on May 12, 1981:

> "To date there has been little public discussion as to whether this continued growth (3 million in a year) is desirable and whether the U.S. ought to establish a goal of population stabilization as recommended in 1972 by the Rockefeller Commission. Furthermore little research has been done on the long-term carrying capacity of the U.S. We really don't know whether sufficient supplies of energy,. water, food, mineral resources can be obtained in the future to support our large and

growing population at its present standard of living . . . As a nation, our economic well-being, our national interest and indeed our security depend upon our ability to anticipate and adjust to changing domestic and international conditions. By failing to deal with the fundamental issue of population growth in our country, we face the prospect of having to respond to economic, social and political events through haphazard, stop-gap measures . . ."

Or, as Dr. Albert Schweitzer warned: "Man is losing the ability to foresee and forestall. He will end by destroying the earth."

In response to your specific questions, I believe that:

(1) There should be a limit on immigration fixed in law. (Periodic legislative reaffirmation or indexing immigration to variables would tend to weaken the law and its deterrent effect on those seeking, one illegal way or another, to get to the United States.)

(2) The law should be restricted to immigration *per se*, with refugee limits set under the provisions of the Refugee Act. (However, in administering the Refugee Act, we must take greater care than in the past not to stretch the concept of refugee beyond its proper boundaries, as established in international instruments. Otherwise the term "refugee" will become debased. Moreover we must *not* give refugees undue preferential treatment in comparison to other disadvantaged U.S. residents.)

I agree with all the basic criteria you mention, but they should include maintaining a balanced composition of immigrants (and refugees so far as possible) so as to achieve the objective of cultural diversity and to ensure that no single national ethnic, racial or linguistic group comes permanently to dominate American immigration as, indeed, is happening at present due to our having lost control of our borders.

Senator Simpson. Mr. Comstock, in your testimony you have advocated raising the total numerical limits for all categories to 800,000 from this year's level of about 550,000.

How is that justified at this time when we still do not know what the labor market effect of legalization will be, and especially when unemployment among Americans is presently so high?

Would it not be more prudent to wait until our economy has improved before allowing additional numbers?

Mr. Comstock. Senator, if you could look at the issue of legal migration in isolation from the other components before us, perhaps that thesis would be appropriate. Certainly any time additional workers enter the labor force, there is an initial problem with increased competition for job opportunities. In periods of recession like this, that is a particular concern.

I think you also have to look at the positive benefits of legal migration, as I attempted to enumerate, with regard to reducing the incentive for illegal migration. The Reagan administration has proposed a temporary guest worker program allowing 50,000 workers in annually, and they rationalized it as an escape valve. I suggest that it is not a reasonable escape valve. Temporary workers, for exactly the same reason as undocumented workers, undercut American labor standards, not because of their numbers, but because of the quality of employment available to them and the conditions under which they are compelled to accept it. Guest workers, because they are only here for a few months, really do not have any opportunities to avail themselves of the protection under the law.

By extension, I think that the real issue here is to what extent legal migration can help stem the tide of illegal migration. When legal migrants come here, they come here bringing skills, they come here with an extraordinary degree of ambition and self-reliance. Ambassador Green and I were just discussing what motivates an immigrant. I was thinking that if I had to pick up, move 10,000 or 12,000, miles, leave my friends and family behind, I would not be a typical American. I would be a very highly motivated person who is coming to a foreign country with a specific motive in mind.

This, I think, explains the tremendous multiplier effect that immigrants have traditionally provided the United States. Their inputs, to use economic jargon, have far outweighed the initial costs. They create jobs in a greater proportion than do American citizens because they are interested in entrepreneurial activity. The family reunification aspects and the additional 100,000 visas per year to clear the current backlog, as I mentioned in my testimony, will help to alleviate the incentives that those groups have to come in the country illegally.

The real issue, Senator, in our opinion—and this is based on 10 years of studying this in the laboratory of the workplace, the experience of our union has been that the numbers are not nearly as important as the status. And that is why we have a commitment to a high level of legal migration.

If I may, I would like to anticipate another question as well. I have read the testimony——

Senator Simpson. Subject to that, I will allow it. [General laughter.]

Mr. COMSTOCK. I have read the testimony of some of the groups who suggest that America has reached its peak growth, that if our population grows any further, we simply will not have the resources to maintain them. And I have to confess to you that has a certain appeal. Before I began the serious study of economics, I was an advocate of that position myself. Since then, however, I have had the benefit of some additional information.

First of all, the real issue with regard to depletion of resources would appear, given the history of our Nation, to be based more on who has control over the resources rather than the size of the population. The most rapacious exploitation of natural resources in our history took place in the latter half of the 19th century when our population was approximately one-fifth of what it is today. The fact of the matter was that the people who have controlled those resources used them to suit their own benefits, and not in the national interest.

Second, immigrants, because of their disproportionate interest in entrepreneurial activities, have the effect of recycling resources. If one were to visit the Borum Hill section of Brooklyn, sections in Texas where Vietnamese refugees have settled, sections of Los Angeles where legal Hispanic residents have settled, you will see that buildings and neighborhoods that were given up for lost have been revitalized because you have people who have an incentive to come in and do the best they can, and are willing to accept risks that American citizens normally will not accept.

The mortar, the brick, the electrical equipment, the glass, the land on which these abandoned neighborhoods are situated, have been recycled through immigration.

Last, and I am very sensitive to the resource argument, but I think it is rebuttable in a theoretical sense, our only truly renewable resource is human ingenuity and endeavor. I think it is a very dangerous and ultimately tragic philosophy to follow to suggest that somehow we can have more by having less human ingenuity and endeavor. And that is really at the base of this notion that we cannot accept more people, and that in turn is an extension of what economics call the zero sum theory, the idea that people do not create economic growth, that they only expend resources. And I think that our history clearly rebuts that presumption.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me ask you, immigrants have historically exhibited a significant level of what we refer to as upward mobility in terms of employment in the United States. That has been discussed several times today.

Would you expect significant numbers of current illegal workers to move out of low level jobs once they take the benefit of legalization, and if so, then what effect will that have on the labor market and production in those areas where they are concentrated?

Mr. COMSTOCK. Senator, I think that that is entirely possible. I think that for the majority, at least over the short term, what they will probably do is stay in the occupations where they find themselves, but like the immigrants that founded our union in 1900, will, once they have the protection of law, find means to upgrade that status within those occupations.

Very clearly, once their incomes increase, once their standard of living improves and they have more purchasing power, they will contribute greatly to demand for the goods and services that the private sector produces, and it should have a very positive effect as it traditionally has on employment opportunities.

Senator SIMPSON. Several witnesses have today testified that the U.S. population size should stabilize at the current number of about 230 million.

Do you have any comments on that policy proposal from the standpoint of the U.S. work force?

Mr. COMSTOCK. Yes, I do. I think that it belies several other assumptions. How somebody arrives at 230 million or 235 million is really a question of what assumptions you want to make going in. I have had a little bit of experience with econometrics and computers, and I know that if I make a certain set of assumptions, I can produce any results that I want.

One of the unforeseen factors during the 1970's, however, was that labor force participation rates by native Americans increased much more drastically than did the total population growth, particularly among women, and particularly among young women. Economists have credited that to the combination of the recession and inflation which has made the single-earner family a thing of the past. Nobody in the 1960's could have assumed that we would have had a net increase of 20 million legal workers during the decade of the 1970s, roughly an increase that ran at about two and a half to three times the rate of population increase.

Consequently, I do not think that just freezing the population at a given point is the answer. The real answer is what sort of economic opportunities are we going to provide people in the work force? We can have a population of 230 million with 15 percent of the work force unemployed, or we can have a population of 400 million with everybody gainfully employed. Those outcomes will depend on the sort of decisions we make now.

Just one additional point, something that most people overlook when we talk about overcrowding and high population. Ninety-seven percent of the American population lives on 3 percent of the land area. In many ways we still have a frontier to be discovered. Oil shale deposits may yield new cities just in the way the gold rush yielded new cities like San Franciso. I think we have a great deal to go in this country, and the notion that our economic growth has to be stagnant from here on is just a form of defeatism.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, one more question.

In your testimony you implied that the United States would seem to be better off if immigrants were all dependents who in a sense would consume and do not compete for jobs. I would see that as an increase in demand for goods and services without an increase in supply of labor, therefore, I think an increase in prices without an increase in average income. In other words, a greater number of consumers would seem to me to lower the gross national product per capita.

How would that be in the economic interest of the country to have that?

Mr. COMSTOCK. Senator, if I conveyed the impression that I would prefer the overwhelming majority of immigrants to be non-jobseekers, I was in error. I made reference to those points simply because they tend to mitigate the normal arguments against fairly sizable levels of immigration.

However, I would like to respond to——

Senator SIMPSON. You say it would have a negligible effect on the competition for additional jobs?

Mr. COMSTOCK. That portion, and those portions represent approximately 40 percent of our estimate.

However, Senator, one additional point. Plant capacity utilization in the United States currently hovers around 72 percent. Our problem is not that we have excess demand and insufficient means to supply it; it is just the opposite. Increased consumer demand in the United States would likely result in the sort of capital expenditures that the Reagan administration is hoping for to make our plant capacity more productive, to reduce the very heavy inflationary push that comes from having fully 20 to 25 percent of our fixed overhead idle.

And obviously, Senator, you have heard things of that nature before, so I will not belabor you with the details.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

Ambassador Green, if I may, in your testimony you have expressed concern at the large numbers of immigrants and refugees entering the United States in recent years, that the United States cannot possibly hope to alleviate global problems through its immigration policies, and yet I know that you are opposed to an overall cap, too, which would include refugees, and I would like to have your thoughts, in view of that distinction, as I see it.

Ambassador Green. I do not think I said I was opposed to an overall cap. I said there should be a limit in immigration fixed in law, but I did not agree that refugees should be lumped in with immigrants.

Senator SIMPSON. Are you opposed to an overall cap which would include refugees?

Ambassador Green. No, I thought that the current Refugee Act of 1980 had adequate provision for handling the refugee question because it permitted a cap or a limit of 50,000, but it is subject to annual consultations between the legislative and executive branches as to the actual numbers that would be admissible in that year, in the light of exigencies.

Senator SIMPSON. In your view, what is the optimum level for population stabilization in the United States, if you have a thought on that? Would you favor using the fertility data, as two or three witnesses have testified to today, in computing the level of immigration which would then insure population stabilization?

Ambassador Green. Well, I have great difficulty in agreeing with that proposition, or, as a matter of fact, disagreeing with it. When I noticed the report prepared for President Hoover back in 1932 with regard to population in the United States, it was the consensus of all of the specialists writing that Presidential report, that the population of the United States would peak in the 1970's at 180 million people or some figure like that. Anyway the figure was off base.

Therefore, today, to sit down and make projections as to what population increase is likely to occur over a long period of time is equally hazardous.

What I did say was that the question of the optimum level for admissions into the United States every year should be the subject of careful study along the lines of the criteria you mentioned, plus one or two others. But having set that cap, I would hope we would stick to it, not make it subject to annual review.

However, if the situation should arise where, contrary to expectations, the population either increased or decreased appreciably, then I think that that should be subject to review, and again setting another cap. But I would not make it a standard procedure every year, no.

Senator SIMPSON. In your view—and you have a long background in this area—what responsibility does this country have to assist other countries in addressing specifically their unemployment problems, and to what extent should that be addressed by our U.S. immigration policy?

Ambassador Green. Well, of course, in many ways the United States does have a responsibility for having helped create the population explosion of the world. More than any other single country's—our modern medicine and sanitation and technology have helped bring down sharply death rates in the world, whereas, the birth rates remained high in the developing world. That is, of course, the cause of the population explosion.

Since that time, the United States has been giving far more assistance to countries of the world to reduce their death rates than we have to reduce their birth rates. Therefore, we have continued, you might say, to contribute to that problem, even though I am not suggesting we should withdraw our food aid. I am simply saying that that is one of the concomitants of our generosity.

Now we face a situation where there is tremendous growing unemployment, underemployment around the world. That is going to be a major push factor for migration largely to the United States. Also, comparatively, the United States is better off than other countries, so that is going to be a pull factor.

It is going to be very difficult for the United States to deal with illegal migration due to these very strong pressures unless we are prepared to take steps which so far we have been unwilling to do.

Senator SIMPSON. That is an interesting—you really are saying it is going to take the interest and presentation of information to others in the world as to how to control birth as well as how we have taught them to control death, before we would make progress in that area.

Is that what you are saying?

Ambassador Green. The way I put it was that roughly every year we are giving 14 times as much assistance to developing countries to reduce their death rates as we are to giving them assistance, largely family planning assistance, to reduce their birth rates; and therefore we are contributing to the problem, even though our objectives are highly worthy and I believe we should continue to give food assistance.

Now, that brings up the question of food assistance. The world is coming to depend more and more upon the United States for food. Some 70 or 80 countries are now in a food deficit position that is getting worse all the time, so there is a tremendous and growing dependency upon North America as a breadbasket. Meanwhile the vast Ogalala aquifer of 156,000 square miles, which is the primary water resource for the Great Plains, breadbasket of the world, is seriously depleted. It is going down all the time.

That is why I do not want to be characterized by my good friend Mr. Comstock as being a defeatist nor do I want to characterize him as being unduly optimistic or being a Polyanna. But I do think that there are two sides to these questions. There are plenty of storm warnings up with regard to the future of our country and our ability to supply a world that is becoming increasingly dependent upon us.

And what happens when the time comes when we cannot give these countries the food bounty they are now receiving from the United States, largely on highly concessional terms? Whom do we have but ourselves to blame that we did not foresee these things?

That is what I am suggesting. We should be paying more attention to those issues.

You asked me what the optimum size of the population of the United States should be. I quoted what Senator Hatfield's bill stated as being the optimum, and I could not improve on that language. It is very generally phrased. It has to be very generally phrased.

Now, I know that that the report "Population and the American Future" prepared by the Rockeller Commission back in 1972 held that there is hardly a single social problem in our country whose solution would not be easier if our population growth were not so great. I certainly agreed with that when I tried to park my car just now here on Capitol Hill.

Professor Julian Simon has recently gained great notice through his book which holds a very optimistic view of the world's future population growth. One of the arguments he uses is that by having more people in the world, there are greater chances of there being more Michelangelos and Mozarts and Leonardo da Vincis. What I would point out—and here again, perhaps, I am a defeatist—there are also going to be more Ayatollahs, Idi Amins, Pol Pots and Colonel Qadhafis. So you can have your choice of whether you are a Polyanna or a defeatist.

Senator SIMPSON. That was a hell of an answer. [General laughter.]

At least I think I would have forgotten the question. But you came back to that, and you nailed that. I like the way you got back to that.

Well, I think that will do it for today.

One of the things I would share with you that was interesting in the Mexican visit was the attitude held by some of those scholars who resist whatever we are doing, you know, they do not know what we are doing, and Congress, in its wisdom, may not know any more about that sooner nor later. But one of the things that was interesting for me is that some of these people felt, or a good, significant thinking group felt that we were only seeking this immigration and refugee policy reform because of the present rate of unemployment in the United States. And I can assure you that I disabused them of that fact, that that was not why we are moving in this area. We only move laboriously once every 30 years when the period of expulsion or exertion is upon us or something like that.

But I tried to emphasize to them that President Ford set the first wheels in motion in 1976 with the Domestic Policy Council and the Task Force Report on Illegal Immigration, and then President Carter presented his proposals in 1977. The Select Commission was established, held hearings nationwide, and then in March 1981 issued the report of the Select Commission, and then President Reagan's Interagency Task Force was chaired by the Attorney General. So that was interesting to me because they were putting a great deal of emphasis on that, that oh, gosh, you know, why don't you just slow up, wait until your unemployment rate goes down to its usual figure, and then you can go back to sleep again on this one.

I said, no, not this trip, I do not believe. So I will just share that with you.

I thank you. It is very helpful testimony. As I say, we have come down to the final hearing. It is soon to go to processing and markup, and will result in a combination of various immigration and refugee policy reforms.

Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony.

That will conclude the hearing, and I thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:21 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DENNIS DeCONCINI
AT SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY HEARING
JANUARY 25, 1982

Today's hearing is another important source of information to the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy regarding proposed changes in the nation's immigration law. As we consider changes such as the possibility of placing a maximum limit on the number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens who may enter the country, or requiring reductions in preference immigrants in return for overflows in the levels of legally admitted refugees, or increasing the number of visas available to Canada and Mexico, it is absolutely essential that we have both thoughtfully considered observations as to the social and political consequences of the proposals as well as accurate demographic information.

Our nation periodically reviews and revises its immigration policy. As we head into the last two decades of this century, we face problems which are difficult; the solutions to these problems (or the lack thereof) will affect us for decades to come. Population pressures, economic forces, limited resources and environmental concerns are interacting in unprecedented combinations, and all of these factors must be considered before we take action. The testimony presented today by our distinquished witnesses will be valuable in helping the subcommittee evaluate these issues.

STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS EISEN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC POLICY
ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, INC.

I am Phyllis Eisen, Director of Public Policy for Zero Population Growth, Inc. On behalf of ZPG, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to submit our testimony for the Record.

ZPG is a private, non-profit citizens organization. It is supported by people around the country who believe the United States would benefit from a planned, voluntary end to its continued population growth. Our country has experienced and, in the decades ahead will continue to experience major changes in its population -- not only continued growth but also new shifts in the distribution of the population.

Because immigration significantly influences the growth, the distribution, and the age structure of the U.S. population, ZPG believes it must be addressed in public planning for ongoing changes and long-term population goals. Immigration, both legal and illegal, represents a complex human phenomenon affected by demographic as well as social, economic, and political factors in the United States and around the world. For that reason, ZPG advocates a comprehensive reform of immigration law that would speak to long-term population goals.

Today, the American population exceeds 230 million and is growing by an additional two million or more each year. The U.S. has not reached zero population growth, nor is this likely in the next several decades -- even if we had no immigration. Natural increase -- the excess of births over deaths, as well as net immigration contribute to that two million increase. Although each American woman is bearing, on the average, fewer children than women did in the past, the total number of babies born each year is still on the rise. The high number of women born during the "baby boom" generation who are now in or entering their childbearing years is contributing to an increase in the birthrate. Last year, 3.6 million babies were born -- an increase of 4% over the year before. That's up 16% since our low-point in 1973, when 3.1 million babies were born.

The continuing immigration of people -- legally and illegally -- into the United States adds substantially to current and projected population growth. Since current estimates indicate that 40 to 50 percent of our growth is attributable to immigration, we are vitally interested in any legislation that affects that growth. Unless rational and enforceable restrictions are implemented, both legal and illegal immigration will continue to be substantial, and with fertility expected to remain low, immigration will be an increasingly more important ingredient in the determination of U.S. population growth and size.

The flow of immigrants to the U.S. is at near record levels. Immigration rose dramatically in the decade of the 70s and may once again be as high as in the first decade of this century when about nine million people entered the country. These record level are expected to continue and even to accelerate due in part to the population growth in the source countries. Under the "push-pull" theory, immigrants will be pushed from their homeland by overpopulation, resource depletion, unemployment and consequent political instability and pulled into the U.S. by job prosepcts and an ever increasing divergence in per capita income.

Unfortunately, the population problem is seen by many as a third world problem, a problem of the developing nations. In fact, the U.S. is the fourth most populous nation on earth. The present U.S. population is triple the number of people at the turn of the century. In 1980, the U.S. population increased at a growth rate of 1.02%. This was the greatest population growth of any developed nation and was exceeded by only six developing nations. The numerical growth and the rate of growth were the highest in the U.S. since 1970. In 1980, the fertility rate of U.S. women reached 1.875, the highest since 1973. In terms of resource consumption, the 2.3 million new Americans will consume much more than their third world counterparts - for example, 11 times more energy per capita, 4 times more grain.

Clearly, industrialized countries are not immune from the impacts of increased population. Resource constraints, caused in part by population growth, have contributed significantly to inflation and slowing of economic growth. High unemployment has resulted. The Japanese have experienced a rapid increase in per capita income, approaching Western European levels, and yet the same high quality of life evades the Japanese because of overcrowding, lack of living space and a scarcity of natural recreation areas.

The concept that the problems of population growth, resource depletion and environmental degradation are something we must deal with solely in the future is a myth. The problems are upon us. The recently completed National Agriculture Lands Study found that population growth and shifts are prime factors in the loss of three million acres of U.S. agricultural land a year. At the same time that this loss has been occurring, the demand for U.S. agricultural products is being increased significantly by population growth and increased per capita consumption. Demand for U.S. farm products may increase by 85% by the end of the century. In 1980, world food production increased by only approximately .27% while population grew by 1.7%. This mean less per capita food availability at a time when over 600 million people on earth are severely malnourished. Parts of the U.S. are running out of water, soil erosion is a significant problem, and desertification is occurring in several regions of this country.

Population stabilization is not a self-contained goal but, instead, one of the necessary tools to meet these problems and assure better living conditions for all people. If we do not stabilize population and reach zero population growth, we will not solve the many crucial and complex economic, resource, immigration and political problems confronting us. Former Secretary of Defense and President of the World Bank, Robert S. McNamara, cited overpopulation ad the gravest threat to mankind next to nuclear war. In 1974, then California Governor Ronald Reagan stated, "Our country has a special obligation to work toward the stabilization of our own population so as to credibly lead other parts of the world toward population stabilization." And the industrialized countries, recently concluding the Ottawa Summit on global economic conditions, agreed in their Summit Declaration that they "are deeply concerned about the implications of world population growth. . .and will place greater emphasis on international efforts in these areas." In spite of these pronouncements, the U.S. still has no national population policy, has no specific demographic goals, and seems willing to accept whatever growth that occurs. While the population problem is a global problem it is also a national and local problem and one that must be dealt with by all nations in this interdependent world.

Unless this silent explosion is confronted soon, regulation regimentation and government controls may become a necessity of survival. Delaying decisions on defusing the explosion will limit the choices available to government as the carrying capacities of nations are strained and exceeded.

Yet, as noted before, the U.S. still does not have a population policy which might guide overall planning in the future. Can we possibly determine the best immigration policy without an overall population policy which includes at least a goal for growth in this country? ZPG thinks not. The 1970-72 Presidential Population Commission concluded". . .we have found no convincing argument for continued national population growth." ZPG agrees. It will be much easier to determine immigration levels if some determination can be reached about some future point in time at which the U.S. should reach zero growth.

We do have some knowledge of growth projections that can guide us and allow us to understand the options of different levels of growth. We do know that if there is no change in the present 1.875 children per woman in the U.S. and current legal and illegal immigration of at least one million per year, the U.S. population will exceed 300 million in 50 years and 400 million in 100 years.* Is that size and growth too much for a country already strained in some areas at 230 million? ZPG believes so. We also believe that we can have continued immigration into our country -- a phenomenon that has brought cultural diversity and unique strength to the U.S. But it is essential to our policy makers and the American public to come up with the best balance between that important population flow and our need for limits to growth.

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*Bouvier, Leon F., The Impact of Immigration on U.S. Population Size, Population Reference Bureau, Inc., January, 1981, p. 2.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF
DONALD G. HOHL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES
UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE

The discussion of immigration policy revolves around the need for establishing and then maintaining a balance of three kinds of entrants each vying for special treatment. The first group is composed of members of families of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent resident aliens. The other two comprise independent immigrants and refugees. Inevitably the discussions evolve around numbers, composition, limitations of each group and possibly an overall cap or ceiling on all immigration. This presentation's principal focus will relate to the social and cultural factors to be considered in imposing controls (limitations) on the movements of people to the United States.

At the onset we want to state our feelings that the immigrants make a strongly positive contribution to our society. Unlike many immigrants from the distant past, the immigrants of today usually have strong family and ethnic roots in the United States and frequently bring with them valuable and needed skills. As a result they are more able to adjust quite well both socio-culturally and occupationally and, as the research of Professor Barry Chiswick has shown, within a relatively short period after arrival, their income surpassed those of native Americans. What this evidence points to is that not only are immigrants not burdens on the U.S., they are in fact full contributors to its cultural and economic well being and readily and unequivocably adopt the dominant culture.

The family is the basic unit of society. The sanctity of the family unit must be preserved and family reunification is indeed recognized as a basic human right. Thus, the preservation of the family unit must be the guiding principle in creating any system to facilitate the movement of family members to this country.

The term "family" can, however, be defined in a most restricted way (nuclear) or broadly (extended) or somewhere in between to include "fireside" relatives. There certainly should be agreement that the family unit of husband, wife and sons and daughters should be included in the most restrictive definition of a "nuclear" family. The "fireside relative" family most often will include the parents of the husband and/or wife. The extended family more likely will include siblings and even perhaps more distantly related persons.

We believe that as a minimum the nuclear or fireside type definition must be accepted and that there must be free movement of such relatives to this country. Should there indeed be any distinction between the family of a U.S. citizen and that of a lawful permanent resident alien if we recognize as a basic human right the principle of family reunification?

The issue of preferential treatment for Canada and Mexico can be addressed at many different levels. The perspective which this Administration has adopted is obviously based on the recognition of such facts as: the special relationship and mutual responsibilities which contiguity imposes on national neighbors; the unreasonable backlog of applications for admission from Mexico, most of which (nearly 60,000 in the second preference category alone) involve family reunifications; the deep economic penetration of both countries by the U.S. and perception of "responsibility" which such penetration entails; the intrusion of energy questions in what has been a U.S. pattern of addressing common problems unilaterally and, last but not least, the realization that since our vast borders with each of the two countries cannot be made inpenetrable, it is best to remove some of the incentive for illegal immigrants by opening the main gate of legal immigration wider.

Within the independent immigration group should be included not only ministers of religion but also bona fide religious functionaries such as nuns and brothers and here also we appeal for their free movement. Such individuals provide extensive service by administering to the needs of the community by staffing schools, hospitals, orphanages, day-care centers and engaging in social work and community organization. These needs increase daily especially in the urban and inner city areas of the U.S. Their entire support comes from within their own religious communities and function without being a burden to the public sector. The entry of such personnel is most beneficial to the health, welfare and cultural interests of our nation and is most complementary to the Administration's program of volunteerism and increased involvement of the private sector.

The third and final group of entrants to be considered is that of refugees. In the limited period of its existence we have found the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980 relating to definition, numbers, flexibility and Congressional oversight to be working quite satisfactorily. An established ceiling for refugees separate from that of "normal" immigration movement is to our minds essential. The fate of refugees and the reunification of families should not be linked together.

All too often at the bottom of the debate on numbers and limits is a concern about the "desirable" ethnic composition of future immigrant flows and the effect on the ethnic, cultural and linguistic profile of the United States. At the onset it is well to point out a well-established fact of American History, i.e., that established immigrant groups have almost invariably opposed new immigration. No sooner had our first colonists settled on our shores than they sought to prevent the admission of others, basing such discrimination on the religious and political background and the moral and economic fitness of the newcomer.

Thomas Jefferson heads a list of an endless roll-call of distinguished Americans who have repeatedly admonished the nation about the potentially deleterious impact of new immigrants on the American policy. Writing in 1782, he asks:

> "But are there no inconveniences to be thrown into the scale against the advantage expected from a multiplication of numbers by the importation of foreigners? . . . They will bring with them the principles of the governments they leave, inbibed in their early youth; or, if able to throw them off, it will be in exchange for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as is usual, from one extreme to another . . . In proportion to their numbers, they will share with us the legislation. They will infuse into it their spirit, warp and bias its directions, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass."

During its first hundred years the United States encouraged immigration to settle the new frontier. Despite this definite and urgent need, the underlying anti-foreign feeling continued to grow and was evidenced by the use of the native American and the "know-nothing" movements of the 1930's and 1950's.

The concern and fear of the alien stranger coupled with racism was legislatively evidenced for the first time with the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. This legislation was followed by the continued rise of racial and nationalistic discrimination culminating in the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924. The infamous National Origins Quota System excluded all Asiatics and sought to preserve the ethnic composition and culture of the United States as it then existed. The Catholic Bishops of the United States, speaking through the Department of Immigration, stated in 1924:

> "We protest against the principle and purpose underlying this bill (H.R. 101 which instituted the quota system) which excludes immigrants from certain countries and favors admission of immigrants from other countries. Such a policy is a distinct and deplorable departure from our enduring tradition as a nation. Our fundamental tradition is fair treatment to all nations. The proposed bill involves an evident discrimination and a substantial injustice to certain particular nations. No reason of statesmanship can be advanced in its defense."

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, passed over President Truman's veto, while eliminating the bar to Asiatic immigration carried on with modifications the essential elements of the 1924 Act. Mr. Truman in his veto message stated:

> "The basis of this quota system was false and unworthy in 1924. It is even worse now. At the present time this quota system keeps out the very people we want to bring in. It is incredible to me that, in this year 1952, we should again be enacting into law such a slur on the patriotism, the capacity, and the decency of a large part of our citizenry."

The efforts to repeal the National Origins Quota System continued. The Senate Immigration opened hearings on January 13, 1964 with the testimony of the late and beloved Senator Philip Hart who stated in part:

> "Discriminatory provisions against immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, token quotas for Asian and African countries, and implications of race superiority in the Asian-Pacific Triangle concept have no place in the public policy of the United States.
>
> "A newcomer should not arrive at our nation's door, hat in hand, apologizing for his parentage or birthplace. This is the great vice of the national origins quota system.
>
> "True, we need a careful selection of immigrants. We should discriminate--but not with irrational concepts founded on the theories of ethnic superiority.
>
> "Congress must enact a statute that will be discriminatory in the best meaning of the word--on the grounds of security and economic and scientific benefit; on the principles of family unity and asylum to the homeless and the oppressed."

P.L. 89-236, signed into law on October 3, 1965 by President Lyndon Johnson, was successful in eliminating the National Origins Quota System and all racial bars to entry into the United States and established an entry selection system based on the principle of first come, first served.

We feel it worthy of our time to review the historic sequences of the changes in our laws and some of the arguments which were eventually persuasive in accomplishing reform, for today we hear once again the lament that the new immigration threatens to change the social, cultural and even linguistic profile of our society. The implication is that America as a whole will be a worse nation for it. After all, wasn't this the judgment passed by settled groups on each substantial WAVE ~~waiver~~ of immigration? Let us learn from the past and not repeat our errors in the future. Let us never again mold the composition of our immigrant populations of the future by the color of their skin, their nationality, their customs, mores or mother tongue. Let us rather protect and strengthen the guarantees of freedom couched in our Constitution which, after all, is what makes the American Society great.

THE NEED FOR A LIBERAL IMMIGRATION POLICY

TESTIMONY OF

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There are strong logical and empirical arguments in favor of a liberal United States immigration policy. There is, in the first place, the argument on grounds of economic efficiency: economic theory shows that voluntary immigration results in a more productive distribution of world labor resources. Moreover, immigrants to the United States have made, and continue to make, a significant contribution to our national product. Their talents, skills, and energy continue to enrich us, as they have in the past. To deny entrance to those who would come here to work and live is to deny ourselves the benefits of their contribution.

Empirical studies by such scholars as Professor Julian L. Simon of the University of Illinois have quantified the positive contribution which immigrants are making to our economic society. I am personally acquainted with the valuable and varied contribution being made to my own state of California by immigrants from Mexico. My grandparents on one side of my family were immigrants. The United States is richer and more advanced because they came and contributed their energy and their talent to our society.

It is most unfortunate that the apostles of the imaginary "population crisis" have had so much influence over recent policy in the United States. They lack both economic understanding and common sense. Their opinions are based on imaginary things that go bump in the night. The simple economic fact is that the contribution that additional workers can make to our national output has never been higher. In truth, we need additional workers as much as we ever have in the past, and perhaps more.

We have barely scratched the surface of the resources that we could use if we had a larger population and a larger labor force. A few facts will illustrate my point: it is only by continual restrictive effort and at great expense that we are able to hold our agricultural production to a fraction of its potential; our industrial resources of all kinds are in fact expanding at a rapid rate; copper reserves have tripled since 1960; reserves of iron ore have increased six-fold; our coal reserves are too vast to measure, easily sufficient for centuries of use; millions of board feet of uncut timber rot on the stump in our national forests each year; at least 20 million acres of our cropland lie idle; we use less than 3 percent of our land area for all of our cities, buildings, roads, and airports; our people are spread out over our great, empty spaces at an average density that is less than one-tenth that of Germany. We are, in fact, a great, largely empty country that has so far explored only a small fraction of its productive potential.

Being an economist, I am as aware as anyone of current levels of registered "unemployment." At any given time only about half of our unemployed have actually lost their jobs. The other half are new entrants and re-entrants to the labor force and persons who have voluntarily quit jobs. The wealth of our economy is so great that people can afford to spend long periods of time looking for the "right" job. Some of our job-seekers are prevented by minimum wage laws and union restrictions from accepting jobs that they would be willing to take. Others are prevented from working by government-imposed restrictions on output. This is the case in my community, where jobs in lumbering have been eliminated by taking forest land for national parks. Between 1960 and 1980 federal wilderness lands increased eight-fold, from 9 million to more than 80 million acres.

As well as people looking for jobs, we have jobs looking for people. The number of these unfilled jobs typically exceeds the number of unemployed people by a large number—in 1979 the U.S. Employment Service recorded 3.5 million more job openings than unemployed people.

Our policies of restricting output and raising prices fulfill our prophesies of doom, forcing us into deprivation that would not exist if we used our resources more fully. It is the tragedy of our age that we stand surrounded by potential abundance even as we bemoan the imaginary approach of resource exhaustion. With opportunity beckoning on every hand, we imagine ourselves to be in a lifeboat, running out of food and water. This dark and futile mind-set will be our undoing unless we come to terms with reality.

The reality is that we need more talent, more effort, more people to help develop our country and to share in our truly hope-full destiny.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERICH PARK, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ESTONIAN AID, INC., NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee:

I respectfully submit the following remarks on the subject of Population and Immigration Policy in the Administration's immigration proposals, with a request that these be included in the report of the hearings:

During the past decade, the population of the United States has become more and more "affirmative".
The percentage of persons belonging to racial and ethnic groups supported by the Government's "affirmative action" privileges and by various entitlement programs has been constantly increasing.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the total population increase in the United States from 1970 to 1980 was 11.4 percent. At the same time, the Spanish-origin population grew by 61 percent (to 14.6 million), and the numbers of Asians and Pacific Islanders by 133 percent. These rapid increases were due to greatly increased immigration from the respective areas, and to high birth rates of these people.
The actual increase of the said three population groups was probably even much higher, because the Census Bureau's figures are believed to exclude considerable millions of illegal aliens.
The black population in the U.S. increased from 1970 to 1980 by 17 percent, totalling 26.5 million.
Not counting the unknown millions of illegal aliens, the officially recorded number of persons with potential

affirmative action privileges appears to be about 46 million. Together with illegal aliens, it could be roughly 54 to 60 million.

Should Congress decide to give amnesty to the illegals, and also to increase legal immigration, and that of the so-called "refugees", then, in the absence in recent years of significant immigration from Europe, we would be faced with chain-explosions of new influxes of privileged "affirmatives":

First, there would be the families and the numerous relatives of the amnestied millions;

Then, new waves of illegal aliens, encouraged by the amnesty, and confidently expecting new amnesties;

Then, relatives of the newly admitted relatives, and again new waves of illegals, and of pseudo-refugees;

Et cetera, _et cetera_.

The vast majority of immigrants settle in urban areas, especially in large cities. Due to overcrowding, lack of employment, politically encouraged dependency on welfare, drugs, and crime, the quality of American life has declined.

Government policies such as public assistance, Medicaid, food stamps, public housing, preferential hiring under racial quotas and timetables, financial support to "minority" businessmen, billions in Federal tax credits to employers who hire "minorities" under WIN and TJTC (Targeted Jobs Tax Credit) plans, gigantic basic education and training programs, bilingual education, CETA, summer jobs, etc., have not stopped, and not even slowed the decay of our cities. It is clearly apparent that our social problems, with long waiting lists for space in bursting prisons and "reform" institutions, have reached a point where the United States can no longer digest limitless immigration.

Immigration should be decreased, not increased.
Those to be admitted, including refugees, should not be expected to live on welfare, and should not enjoy "affirmative action" or other special privileges.
The watered-down definition of "refugees" in the Refugee Act of 1980, under which almost every alien who enters this country can claim himself or herself as a refugee, should be changed.
The billions spent on welfare, crime, and all the other affiliated social ills in this country, could be more wisely sent to the homelands of the intending immigrants. If our money helps to make their lands into better places to live, then both sides would win.

Respectfully submitted by

Erich Park

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ENGLISH LANGUAGE USAGE BY THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

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December 7, 1981

ENGLISH LANGUAGE USAGE
BY THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

BACKGROUND

America has long been regarded as a melting pot. Millions of immigrants of various nationalities have been assimilated into American society. Assimilation in this context refers to those processes that lead to greater homogeneity in society. This is accomplished by changes within immigrant groups in such areas as language, culture, social structure, inter-marriage, identification, and economic adaptation. Debate regarding the desirability and need for continued assimilation of ethnic groups has flourished. Such assimilation has been criticized by those who support the maintenance of cultural pluralism in the United States. They argue that assimilation destroys significant and desirable features of immigrant cultures. Those who support assimilation maintain that cultural pluralism could retard the economic assimilation of the immigrant groups or encourage separatism and, thus, come to threaten American society.

Controversy Over Language Assimilation

Perhaps the most identifiable element in the assimilation process, and hence one of the most controversial, is that of language acquisition. According to one writer, "to be American has meant, in this century at least, to speak English." 1/ Moreover, language assimilation is perceived to be the first step

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1/ Levinson, Sanford. "Bilingualism: A Symposium," The Nation, v. 228 (March 17, 1979), p. 263.

in the overall process of becoming American. 2/ One outcome of this situation is that language acquisition has become a political issue, linked in the "legislative and judicial record of the last dozen years. . . ." 3/ Bilingual education programs are mandated in more than half the States, at least three important court decisions have been made enforcing the right of children with limited English-speaking ability to compensatory education, and amendments to major Federal acts have recognized linguistic disadvantage. 4/ Debate continues regarding how bilingual education should be accomplished and what should be the goals of such education. A primary underlying issue is whether it should serve to help preserve the language and values of a foreign culture or whether it should assist children in the process of linguistic assimilation.

Language Assimilation by Hispanics

The concern regarding linguistic assimilation is particularly acute currently with respect to the Spanish-speaking population in the United States. There are several reasons for this concern. First, people of Spanish origin are among the largest and fastest growing ethnic minority groups in the United States, according to figures from the U.S. Census Bureau. Moreover, the size of the Spanish origin group in the United States is accentuated by the fact that Spanish is the second most frequently used language in this country. Because of our proximity to Mexico, it is probable that the number of Spanish-speaking aliens in the United States will continue to grow. The size and probable growth

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2/ Veltman, Calvin. "The Evolution of Ethno-Linguistic Frontiers in the United States and Canada," Social Science Journal, v. 14 (Jan. 1977), p. 50.

3/ Thernstrom, Abigail. "Language: Issues and Legislation," in Thernstrom, Stephan, ed. Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980. p. 619.

4/ Ibid.

of this minority language population seem to pose a threat to those who maintain that language assimilation is a necessary preliminary to "Americanization."

Second, America is "one of the most linguistically homogenous" nations in the world. 5/ Past immigrant groups who came to the United States have generally, over a period of approximately three generations, shifted from use of their native language to use of the English language. This shift from immigrant language to the language of the "host" society is considered the most typical response of immigrant groups. 6/ In America, "the one population--one language paradigm . . . has often assumed overtones of moral, social, and psychological normalcy." 7/ Concern has been expressed that use of the Spanish language is not only persisting but is increasing within Spanish-origin groups in the United States, and that linguistic assimilation is not proceeding as it did with other immigrant groups. 8/

Despite these concerns, however, most researchers have indicated that they believe it is highly unlikely that there will be long-range maintenance of any minority language in the United States or, conversely, that any language group can avoid assimilation. These beliefs with respect to the Spanish-speaking population are based in part on the belief that factors that inhibit language assimilation in the United States are not significant enough to prevent eventual

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5/ Ibid.

6/ Fishman, Joshua. "Language Maintenance," in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, p. 629.

7/ Ibid., p. 631.

8/ See, for example, Veltman, Calvin. "The Evolution of Ethno-Linguistic Frontiers in the United States and Canada;" Lopez, David E. "Chicano Language Loyalty in an Urban Setting," in Sociology and Social Research, v. 62 (Jan. 1978); and Flores, Juan, John Attinasi, and Pedro Pedraza, Jr. "La Carreta Made a U-Turn: Puerto Rican Language and Culture in the United States," in Daedalus, v. 101 (Spring 1981).

assimilation and in part on studies that have been done on the use of Spanish in the United States, which indicate assimilation is in progress. 9/

A variety of factors have been identified as inhibiting language assimilation. Some of the most significant factors identified include: legal restrictions or conventions that allow or encourage newcomers to use their native language in public (official support for ethnic language); the degree to which the immigrant population is spatially separated from those of other ethnic groups (spatial isolation); the development of separate immigrant social and cultural organizations (social and cultural isolation); and the dependence of the immigrant upon economic forces within his own ethnic group (economic isolation). It has been argued that Hispanics have experienced all of this inhibiting phenomena to some degree.

Past studies have focused on small segments of the population or on specific Hispanic subgroups. Their findings regarding English language usage and Spanish language maintenance do not necessarily agree, nor do they reflect a national picture. However, most studies generally agree that although Hispanics are learning English, a large number continue to use Spanish. 10/ Hispanic

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9/ See, for example, Lopez, David E. "Chicano Language Loyalty in an Urban Setting;" Flores, Juan, John Attinasi, and Pedro Pedraza, Jr. "La Carreta Made a U-Turn; Puerto Rican Language and Culture in the United States;" Arnold, Richard D. and Thomasine H. Taylor. "Mexican-Americans and Language Learning," in Childhood Education, Dec. 1969; Skrabanek, R. L. "Language Maintenance Among Mexican-Americans," in International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 11, no. 4 (Dec. 1970); Wolfram, Walt. "Objective and Subjective Parameters of Language Assimilation Among Second-Generation Puerto Ricans in East Harlem" in Lourie, Margaret and Nancy Faires Conklin, eds. A Pluralistic Nation: The Language Issue in the United States. Rowley, Mass., Newbury House Pubs., 1978; and Glazer, Nathan. "The Process and Problems of Language--Maintenance: An Integrative Review," in A Pluralistic Nation: The Language Issue in the United States.

10/ Ibid.

bilingualism is cited as one of the principal differences between Hispanic language patterns and patterns of earlier European immigrant groups.

This paper examines data from the November 1979 Current Population Survey of the U.S. Bureau of the Census to determine the extent of English language usage and Spanish language maintenance by Hispanics; and discusses the limited usefulness of the findings as well as the need for further study.

DATA ANALYSIS ON LANGUAGE USAGE BY HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STATES

The following is an analysis of data on language usage by Hispanics in the United States. It is presented in the following sections: 1) Overview of the Hispanic population; 2) Language usage by Hispanics and non-Hispanics; 3) additional data on first generation entries; 4) areas for further analysis; and 5) summary. A description of the methodology used in the analysis and a discussion of the limitations of the data are in Appendix I.

Data Analysis and Findings

Overview of the Hispanic Population

The data utilized in this analysis represent the total civilian, non-institutionalized population in the United States. Those identified as Hispanic in the tables specified their ancestry as South American, Latin American, or Central American; or as Mexican, Cuban, Spanish, Puerto Rican, or from other predominantly Spanish-speaking countries (see methodology section for details). The non-Hispanic label covers all other categories of people who positively identified an ethnic origin other than Hispanic.

First generation people are defined in this analysis as those who are foreign born of foreign born parents; second generation people are native born of foreign born parent or parents; and third generation people are defined as those who are native born of native born parents. Third generation actually encompasses third and succeeding generations, and third generation people would include those whose families date back to the colonization of America. This analysis focuses on the total population, the first generation, and the third generation, because it was believed that the greatest amount of relevant information would come from comparisons between these groups.

As shown in tables 1 and 2, there were 12.2 million persons in the United States who reported they were of Hispanic ethnic origin, representing 5.6 percent of the total population; 186.4 million persons were non-Hispanic, representing 86.1 percent of the population; and the remaining 8.3 percent is unknown.

The majority of non-Hispanics are third generation persons (that is native born of native parents) and a small minority are first generation persons (that is foreign born of foreign parents), while Hispanics are more equally divided. Further, slightly more than half of the Hispanic population was born in the United States, regardless of where their parents were born, compared to nearly all of the non-Hispanic population. Table 3 shows that of the total population, approximately 5.3 percent are first generation. Of the Hispanic population, 25.3 percent are first generation as compared to 4.5 percent of the non-Hispanic population. About 78.9 percent of the total population are third generation. Approximately 36.0 percent of the Hispanic population are third generation as compared to 83.7 percent of the non-Hispanic population. A total of about 8 million Hispanics, or 66.2 percent, were born in the United States, regardless of where their parents were born; a total of nearly 177 million non-Hispanics, or 94.9 percent are so categorized.

As pointed out earlier, the data for third generation entries include persons who have been in the United States for three or more generations. Since figures from the Immigration and Naturalization Service indicate that European immigration to the United States peaked in the early 1900s while Hispanic entries (documented and undocumented) have increased since that time, it is not surprising that non-Hispanics are primarily identified as third generation while a much larger percentage of Hispanics are first generation. 11/

11/ U.S. Department of Justice. Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

TABLE 1. ETHNIC ORIGIN
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1/:
NOVEMBER 1979

COUNTRY OF BIRTH	Total	HISPANIC	NONHISPANIC	NOT IDENTIFIABLE
Total	216,493,377	12,163,510	186,367,873	17,961,995
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.2/	170,801,565	4,375,802	156,053,458	10,372,305
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S	13,080,434	2,186,315	10,758,065	136,054
BORN IN U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S	10,596,575	1,423,257	9,127,519	45,798
BORN IN U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	1,494,673	70,020	895,993	528,661
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S	615,190	25,120	565,846	24,224
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S	12,410 194	3,895,544	8,454,740	59,910
FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN3/	11,475,884	3,080,374	8,335,600	59,910
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S	630,808	184,416	445,182	1,209
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	71,888	3,035	67,069	1,785
BIRTHPLACE NOT KNOWN OR NO RESPONSE 4/	6,792,050	-	-	6,792,050

1/ COUNTRY OF BIRTH IS CODED AS FOLLOWS:
BORN IN U.S. - BORN IN ONE OF THE 50 STATES,
BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - FOREIGN BORN OR BORN IN U.S. TERRITORY OR 'OUTLYING AREA' OF THE U.S.

2/ THIRD AND SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS.

3/ FIRST GENERATION.

4/ PERSONS WHO ANSWERED THE CPS MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE BUT FAILED TO ANSWER THE SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE.

- Data not available.

NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.

SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

TABLE 2. - PERCENT DISTRIBUTION - ETHNIC ORIGIN BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1/: NOVEMBER 1979

COUNTRY OF BIRTH	Total	HISPANIC	NONHISPANIC	NOT IDENTIFIABLE
Total	100.0%	5.6%	86.1%	8.3%
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.2/	100.0	2.6	91.4	6.1
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	100.0	16.7	82.2	1.0
BORN IN U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	100.0	13.4	86.1	.4
BORN IN U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	100.0	4.7	59.9	35.4
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.	100.0	4.1	92.0	3.9
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	100.0	31.4	68.1	.5
FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN3/	100.0	26.8	72.6	.5
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	100.0	29.2	70.6	.2
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	100.0	4.2	93.3	2.5
BIRTHPLACE NOT KNOWN OR NO RESPONSE 4/	100.0	-	-	100.0

1/ COUNTRY OF BIRTH IS CODED AS FOLLOWS:
BORN IN U.S. - BORN IN ONE OF THE 50 STATES.
BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - FOREIGN BORN OR BORN IN U.S. TERRITORY OR 'OUTLYING AREA' OF THE U.S.

2/ THIRD AND SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS.

3/ FIRST GENERATION.

4/ PERSONS WHO ANSWERED THE CPS MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE BUT FAILED TO ANSWER THE SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE.

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SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

TABLE 3. - PERCENT DISTRIBUTION - ETHNIC ORIGIN BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1/: NOVEMBER 1979

COUNTRY OF BIRTH	Total	HISPANIC	NONHISPANIC	NOT IDENTIFIA-BLE
Total..........................	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.2/....................	78.9	36.0	83.7	57.7
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S..................	6.0	18.0	5.8	.8
BORN IN U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S..................	4.9	11.7	4.9	.3
BORN IN U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN....	.7	.6	.5	2.9
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S..................	.3	.2	.3	.1
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.............	5.7	32.0	4.5	.3
FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN3/...........	5.3	25.3	4.5	.3
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.............	.3	1.5	.2	.0
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN.........................	.0	.0	.0	.0
BIRTHPLACE NOT KNOWN OR NO RESPONSE 4/.................	3.1	-	-	37.8

1/ COUNTRY OF BIRTH IS CODED AS FOLLOWS:
BORN IN U.S. - BORN IN ONE OF THE 50 STATES.
BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - FOREIGN BORN OR BORN IN U.S. TERRITORY OR 'OUTLYING AREA' OF THE U.S.

2/ THIRD AND SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS.

3/ FIRST GENERATION.

4/ PERSONS WHO ANSWERED THE CPS MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE BUT FAILED TO ANSWER THE SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE.

- Data not available.

NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.

SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

Language Usage by Hispanics and Non-Hispanics

The data on language usage in this analysis is based on respondents age 5 and over, since questions regarding language usage of younger age groups would not be valid for purposes of comparison.

The English language skills of those surveyed are addressed by two measures both of which are based on self reports of respondents--whether respondents speak English at home and whether those who speak a language other than English at home also speak English. The second measure allowed for refinement regarding the level of skill in English, ranging from "very well" to "with difficulty or not at all."

It appears that a much greater percentage of non-Hispanics than Hispanics age 5 and over speak English. It also appears that Hispanics are far more bilingual than non-Hispanics. However, although a greater percentage of non-Hispanics than Hispanics speak English, a significant majority of both groups use the English language. In addition, more than half the Hispanics compared to a small percentage of non-Hispanics are bilingual. Table 4 shows that 26.6 percent of Hispanics speak only English at home, while 94.2 percent of non-Hispanics do so. In addition, 51.9 percent of Hispanics and 4.9 percent of non-Hispanics age 5+ speak a language other than English but also speak English very well or well (i.e., are bilingual). A total of 78.5 percent of Hispanics either speak only English or speak another language but also speak English, compared to 99.1 percent of the non-Hispanics.

Another way of looking at the extent of Hispanic and non-Hispanic English usage is to determine what percentage of each group does not use the language. It appears that a greater percentage of Hispanics than non-Hispanics age 5+ are not skilled in English. Table 4 shows that 21.5 percent of Hispanics age 5+

TABLE 4. LANGUAGE FACILITY OF PERSONS AGE 5 AND OVER, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1/ AND ETHNIC ORIGIN: NOVEMBER 1979
(EXCLUDES SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE NONRESPONDENTS)

COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND ETHNIC ORIGIN	Total									
	Total	PERCENT	ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME		LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME					
			Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT	SPEAKS ENGLISH VERY WELL OR WELL		SPEAKS ENGLISH WITH DIFFICULTY OR NOT AT ALL	
							Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT
Total										
Total	194,221,262	100.0%	176,255,795	90.7%	17,965,467	9.3%	14,093,817	7.3%	3,871,651	2.0%
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S. 2/	157,208,350	100.0	153,281,477	97.5	3,926,874	2.5	3,768,434	2.4	158,439	.1
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	12,343,750	100.0	8,688,136	70.4	3,655,613	29.6	3,359,299	27.2	296,314	2.4
BORN IN U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	9,883,138	100.0	8,483,387	85.8	1,399,751	14.2	1,320,265	13.4	79,485	.8
BORN IN U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	1,320,272	100.0	1,278,056	96.8	42,216	3.2	35,068	2.7	7,148	.5
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.	570,825	100.0	525,894	92.1	44,931	7.9	36,750	6.4	8,181	1.4
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	12,237,738	100.0	3,605,570	29.5	8,632,168	70.5	5,356,824	43.8	3,275,344	26.8
FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN 3/	11,337,163	100.0	3,507,715	30.9	7,829,447	69.1	4,858,647	42.9	2,970,801	26.2
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	588,196	100.0	325,772	55.4	262,425	44.6	215,687	36.7	46,738	7.9
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	68,993	100.0	67,504	97.8	1,489	2.2	1,489	2.2	-	-

See footnotes at end of table.

LANGUAGE FACILITY OF PERSONS AGE 5 AND OVER,
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1/
AND ETHNIC ORIGIN: NOVEMBER 1979
(EXCLUDES SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE NONRESPONDENTS)-Continued

COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND ETHNIC ORIGIN	Total									
	Total	PERCENT	ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME		LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME					
			Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT	SPEAKS ENGLISH VERY WELL OR WELL		SPEAKS ENGLISH WITH DIFFICULTY OR NOT AT ALL	
							Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT
HISPANIC										
Total	10,586,396	100.0%	2,818,020	26.6%	7,768,376	73.4%	5,493,735	51.9%	2,274,641	21.5%
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S. 2/	3,638,150	100.0	1,864,343	51.2	1,773,807	48.8	1,678,277	46.1	95,530	2.6
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	1,733,171	100.0	212,283	12.2	1,520,888	87.8	1,283,881	74.1	237,007	13.7
BORN IN U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	1,174,496	100.0	455,513	38.8	718,983	61.2	652,288	55.5	66,694	5.7
BORN IN U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	53,438	100.0	50,032	93.6	3,407	6.4	3,407	6.4	-	-
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.	25,120	100.0	11,648	46.4	13,473	53.6	8,388	33.4	5,085	20.2
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	3,801,845	100.0	189,025	5.0	3,612,820	95.0	1,775,478	46.7	1,837,342	48.3
FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN3/	3,017,898	100.0	136,069	4.5	2,881,829	95.5	1,321,381	43.8	1,560,448	51.7
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	158,566	100.0	33,567	21.2	124,998	78.8	92,016	58.0	32,983	20.8
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	1,611	100.0	1,611	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-

See footnotes at end of table.

LANGUAGE FACILITY OF PERSONS AGE 5 AND OVER,
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1/
AND ETHNIC ORIGIN: NOVEMBER 1979
(EXCLUDES SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE NONRESPONDENTS)-Continued

COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND ETHNIC ORIGIN	Total									
	Total	PERCENT	ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME		LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME					
			Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT	SPEAKS ENGLISH VERY WELL OR WELL		SPEAKS ENGLISH WITH DIFFICULTY OR NOT AT ALL	
							Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT
NONHISPANIC										
Total	173,265,428	100.0%	163,214,252	94.2%	10,051,176	5.8%	8,474,494	4.9%	1,576,682	0.9%
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S. 2/	143,941,920	100.0	141,868,470	98.6	2,073,450	1.4	2,013,942	1.4	59,508	0
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	10,482,190	100.0	8,357,844	79.7	2,124,346	20.3	2,066,719	19.7	57,627	.5
BORN IN U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	8,666,451	100.0	7,990,831	92.2	675,620	7.8	664,158	7.7	11,462	.1
BORN IN U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	783,383	100.0	766,790	97.9	16,593	2.1	14,438	1.8	2,154	.3
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.	521,481	100.0	490,022	94.0	31,459	6.0	28,362	5.4	3,096	.6
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	8,375,983	100.0	3,385,191	40.4	4,990,793	59.6	3,561,714	42.5	1,429,079	17.1
FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN 3/	8,259,355	100.0	3,340,292	40.4	4,919,063	59.6	3,517,634	42.6	1,401,429	17.0
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	428,421	100.0	290,995	67.9	137,426	32.1	123,671	28.9	13,755	3.2
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	65,598	100.0	64,108	97.7	1,489	2.3	1,489	2.3	-	-

See footnotes at end of table.

LANGUAGE FACILITY OF PERSONS AGE 5 AND OVER,
BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND PARENTS' COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1/
AND ETHNIC ORIGIN: NOVEMBER 1979
(EXCLUDES SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE NONRESPONDENTS)-Continued

COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND ETHNIC ORIGIN	Total									
	Total	PERCENT	ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME		LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME					
			Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT	SPEAKS ENGLISH VERY WELL OR WELL		SPEAKS ENGLISH WITH DIFFICULTY OR NOT AT ALL	
							Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT
NOT IDENTIFIABLE										
Total	10,369,438	100.0%	10,223,523	98.6%	145,915	1.4%	125,587	1.2%	20,328	0.2%
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.2/	9,628,280	100.0	9,548,664	99.2	79,616	.8	76,216	.8	3,401	0
BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	128,389	100.0	118,010	91.9	10,379	8.1	8,698	6.8	1,681	1.3
BORN IN U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	42,191	100.0	37,043	87.8	5,148	12.2	3,819	9.1	1,329	3.1
BORN IN U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	483,450	100.0	461,234	95.4	22,216	4.6	17,222	3.6	4,994	1.0
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.	24,224	100.0	24,224	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	59,910	100.0	31,355	52.3	28,555	47.7	19,632	32.8	8,924	14.9
FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN3/	59,910	100.0	31,355	52.3	28,555	47.7	19,632	32.8	8,924	14.9
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN INSIDE U.S., ONE PARENT BORN OUTSIDE U.S.	1,209	100.0	1,209	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORN OUTSIDE U.S., BIRTHPLACE OF ONE OR BOTH PARENTS NOT KNOWN	1,785	100.0	1,785	100.0	-	-	-	-	-	-

1/ COUNTRY OF BIRTH IS CODED AS FOLLOWS:
BORN IN U.S. - BORN IN ONE OF THE 50 STATES,
BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - FOREIGN BORN OR BORN IN U.S. TERRITORY OR 'OUTLYING AREA' OF THE U.S.
2/ THIRD AND SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS.
3/ FIRST GENERATION.
- Data not available.
NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.
SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

speak English with difficulty or not at all, while 0.9 percent of non-Hispanics are so categorized.

It also appears that, overall, a much greater percentage of Hispanics than non-Hispanics age 5+ speak a language other than English: While 73.4 percent of the Hispanics speak a language other than English, only 5.8 percent of the non-Hispanics do so.

When Hispanic and non-Hispanic language responses are adjusted for differences in generations, it becomes clear that language usage is related to whether respondents are first generation or third generation (i.e., are foreign born or native born).

Among the first generation (foreign born, foreign parentage), non-Hispanics appear to have greater English language skills than Hispanics. This may be due, in part, to a variety of socio-economic factors associated with entering ethnic groups as well as the language policies of sending countries which encourage multiple language use. However, these hypotheses are not tested in this analysis. Table 4A shows that 4.5 percent of first generation Hispanics age 5+ speak only English at home, while 40.4 percent of first generation non-Hispanics do so. 43.8 percent of first generation Hispanics speak a language other than English but also speak English very well or well, while 42.6 percent of non-Hispanics do so. Thus, a total of 48.3 percent of first generation Hispanics speak English, while a total of 83.0 percent of non-Hispanics do so.

In contrast, the difference in overall English skill between third generation (i.e., native born, native parentage) Hispanics and non-Hispanics seems to be quite small: Nearly all third generation people speak English (a total of 97.3 percent of Hispanics and 100.0 percent of non-Hispanics). However, while most non-Hispanics in the third and successive generations use English exclusively, Hispanics do so to a lesser degree. This may, in part, be due to the

TABLE 4A. LANGUAGE FACILITY AMONG FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD AND SUCCEEDING GENERATION HISPANICS AND NONHISPANICS, AGE 5 AND OVER NOVEMBER 1979

	Total	PERCENT	ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME		LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME					
			Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT	SPEAKS ENGLISH VERY WELL OR WELL		SPEAKS ENGLISH WITH DIFFICULTY OR NOT AT ALL	
							Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT
HISPANIC										
THIRD AND SUCCEEDING GENERATION1/	3,638,150	100.0%	1,864,343	51.2%	1,773,807	48.8%	1,678,277	46.1%	95,530	2.6%
SECOND GENERATION2/	1,733,171	100.0	212,283	12.2	1,520,888	87.8	1,283,881	74.1	237,007	13.7
FIRST GENERATION3/	3,017,898	100.0	136,069	4.5	2,881,829	95.5	1,321,381	43.8	1,560,448	51.7
NONHISPANIC										
THIRD AND SUCCEEDING GENERATION1/	143,941,920	100.0	141,868,470	98.6	2,073,450	1.4	2,013,942	1.4	59,508	0
SECOND GENERATION2/	10,482,190	100.0	8,357,844	79.7	2,124,346	20.3	2,066,719	19.7	57,627	5
FIRST GENERATION3/	8,259,355	100.0	3,340,292	40.4	4,919,063	59.6	3,517,634	42.6	1,401,429	17.0

1/ BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN IN U.S.
2/ BORN IN U.S., BOTH PARENTS BORN OUTSIDE U.S.
3/ FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN
NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APPROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.
SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

probability that third generation Hispanics are fewer generations removed from country of origin than non-Hispanics. However, this hypothesis has not been tested in this analysis. Table 4A shows that 98.6 percent of non-Hispanics and 51.2 percent of Hispanics speak only English at home, while a much greater percentage of Hispanics (46.1 percent) than non-Hispanics (1.4 percent) speak English as well as another language.

Likewise, analysis of language usage by generation also shows that while a greater percentage of first generation Hispanics (51.7 percent) than non-Hispanics (17.0 percent) have difficulty with English, by the third generation the differences have almost disappeared. Table 4A shows that 2.6 percent of third generation Hispanics and less than 1 percent of non-Hispanics have difficulty with or cannot speak English.

The incidence of bilingualism is also related to generation of entry. It appears that Hispanics maintain their bilingual ability for more generations than non-Hispanics. As shown in table 4A, first generation non-Hispanics and Hispanics are almost equally bilingual (42.6 percent and 43.8 percent respectively). However, by the third generation, non-Hispanics are nearly monolingual in English (only 1.4 percent speak a language other than English), while third generation Hispanics are still quite bilingual (46.1 percent speak a language other than English and also speak English).

Additional Data on the First Generation

As noted earlier, first generation refers to those who are foreign born of foreign parentage. Persons identified as being in the first generation numbered 11.5 million. Among these, approximately 72.6 percent positively identified themselves as being of non-Hispanic origin and 26.8 percent of Hispanic origin. Not quite 1 percent did not specify an ethnic origin.

Because the data indicate that English language usage is lower and native (or other) language usage is higher for first generation entries than for those of the third and succeeding generations, special analyses were done on the first generation. Language usage was adjusted by year of entry in order to more fully explore the effect of recency of entry on language usage. Tables 5 and 6 display the results of this analysis.

The data indicate that first generation Hispanics age 5+ have been in the United States a shorter period of time than non-Hispanics (table 6). While 9.5 percent of first generation Hispanics entered the United States prior to 1950, 33.5 percent of first generation non-Hispanics entered during that period. In fact, more than half the Hispanics arrived after 1970, while 5.9 percent of the non-Hispanics arrived prior to 1970. Thus, not only are a greater percentage of non-Hispanics than Hispanics foreign born of foreign parents (i.e., first generation), but, further, these first generation Hispanics entered the United States later than the non-Hispanics.

As pointed out earlier, first generation non-Hispanics have greater English language ability than Hispanics. However, a nearly identical percentage of first generation Hispanics and non-Hispanics are bilingual (that is speak English as well as another language).

When English language usage by first generation people is adjusted for by year of arrival, it appears that a greater percentage of non-Hispanics than Hispanics speak English, regardless of year of entry. Likewise, first generation Hispanics are less skilled in English than non-Hispanics, regardless of year of entry. However, year of entry does affect the extent of bilingualism: a greater percentage of the most recent non-Hispanic entries (1975-79) are

E 5. LANGUAGE FACILITY OF FIRST GENERATION AMERICANS 1/ AGE 5 AND OVER,
BY ETHNIC ORIGIN AND YEAR OF ENTRY
NOVEMBER 1979

EAR OF ENTRY AND ETHNIC ORIGIN	Total									
	Total	PERCENT	ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME		LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME					
			Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT	SPEAKS ENGLISH VERY WELL OR WELL		SPEAKS ENGLISH WITH DIFFICULTY OR NOT AT ALL	
							Total	PERCENT	Total	PERCENT
Total										
Total	11,337,163	100.0%	3,507,715	30.9%	7,829,447	69.1%	4,858,647	42.9%	2,970,801	26.2%
1975 - 1979	2,404,789	100.0	400,656	16.7	2,004,133	83.3	901,372	37.5	1,102,761	45.9
1970 - 1974	1,891,501	100.0	314,201	16.6	1,577,300	83.4	920,201	48.6	657,099	34.7
1965 - 1969	1,436,213	100.0	301,860	21.0	1,134,354	79.0	742,571	51.7	391,783	27.3
1960 - 1964	986,006	100.0	274,448	27.8	711,558	72.2	502,041	50.9	209,517	21.2
1950 - 1959	1,514,032	100.0	504,468	33.3	1,009,564	66.7	764,928	50.5	244,636	16.2
BEFORE 1950	3,104,621	100.0	1,712,082	55.1	1,392,539	44.9	1,027,534	33.1	365,005	11.8
HISPANIC										
Total	3,017,898	100.0	136,069	4.5	2,881,829	95.5	1,321,381	43.8	1,560,448	51.7
1975 - 1979	764,180	100.0	22,925	3.0	741,256	97.0	224,452	29.4	516,804	67.6
1970 - 1974	747,978	100.0	23,573	3.2	724,405	96.8	297,824	39.8	426,581	57.0
1965 - 1969	568,466	100.0	12,880	2.3	555,586	97.7	291,317	51.2	264,268	46.5
1960 - 1964	351,971	100.0	19,751	5.6	332,221	94.4	202,635	57.6	129,585	36.8
1950 - 1959	293,083	100.0	28,360	9.7	264,723	90.3	159,047	54.3	105,676	36.1
BEFORE 1950	292,219	100.0	28,581	9.8	263,638	90.2	146,106	50.0	117,533	40.2
NONHISPANIC										
Total	8,259,355	100.0	3,340,292	40.4	4,919,063	59.6	3,517,634	42.6	1,401,429	17.0
1975 - 1979	1,627,786	100.0	370,020	22.7	1,257,766	77.3	676,920	41.6	580,846	35.7
1970 - 1974	1,138,770	100.0	287,673	25.3	851,098	74.7	620,580	54.5	230,518	20.2
1965 - 1969	852,841	100.0	285,128	33.4	567,713	66.6	441,984	51.8	125,729	14.7
1960 - 1964	630,308	100.0	252,764	40.1	377,543	59.9	297,612	47.2	79,932	12.7
1950 - 1959	1,219,262	100.0	476,108	39.0	743,154	61.0	604,195	49.6	138,959	11.4
BEFORE 1950	2,790,387	100.0	1,668,597	59.8	1,121,789	40.2	876,344	31.4	245,445	8.8
NOT IDENTIFIABLE										
Total	59,910	100.0	31,355	52.3	28,555	47.7	19,632	32.8	8,924	14.9
1975 - 1979	12,822	100.0	7,710	60.1	5,111	39.9	-	-	5,111	39.9
1970 - 1974	4,753	100.0	2,955	62.2	1,797	37.8	1,797	37.8	-	-
1965 - 1969	14,906	100.0	3,851	25.8	11,055	74.2	9,270	62.2	1,785	12.0
1960 - 1964	3,727	100.0	1,934	51.9	1,794	48.1	1,794	48.1	-	-
1950 - 1959	1,686	100.0	0	0	1,686	100.0	1,686	100.0	-	-
BEFORE 1950	22,015	100.0	14,904	67.7	7,111	32.3	5,084	23.1	2,027	9.2

1/ FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN.
- Data not available.
NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APPROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.
SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

TABLE 6. FIRST GENERATION AMERICANS 1/ BY YEAR OF ENTRY AND ETHNIC ORIGIN NOVEMBER 1979

YEAR OF ENTRY	Total	HISPANIC	NONHISPANIC	NOT IDENTIFIABLE
Total	11,475,884	3,080,374	8,335,600	59,910
1975 - 1979	2,542,826	826,657	1,703,347	12,822
1970 - 1974	1,891,501	747,978	1,138,770	4,753
1965 - 1969	1,436,213	568,466	852,841	14,906
1960 - 1964	986,006	351,971	630,308	3,727
1950 - 1959	1,514,032	293,083	1,219,262	1,686
BEFORE 1950	3,105,306	292,219	2,791,072	22,015

1/ FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN.
NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.
SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

- PERCENT DISTRIBUTION -
FIRST GENERATION AMERICANS 1/ BY YEAR OF ENTRY AND ETHNIC ORIGIN: NOVEMBER 1979

YEAR OF ENTRY	Total	HISPANIC	NONHISPANIC	NOT IDENTIFIABLE
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
1975 - 1979	22.2	26.8	20.4	21.4
1970 - 1974	16.5	24.3	13.7	7.9
1965 - 1969	12.5	18.5	10.2	24.9
1960 - 1964	8.6	11.4	7.6	6.2
1950 - 1959	13.2	9.5	14.6	2.8
BEFORE 1950	27.1	9.5	33.5	36.7

1/ FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN.
NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.
SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

- PERCENT DISTRIBUTION -
FIRST GENERATION AMERICANS 1/ BY YEAR OF ENTRY AND ETHNIC ORIGIN: NOVEMBER 1979

YEAR OF ENTRY	Total	HISPANIC	NONHISPANIC	NOT IDENTIFIABLE
Total	100.0%	26.8%	72.6%	0.5%
1975 - 1979	100.0	32.5	67.0	.5
1970 - 1974	100.0	39.5	60.2	.3
1965 - 1969	100.0	39.6	59.4	1.0
1960 - 1964	100.0	35.7	63.9	.4
1950 - 1959	100.0	19.4	80.5	.1
BEFORE 1950	100.0	9.4	89.9	.7

1/ FOREIGN BORN, BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN BORN.
NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APPROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.
SOURCE: NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS).

bilingual than Hispanics, while those who entered between 1950-59 12/ are almost equally bilingual. Year of entry also affects total language ability of both Hispanics and non-Hispanics: those who entered between 1950-59 have stronger English language skills than the most recent entries (1975-79).

It is possible that the language ability demonstrated by those entering between 1975-79 is more a reflection of language ability at time of entry than acquired language skills since the time of entry. If so, it could be that non-Hispanic persons come to the United States with greater English ability than Hispanics. However, there is no way of directly testing this hypothesis with the available data.

Table 5 illustrates language usage by year of entry. It shows that 9.7 percent of first generation Hispanics and 39.0 percent of the non-Hispanics age 5+ who arrived between 1950-59 speak only English at home. An additional 54.3 percent of the Hispanics and 49.6 percent of the non-Hispanics speak a language other than English but also speak English. A total of 64.0 percent of the Hispanics arriving between 1950-59 thus speak English compared to a total of 88.6 percent of the non-Hispanics arriving during the same period. During the most recent entry period (1975-79), 3.0 percent of the Hispanics and 22.7 percent of the non-Hispanics speak only English. In addition, approximately 29.4 percent of these latest Hispanic arrivals and 41.6 percent of the non-Hispanics speak a language other than English but also speak English. Thus, a total of 32.4 percent of the latest Hispanic arrivals speak English as compared to 64.3 percent of the latest non-Hispanics. Table 5 also shows that 36.1 percent of the Hispanics and 11.4 percent of the non-Hispanics who entered between 1950-59 are not skilled in English. 67.6 percent of Hispanics and 35.7 percent of non-Hispanics entering between 1975-79 are not skilled in English.

12/ We have elected not to compare first generation hispanics and non-hispanics who entered before 1950, since it is likely that non-Hispanics in this group, on the average, entered the United States before Hispanics.

Year of entry appears to have a slight effect on the first generation's use of a language other than English. A greater percentage of first generation Hispanics than non-Hispanics speak a language other than English, regardless of the year of entry. However, more than half of both first generation Hispanics and non-Hispanics in all but the earliest entry period speak a language other than English. Table 5 shows that 90.3 percent of first generation Hispanics and 61.0 percent of non-Hispanics who entered between 1950-59 continue to speak a language other than English. 97.0 percent of the latest (1975-79) Hispanic and 77.3 percent of the non-Hispanic entries speak a language other than English.

Year of entry does seem to be related to the extent of bilingualism. Hispanics and non-Hispanics who entered between 1950-59 are almost equally bilingual (54.3 percent to 49.6 percent respectively), while a greater percentage of the most recent (1975-79) non-Hispanics (41.6 percent) than Hispanics (29.4 percent) are bilingual (see table 5). Thus, a slight majority of those first generation Hispanics and almost half the non-Hispanics who have been in the United States since 1950-59 are bilingual. Of those who most recently entered, a majority of Hispanics appear to be monolingual in a language other than English (presumably Spanish), while non-Hispanics are more equally divided between bilingualism and monolingualism in either English or another language.

Areas for Further Analysis

There are many possible reasons for the differences in English language ability between Hispanics and non-Hispanics which are not addressed in the data analysis. The following is a discussion of possible reasons, some of which may deserve further study.

Social/cultural supports for using a native language are cited as a major factor that inhibits language assimilation. The proximity of Mexico to the

United States and the status of Puerto Rico as a U.S. territory have been cited as social and cultural supports for continued Spanish usage. It is argued that Hispanics may continue to feel national ties with their native countries because of the relatively easy access. In addition, frequent visits from either side of the border may be possible and may encourage the continued use of Spanish. Moreover, the continued influx of Hispanics from nearby countries may further encourage the use of Spanish because Hispanics in the United States may feel the need to communicate with newcomers of their ethnic group. It is also possible that new Hispanic entries may be joining family members in the United States, further increasing the motivation for continued Spanish use. In addition, Spanish may continue to be used for pragmatic reasons. For example, Hispanic social structure has been characterized as relying to a large degree on extended family relationships that span several generations. Communication between extended family members may require use of Spanish. Obtaining further information on the social/cultural structure of the Hispanic population and determining how it affects their language usage might clarify the role played by social and cultural supports. Such an analysis might include looking at the relationship between the age of Hispanics and their language ability; and the relationship between language use and family size or structure, including date of entry for members.

Another major factor affecting language assimilation is the entrants' dependence upon economic forces outside their own ethnic group. It is argued that in order for language assimilation to occur, there must be occupational interaction between Hispanics and non-Hispanics. The current status of the Cuban refugee entries of the 1960s has been cited as an example of successful economic adaptation or assimilation in the United States. Their success has been attributed to the fact that they were more highly educated, were of higher socio-economic status, and had greater English language ability at entry than most entering Hispanics. 13/ Generally, the economic status of the Hispanic population in the United States is lower than for the population as a whole. The data do not indicate whether language ability is related to occupation or education at the time of entry. An analysis of this relationship, as well as an investigation of the relationship between language usage and income might provide some answers regarding the role of economic forces in language usage.

A third major factor identified as inhibiting language assimilation occurs when speakers of a native language are geographically clustered, becoming spatially isolated from the rest of the population. It has been suggested that this has occurred with the Hispanic population, where most Hispanics are concentrated in a few geographic areas (including the Southwestern United States and New York). Our data indicate that large numbers of the people who identify as Hispanic are relatively recent arrivals to the United States and thus, speak Spanish. An analysis of the relationship between geographic data and language usage by Hispanics might help clarify the role of spatial isolation.

A fourth factor identified as a major inhibitor of language assimilation is the existence of legal sanctions that support the use of a native language. The bilingual education programs in the United States have been mentioned as one example of official support for continued use of Spanish. Our data do not address the effect of bilingual education on language use, nor does it address the relationship between education and language use. Such an analysis might provide

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13/ Diaz-Briquets, Sergio and Lisandro Perez. Cuba: The Demography of Revolution. Population Reference Bureau, Inc. Population Bulletin, vol. 36, no. 1 (April 1981): 28-29.

insights into the role of education in language usage by Hispanics at entry as well as the role of education in language use by Hispanics residing in the United States.

An additional factor that is not touched upon in the data analysis is what affect the bilingual language policies of sending countries have on language usage. The data findings are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that a greater percentage of non-Hispanics than Hispanics know English at the time of entry. However, this is untested. It might be helpful to further refine this information in order to determine what effect prior knowledge of the English language has on individual entrants as well as on the ethnic community.

Another factor that might affect these findings on language usage is the possibility of biases in the data. For example, people who speak Spanish may be more likely to identify as Hispanic than other people of Hispanic origin, skewing the results to show a greater percentage of non-English speaking Hispanics.

Finally, analysis of the differences in language abilities of Spanish-speaking subgroups might provide some direction for identifying problems that affect Hispanics' acquisition of language as well as insights into the factors that aid in their languuge acquisition.

SUMMARY

Concern has been expressed regarding the adequacy of linguistic assimilation by the Hispanic population in the United States. Past studies done in this area focus on small segments or specific Hispanic subgroups of the population; their findings regarding English language use and Spanish language maintenance do not necessarily agree nor do they reflect a national picture. However, it is generally agreed that although Hispanics are learning English, a large number continue to speak Spanish as well as English.

The analysis of the November 1979 Current Population Survey data suggested some tentative findings on language use in the United States. These findings, however, have limitations because there are many possible reasons for differences in language use between Hispanics and non-Hispanics that are not addressed by the analysis. These findings should be seen as a first step in determining the scope of and factors affecting Hispanic language use. The following is a summary of the findings:

- --A much greater percentage of all non-Hispanics than all Hispanics age 5+ speak English. However, a sizeable majority of both groups use the English language.
- —A greater percentage of non-Hispanics than Hispanics are third generation entries (native born of native parentage), while a greater percentage of Hispanics than non-Hispanics are first generation entries (foreign born of foreign parentage). There appears to be a relationship between language usage and generation of arrival.
  - --In the first generation, non-Hispanics largely speak either English exclusively or are bilingual, whereas Hispanics tend either to be bilingual or to exclusively speak their mother tongue.
  - --Nearly all third generation people--Hispanic and non-Hispanic--speak English. However, third generation

non-Hispanics are nearly monolingual in English, while Hispanics are still quite bilingual.

--First generation Hispanics have been in the United States a much shorter period of time than non-Hispanics and there appears to be some relationship between language usage and year of arrival in the United States by first generation people.

--When English language usage by first generation people is adjusted by year of arrival, a greater percentage of non-Hispanics than Hispanics age 5+ speak only English and a greater percentage of Hispanics than non-Hispanics speak a language other than English, regardless of year of entry.

--Both Hispanics and non-Hispanics who entered between 1950-59 have stronger English language skills than the most recent entries (1975-79).

--While those who entered between 1950-59 are nearly equally bilingual, the most recent (1975-79) non-Hispanic entries are more bilingual than Hispanics.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

The data presented in this paper come from the November 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The main purpose of the survey is to gather information about the U.S. labor force. It is from this survey, for example, that the Department of Labor arrives at its monthly estimates of the unemployment rate. In addition to the labor force information captured on the main survey, each month the Census Bureau administers a supplemental CPS questionnaire to collect additional information of special interest. Examples of subjects of past supplemental surveys include school enrollment, child care arrangements, participation in the school lunch program, immunization, and voting behavior. In November 1979 the Census Bureau collected supplemental information on language and country of origin. Data from the November 1979 CPS and the supplement are presented and discussed in later sections of this paper. In order to understand the limitations of the data, a discussion of survey methods is warranted.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AFFECTING SURVEY RESULTS

Sampling and the Problem of Sampling Error

It is important to note that the CPS is a sample survey, rather than a complete census of the U.S. population. The survey sample is constructed to represent the noninstitutionalized civilian population in the United States. The sample consists of about 76,700 households. Hence, each respondent represents several hundred people in the United States. The Census Bureau calculates weights for each respondent which, when summed across all respondents, equals benchmark totals for the U.S. population as a whole and specific subgroups defined by race, age, and sex.

As with any sample survey, the results of the CPS are subject to sampling error. Results from a sample survey are only estimates of "true" values that would be obtained by interviewing the entire population of interest. The error of estimate, or the degree to which a survey estimate is likely to fall within a certain range of the "true" value (i.e., confidence interval), is a function of the randomness of the sample, as well as the size of the sample relative to the size of the population from which the sample is drawn.

The Problem of Survey Error

In addition to sampling error, survey error constitutes a possible second source of error which may affect results. Such errors may arise from several sources. Two sources of such error--nonresponse and response error--will be mentioned here.

Nonresponse Error

There is a potential for nonresponse error to arise when persons who are selected for a survey either refuse to respond to the survey in total, or refuse to respond to specific items on the survey. Nonresponse may bias survey results if it occurs in a systematic, rather than random fashion. For example, a door to door survey on crime victimization will be biased by nonresponse error if persons who have been victims of crime have a lower likelihood of opening their door to strangers than do other persons.

Response Error

Response error may occur when a recorded response on a survey is incorrect, either due to the respondent, the interviewer or questionnaire (survey instrument), or interaction between them. For example, respondents may deliberately provide a wrong answer or misunderstand a question. Similarly, an interviewer may incorrectly code an answer on the questionnaire.

Response, like nonresponse, errors are particularly troublesome when they are of a systematic rather than random nature. For example, a tendency for persons to underreport certain types of income on surveys makes it difficult to estimate what is the "true" level of income in the population. Such systematic underreporting means that the survey estimate will be "biased" so as to consistently underestimate "true" income.

Survey Error on the November 1979 CPS

We have not analyzed fully the problems of nonresponse and response error on the November 1979 CPS. However, the problem is considered to be of sufficient magnitude and importance to warrant special mention.

Nonresponse Error

Of the total population represented by the November 1979 CPS data file (216,493,377), 3.1 percent answered the main CPS questionnaire but did not answer the supplement questionnaire on language and country of origin.

We discussed this problem of nonresponse with officials at the Census Bureau. Speaking to one official, we learned that about one half of the nonresponse to the supplement questionnaire was due to refusal on the part of the respondent; the remaining nonresponse was due to an administrative mishap in which the supplemental questionnaires for the State of Washington were lost. With the exception of the lost forms, the rate of nonresponse to the main and supplement questionnaires was similar to surveys conducted in other months.

The Census Bureau makes a substantial resource investment in selecting and contacting households for the CPS. Once a household has been selected for the sample, it remains in the sample for 8 months. Since the Census Bureau considers the main questionnaire, dealing with labor force information, to be more important than the supplement questionnaire, interviewers are less likely to push respondents to answer the supplement, particularly if it means possibly losing the person from the sample.

Nonresponse to the survey may have occurred for a variety of reasons. For example, some persons may not have responded to the supplement questionnaire simply because they did not wish to take the time. Others may have reacted to the supplement questionnaire's content, possibly finding it to be disturbing. For example, some people may object on ideological grounds to the government collecting such information. Others may refuse to answer such questions as a matter of self-interest.

Some researchers suggest that undocumented aliens may avoid reporting any official notice of their presence, for fear that sanctions will be enforced against them. One might expect such persons to have disproportionately refused to answer the main CPS questionnaire as well as the supplement. We have no evidence one way or the other to support or refute this premise but consider it a potentially serious bias in the data.

Response Error--The Problem of Defining and Measuring Ethnic Origin

There is not agreement on the definition of ethnicity. One definition that has been suggested is ". . . social diversity that is not related to age, social class, or sex. Hence, it includes diversity that arises because of race, religion, nationality, language, and even geography." Another suggested definition cited for ethnicity is ". . . any of the basic divisions or groups of mankind, as distinguished by customs, characteristics, language, etc." 14/

Problems often arise in defining ethnicity in meaningful and measurable terms. Questions attempting to measure ethnic origin have been asked on the

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14/ Harvard Encyclopedia of Ethnic Groups, p. 954.

main CPS questionnaire since November 1969. The CPS, like other surveys, collects such information from a self-reporting of ethnic identity. As in past months, CPS respondents were asked in November 1979 to identify their origin or descent from a flashcard which was either shown or read to them which contained the following possible responses:

German
Italian
Irish
French
Polish
Russian
English
Scottish
Welsh
Mexican American
Chicano
Mexican
Mexicano
Puerto Rican
Cuban
Cen. or So. Amer.
Other Spanish
Negro
Black
Another group not listed
Don't know

Difficulties arise in attempting to measure ethnicity by such means. CPS estimates of counts of persons by ethnic identity, or ethnic origin, have fluctuated dramatically over relatively short periods of time. For example, CPS estimates of the number of people who ethnically identified themselves as German totalled 19.96 million in November 1979, 25.7 million in March 1971, 25.5. million in March 1972, and 20.5 million in March 1973. Similarly, estimates of persons of Irish origin were 13.3 million, 16.3 million, 16.4 million, and 12.2 million during the same respective periods. 15/ Such variations are greater than what could be accounted for by immigration, natural increase, or sampling variation. Census officials agree that most of the variation in these estimates is most likely due to changes in the design or administration of the questionnaire.

15/ Harvard Encyclopedia of Ethnic Groups, p. 1035.

Other research conducted by the Census Bureau indicates that of persons who responded to both the March 1971 and March 1972 CPS, 35 percent were inconsistent in their response to the ethnic origin question in both years. This research found that

> . . . persons who reported they were of Puerto Rican, Negro, Mexican, Italian, Cuban, or Polish origin were among the most consistent, around 80 to 95 percent reporting the same origin in March 1972 that they reported in March 1971. Among the least consistent were persons who reported that they were of "other Spanish" origin, those who reported that they were of Central or South American origin, and those who reported that they did not know their ethnic origin. These groups were only around one-third to one-half consistent in reporting the same ethnic origin in both years. 16/

This demonstrates that people are not necessarily consistent in reporting their ethnic origin from one time to another. It is possible that responses may be highly sensitive to the manner in which questions on ethnic identity or origin are asked. Also, consistency in reporting ethnic origin may vary from one group to another.

Other measures, such as country of birth, or parent's country of birth, may be a more objective means of measuring ethnic origin than self identification with a particular ethnic group. However, such measures are only effective in identifying the ethnic origin of first generation (foreign born, foreign parentage) and second generation (native born, foreign parentage) individuals. Such methods do not allow for identifying the ethnic origin of third and succeeding generations. Measures such as language spoken in the home and language spoken in the home as a child may also give some indication of ethnic origin, but they suffer from obvious problems--such as not accounting for persons from English-speaking native countries, persons from different origins who speak a common

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16/ U.S. Bureau of the Census. Consistency of Reporting of Ethnic Origin in the Current Population Survey, Technical Paper No. 31. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1974.

language other than English, or other factors which may affect the rate of English language acquisition between various groups.

For purposes of this paper, we chose to identify persons by ethnic origin based upon their response to an ancestry question contained on the November 1979 CPS supplement questionnaire. No efforts were made to include language or country of birth or parents birth to define ethnic origin.

The ancestry question is open-ended, which allows the respondent to specify any ethnic origin he/she pleases. It also allows the respondent to specify a primary, as well as a secondary, ancestry group. This question was chosen over the ethnic identification question on the main CPS because of the greater range of response offered, as well as the fact that persons who only secondarily identify themselves as Hispanic may be identified. In the analysis, we only report a positive ethnic identification for persons who responded to the supplement and who, upon responding to the supplement, were able to positively identify an ethnic group to which they consider themselves to belong. Persons were coded as being of Hispanic origin if they indicated any of the ancestry codes listed below, for either a primary or secondary origin:

--Spain, Spaniard
—Hispano, Hispanic, Spanish, Spanish American
--Chicano, La Raza, Mexican, Mexicano, Mexico, Mexican-American, Mex
--Boricua, Boriqueno, Puerto Rican, Puertorriqueno
--Cuban, Cubano, Cuba
--Dominican Republic, Dominicano
--Argentinian, Argentino
--Bolivia, Boliviano, Bolivian
--Chile, Chileno, Chilean
--Colombia, Colombiano, Colombian
--Costa Rica, Costa Rican, Costarricense
--Ecuador, Ecuadoriano, Ecuadorean
--Honduras, Hondureno, Honduran
—Nicaragua, Nicaraquense, Nicaraguan
--Panama, Panemeno, Panamanian
--Paraguay, Paraguayo, Paraguayan
--Peru, Peruano, Peruvian
--El Salvador, Salvadoreno, Salvadorean, Salvadoran
--Uruguay, Uruguayo, Uruguayan

--Venezuela, Venezolano, Venezuelan
--Centroamericano, Central American
--Latin, Latin American, Latino, Latinoamericano, South American

Persons were coded as being non-Hispanic if they positively identified a primary or secondary ancestry code other than those listed above. Persons were coded as not identifiable if they failed to positively identify an ethnic origin (i.e., no entry, refused, or ancestry unknown).

The coding scheme mentioned above accounted for 12,163,510 (5.6 percent) Hispanics, 186,367,873 (86.1 percent) non-Hispanics, 6,792,050 (3.1 percent) who did not answer the CPS supplement, and 11,169,945 (5.2 percent) who otherwise failed to positively identify an ethnic origin (see Table A). Hence, 17,961,995 (8.3 percent) of the population could not be positively identified by ethnic origin; this group, incidentally, is greater than that which positively identify themselves as being of Hispanic origin.

TABLE A.

ETHNIC IDENTITY ON MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE
BY ETHNIC IDENTITY ON SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

ETHNIC IDENTITY - SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE	Total	ETHNIC IDENTITY - MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE		
		HISPANIC	NONHISPANIC	NOT IDENTIFIABLE
Total	216,493,377	11,577,646	196,042,256	8,873,476
HISPANIC	12,163,510	10,321,046	1,513,328	329,136
NONHISPANIC	186,367,873	804,939	179,821,291	5,741,643
NO ENTRY	11,169,945	75,334	8,841,618	2,252,993
MISSING DATA	6,792,050	376,327	5,866,020	549,703

NOTE TABLE PREPARED BY CRS
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20% CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY

Internal inconsistencies appear in the data when we examine joint responses to the ethnic origin question on the main CPS questionnaire and the ancestry question on the supplement questionnaire. The ancestry question on the supplement identifies more persons as being of Hispanic origin (12,163,510) than does the ethnic question on the main questionnaire (11,577,646), even though fewer people responded to the supplement (see Table A). Perhaps more importantly, responses are not consistent between the two questions. For example, 804,939 people who positively identified themselves as Hispanic on the main questionnaire positively identified themselves as being non-Hispanic on the supplement. In other words, 7.8 percent of the persons who identified themselves as Hispanic on the main questionnaire, positively identified themselves as non-Hispanic on the supplement questionnaire. Similarly, 1,513,328 people who positively identified themselves as non-Hispanic on the main questionnaire, positively identified themselves as Hispanic on the supplement--these people account for 12.4 percent of the people who positively identified themselves as Hispanic on the supplement. Part of the switch from non-Hispanic on the main questionnaire to Hispanic on the supplement may be due to the inclusion of the secondary ancestry group question on the supplement.

Other questions arise when langauge spoken in the home is examined. For example, there are 1,066,017 persons age 5 and over who responded that they speak Spanish in the home, although they did not positively identify themselves as Hispanic on the supplement (see Table B).

TABLE B.

LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME
FOR PERSONS AGE 5 AND OVER,
BY ETHNIC IDENTITY ON SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
NOVEMBER 1979 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

ETHNIC IDENTITY - SUPPLEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE	Total	ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN AT HOME	SPANISH SPOKEN AT HOME	OTHER FOREIGN LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME
Total	200,712,480	176,255,795	8,762,397	9,203,070
HISPANIC	10,586,396	2,818,020	7,696,380	71,996
NONHISPANIC	173,265,428	163,214,252	989,911	9,061,265
NO ENTRY	10,369,438	10,223,523	76,106	69,809
MISSING DATA	6,491,218	-	-	-

- Data not available.
NOTE: TABLE PREPARED BY CRS.
FIGURES ARE BASED UPON THE RESIDENT NONINSTITUTIONALIZED CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO WERE NOT LIVING IN MILITARY BARRACKS.
FIGURES ARE SUBJECT TO SAMPLING ERROR. CELL COUNTS GREATER THAN 75,000 HAVE APROXIMATELY A 95% CHANCE OF BEING ACCURATE WITHIN 20%. CELLS WITH LOWER COUNTS WILL HAVE LESS ACCURACY.

A Final Note--Interpreting the Data

These apparent inconsistencies in the data indicate that the identification of persons by ethnic group in large part depends upon how the concept of ethnic origin is operationally defined. We caution the reader to consider these problems when interpreting the data. Specifically, the reader should note that the concept of ethnic identity is not easily defined or measured. When a person is asked to indicate his/her ethnic identity, the response may vary considerably depending upon how the question is asked.

Further, some people may systematically choose not to answer official surveys or to respond to questions of ethnic identification. Certain groups may systematically alter their self-reported ethnic identity as a reflection of contemporary trends. During certain periods, certain groups may outwardly express or repress their ethnic identity. For example, during World War II, one might have expected many Americans of German ethnic origin to have outwardly downplayed the fact, for fear of retribution. Similarly, one might expect illegal immigrants and undocumented aliens to report an ethnic origin different from their "true" origin. Persons who are more "ethnically active," as characterized by membership in ethnic organizations, or maintenance of ethnic customs, may be more likely to self-identify with an ethnic group in response to a questionnaire item than persons who have a strong desire to "assimilate" or have otherwise lost contact with other members of common ethnic origin. The urge to assimilate may be greater for persons of groups in which ethnic identity is viewed as a handicap.

Further biases may be introduced if people who speak Spanish are more likely to identify themselves as Hispanic, than other persons of Hispanic origin who do not speak Spanish.

Also, one might expect ethnic identity to vary systematically with the number of generations the person is removed from the country of origin. With successive generations, ethnic origin may become exceedingly more difficult to identify as knowledge of one's ancestry is lost, and intermarriage between persons of different ethnic origins over successive generations makes identification with a particular ethnic group increasingly less likely. Geographic propinquity, and economic and social interaction with members of one's own ethnic groups may also affect ethnic identification.

The reliability of estimates is based on the presumption that the sample was randomly drawn from the population of interest. The size of the CPS sample is sufficiently large so that there is approximately a 95 percent chance that a table value representing 75,000 (weighted) persons will be accurate within 20 percent. In other words, the "true" population value will fall within the range of 60,000 to 90,000 95 percent of the time, for a table value representing 75,000 people. Table values representing more persons will generally be more accurate, and values representing fewer persons less accurate. As a general rule of thumb, caution should be exercised in interpreting table values representing fewer than 75,000 persons.

Because of the problems of nonresponse and response errors cited above, caution should be exercised in interpreting the data presented in the tables. The data should be interpreted in terms of relative trends and differences rather than absolute magnitudes. For example, it would be better to say: " . . . approximately 51.9 percent of persons age 5 and over who identify themselves as Hispanic are bilingual," than to say: " . . . 5,493,735 Hispanics age 5 and over in the United States are bilingual."

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THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE PUBLIC COFFERS AND STANDARD OF LIVING

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on Immigration and Refugee Policy

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A key element in a rational immigration policy must be an assessment of the economic effects of immigrants upon natives. In this testimony I argue that, contrary to common belief, immigrants put much more into the public coffers in taxes than they take out in welfare services. They also are not a drain on natives by way of new capital needed for hospitals and schools and the like, because building for those institutions is financed largely through bonds, and immigrants pay for past building as well as current and future building through the debt service and their taxes. And their positive effect on productivity surely outweighs their negative effect through production capital dilution in a short span of time. Taken as a whole, calculations show that immigrants are a great bargain for natives.

I'll start with the welfare and taxes issue.

In 1976 the Census Bureau surveyed 156,000 households (including about 15,000 immigrant families) to learn about 1975 family income and welfare services. From this sample I constructed a picture of lifetime economic behavior by assuming that the information on immigrants who had been here, say, two years as of 1976 describes the representative family after two years, those here ten years in 1976 stand for the tenth year in the U.S. of a representative family, and so on.

The services that catch the public eye are public welfare and supplemental security, unemployment compensation, aid to dependent children, and food stamps. The average native family received $498 from these programs in 1975. The average for immigrant families that arrived between 1950 and 1974 was $548. Not much difference there.

Retirement programs bulk larger. Native families received on average $735 for Social Security, $167 for Medicare, and $20 for Medicaid, totaling $922. Immigrant families received $92 during the first five years in the U.S., $227 the second five years, $435 the third five years, and $520 the fourth and fifth five-year periods. The difference in favor of natives is large. Immigrants get less Social Security and Medicare simply because of age composition. Those coming to the U.S. tend to be young and strong, just as always with immigrants everywhere. This is why human groups since the beginning of history have welcomed additional people in the prime working ages.

Schooling immigrant children during a family's first five years costs slightly less than the $859 for the average native family, because immigrants come before family completion. After that, expenditures on immigrants are higher, rising from $1068 to $1237 during the next 15 years. (The difference is not because immigrants have many children, but because the average native family is older, with many children no longer in school.)

Summing, the average immigrant family receives $1404 in welfare services in years 1-5, $1941 years 6-10, $2247 in the years 11-15, and $2279 in years 16-25. Natives average $2279, considerably more than immigrants in their early U.S. years. And the early years are more relevant because rational policy decisions weigh the far future less heavily than the near future.

But what about Social Security when immigrants age? The answer depends, not on entitlements or legal obligations, but on the flow of real resources from workers to retirees. Retired immigrants, children support them through their taxes, just as with natives. Immigrants bestow a one-time windfall benefit on natives. This is as if the parents of some of natives die immediately upon retirement, or feed their Social Security checks to goats.

If immigrants pay relatively little in taxes, they could still burden natives even with less welfare services for immigrants than for natives. We lack direct information on taxes paid, but from data on family earnings we can estimate reasonably.

Within 3-5 years after entry, immigrant family earnings reach and pass those of the average native family, due to the age compositions of native and immigrant families. The average native family paid $3008 in taxes in 1975. In comparison immigrant families here 6-10 years paid $3359, those here 11-15 years paid $3564, and those here 16-25 years paid $3592, substantial differences benefitting natives.

Assuming 20% of taxes finance activities that are little affected by population size (for example, maintaining the Armed Forces, and Statue of Liberty) and consolidating the data on services used and taxes paid, shows substantial differences in favor of natives; an average of $1354 yearly for the years 1-5, and $1329, $1535, and $1353 for years 6-10, 11-15, and 16-25 respectively. These are the amounts that each year natives are enriched through the public coffers for each additional immigrant family. Evaluating the stream of differences as one would a dam or and harbor, the present value of an immigrant family discounted at 3% (inflation adjusted) was $20,600 in 1975 dollars, almost two years' average earnings for a native family, at 6% the present value is $15,800, and at $12,400 at 9%.

Immigrants affect the standard of living of natives, through other channels too, and not all immigrant groups alike. For example, the Federal government pays $1000 per person to the resettlement organizations to cover overhead and start-up money for the refugees. This plus such costs aspecial refugee schooling would be deducted from the above present-value calculation for the average immigrant family. But these deductions would not likely make the calculation negative.

For illegals the adjustment goes the other way, because illegals get little in welfare services due to their status. David North and

Marion Houstoun found these proportions of illegals using services: medical, 27%; unemployment insurance, 4%; food stamps, 1%; welfare payments, 1%; child schooling, 4%. And practically no illegals receive Social Security, the costliest service of all, though 77% of illegal workers paid Social Security taxes and 73% had federal income tax withheld.

Immigrants can harm natives through capital dilution, that is, Malthusian diminishing returns due to more workers with the same capital. If the private sector were like the government sector--where workers' pay is assumed equal to the full value of what they produce, with nothing left for the owner of the capital--then capital dilution would indeed lower average native income. But in the private sector additional workers imply higher earnings by owners about equal to the loss of earnings by other workers, a tradeoff leaving native per capita income unchanged. And the small number of immigrants who work for the government--about 8%--affects this conclusion little.

Yet "workers" suffer as "capitalists" gain. To the extent that the classes are separate, there is a transfer from workers' pockets to owners' pockets. But much of our private capital is owned indirectly by "workers" through pension funds, and by way of the taxes paid on interest and dividends. Hence the loss to "worker" class is unclear.

As to special groups of workers, and especially low income earners, the negative effect is probably less than commonly thought and maybe non-existent. Nowadays immigrants arrive with considerable education and skills and enter a wide variety of occupations, thereby hurting no occupation or income level much even in the short run. (In the longer run, occupations on average benefit from additional jobs created by the purchase of immigrants, to about the same extent that immigrants take existing jobs within the occupations. That is, immigrants make jobs as well as take jobs.)

Regarding the public capital used by immigrants: We must worry only about the additional capital outlays needed to equip immigrants--the extra schoolrooms, hospital beds, fire houses, and the like. Not relevant is the use of public goods not affecting natives' use or pocketbooks--looking at the Washington Monument, or riding on a lightly-used interstate highway. Luckily we are spared difficult conceptual problems of valuing existing capital because we are nearly on a pay-as-you-go basis with respect to capital expenditures; the debt service on past public borrowings roughly equals outlays on new capital. So through taxes, immigrants pay enough "rent" on the public facilities so that natives feel no extra burden.

Lastly, the likely most important long run effect of immigrants: in the The impact of the additional workers and consumers upon productivity is likely to dwarf all else after a few years in the country. Some productivity increase arises from immi-grants working in industries and laboratories that are at the forefront of world technique. We benefit along with others from the contribution to world productivity that immigrants would not be able to make in their home countries. Other increases in productivity--about which we have more solid evidence--come from increased production in particular industries through learning by doing and other gains from larger industry scale. I built these productivity benefits into a macromodel along with the other factors mentioned above, and the calculations indicate very large increments to natives' incomes.

In sum, immigrants benefit natives through the public coffers by using less than their share of services and paying more than their share of taxes. They cover the additional public capital needed on their account through the debt service on past investments. In the long run, lower-paid workers will not suffer from the new immigrants because immigrants' occupations and educations cover the income spectrum. But some native workers suffer from short run dislocation, just as imports of goods cause temporary dislocation to some native workers; the same general-welfare argument applies as for free trade, but it is cold comfort to the dislocated persons. Other than this inequity, immigrants seem an excellent bargain in economic terms.

D/14